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This study examined judicial influence on academic decision-making by 
identifying factors in the tenure process that have induced courts to rule against higher 
education institutions in litigation stemming from tenure denials.  Many interdisciplinary 
legal and educational studies have been conducted pertaining to tenure related litigation 
using qualitative, quantitative, and legal research methodologies.  Empirical studies have 
been directed at varied issues, such as the peer review process; specific claims, such as 
discrimination; types of institutions; or time periods.  Much of this scholarship has noted 
the importance of judicial deference to decisions made in academia.  Unique to this study 
was the application of dual conceptual frameworks of shared governance and judicial 
deference as to decisions made in the academic tenure denial process.  The study was also 
unique in that it was limited to tenure litigation cases in which institutions did not wholly 
prevail.  
Included in the study were published judicial opinions from the period of 1972 to 
2011 from the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Courts of Appeal, and states’ highest appellate 
courts.  The study sought to determine first, the policies and procedures employed in 
public and private colleges and universities that have contributed to federal and state 
appellate courts’ unfavorable rulings against institutions in tenure denial litigation; 
second, the remedies granted to faculty plaintiffs who prevail in tenure denial litigation; 
and finally, the steps that colleges and universities can take to minimize and mitigate 
tenure denial litigation.   
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Complementary legal and qualitative research methods yielded evidence that 
courts were highly deferential to academic decision-making and that courts ruled against 
institutions’ tenure decisions when the decisions were contrary to law.  Courts granted 
legal and equitable remedies when institutions infringed upon a professor’s rights, 
discriminated against a professor, or breached a contract with a professor.  Based on the 
analysis of case law, this study proposed steps that institutions could take to avoid or 
mitigate tenure denial litigation.  By gaining a better understanding of potential flaws in 
the tenure process and why courts have substituted judicial decisions for those of 
institutional decisions, this study contributes to our understanding as to how to decrease 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Background and Context 
“Tenure is the defining characteristic of American higher education and the most 
distinctive part of working in the higher education setting” (White, 2010).  The term 
tenure exceeds strict definition, as its parameters must be described broadly enough to 
encompass institutional differences (Poskanzer, 2002).  In general, a grant of tenure is a 
contractual right of employment that is given to faculty members, with dismissal only for 
cause (Olswang, 2006). 
Based on a collective set of academic and legal principles, academic tenure has 
evolved concurrent with the evolution of American higher education and the academic 
profession; therefore, to fully comprehend academic tenure requires an examination of 
numerous attendant issues.  Educational literature discussing tenure frequently references 
both educational and legal influences and their significant impact on administrative and 
policy choices.  Legal literature, which customarily includes analyses of the courts’ 
impact on an issue, commonly integrates into discussions of tenure an acknowledgement 
of the historical roots of academic freedom, higher education, and the privileged status of 
academia in the eyes of the courts.  This intertwining of higher education and legal 
principles is fundamental to the complexity of academic tenure.   
Widely misunderstood and heavily debated, tenure is a distinctive aspect of higher 
education employment (Finkin, 1996; Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  Perceived by some 
as a guarantee of lifetime employment that comes with little or no accountability for 
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performance or behavior, tenure is heralded by others for its role in protecting job 
security and academic freedom (Poskanzer, 2002; White, 2010).  While some claim it is 
ineffective and outdated in today’s segmented institutions, others claim it is essential to 
maintaining traditional values of higher education—most importantly, the unimpeded 
search for truth (Alexander & Alexander, 2011; Chait, 2002a; Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  
Varied viewpoints of tenure’s value may be influenced at least in part by one’s role as a 
faculty member, administrator, or member of the public (Leap, 1995).   
Even among faculty members, tenure’s purposes and usefulness are debated.  The 
most significant argument for tenure—propounded by the American Association of 
University Professors (AAUP) and many faculty members—is its protection of academic 
freedom.  Not all faculty members are proponents of tenure, however.  Some believe that 
a tenure system reinforces the status quo in academia and thus may harm academic 
freedom.  Such doctrinal orthodoxy may be at least partly to blame for an enterprise that 
has been very slow to change (Greenburg, 2012; Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).   
 Debates about tenure and academic freedom are linked to the enduring connection 
between higher education institutions and society.  Carrying the responsibility of 
“preserving and expanding intellectual freedom and leading society in the efficient 
pursuit of knowledge” (Alexander & Alexander, 2011, p. ix), colleges and universities 
have been looked to for social and economic stability.  Rhodes (2001) described a 
coexistent “social compact” in which society provides financial support to the university, 
grants the university “a remarkable degree of autonomy,” and in exchange, “the 
university uses its resources and its freedom to serve the larger public interest” (p. 215).   
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Autonomy granted to the higher education community also has a counterpart: 
accountability.  Throughout the history and development of American higher education, 
institutions have been accountable to and influenced by people outside of the 
organization.  Accountability often reflects societal views, with the requisites flowing 
from the source of external funding, externalities that require accountability measures 
from academe, and mutual responsibilities and reciprocal pressures within and between 
organizations (Geiger, 2011; Schmidtlein & Berdahl, 2011).  The federal government 
might impose antidiscrimination measures in student admissions or faculty hiring 
procedures.  Research funding may dictate restrictions on human and animal subjects.  
Financial hardship may result in a state legislature’s closer look at institutional roles and 
the associated costs and effectiveness of programs (Schmidtlein & Berdahl, 2011). 
Another significant area of accountability arises from the influence of legalism on 
the academy.  Those who work in higher education must understand and implement a 
morass of laws and regulations that influence almost every aspect of the institution 
(Alexander & Alexander, 2011; Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Poskanzer, 2002).  In 1978, 
Chamberlain considered the growing legalism on campus the most significant 
development in higher education.  Decades later, scholars are ever aware of the expanded 
role of law on campus and the enormous impact it has on the work of colleges and 
universities (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Olivas and Baez, 2011; Poskanzer, 2002).  Gajda 
(2009) asserted that the growing “legalization” of academia is a direct threat to academic 
freedom (p. 234).   
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Altbach (2011a) explained that “[t]he legal system has had a significant influence 
on the academic profession in the past several decades” (p. 237).  An aspect of legalism, 
the growing resort to the courts for resolving campus disputes raises particular concerns.  
Mirroring a society that has become more litigious, so too has the campus become more 
litigious as students sue institutions over grades, faculty members sue peers for 
defamation from a negative scholarly review, and faculty sue mentors for bad advice.  
Prior to the 1970s, few cases of litigation involved colleges and universities (Kaplin & 
Lee, 2006).  Since the 1972, when Title VII and the Equal Pay Act were amended, there 
have been more than 300 federal decisions on such cases involving college faculty 
(LaNoue & Lee, 1987, p. 20).  In the mid-1990s, the number of legal claims involving 
higher education tripled within the span of five years (Gajda, 2009).  Contributing to the 
rise in litigation are factors such as universities’ handling of civil unrest, the provision in 
federal and state civil rights statutes for new remedies for discrimination, and 
developments in constitutional law recognizing broader rights to free speech and due 
process.  Also influencing the willingness of the academic community to bring suit is the 
increased fragmentation of the profession, a lack of a sense of community, and the 
increased role of the commercialization of the academy (Gajda, 2009). The 
commercialization of research endeavors, for example, has been criticized for the 
conflicts of interests that arise in an atmosphere of competition and consumerism, where 
education and research are viewed as products (Washburn, 2005).      
Many in the higher education community view litigation as interrupting the 
workings of the campus, eroding administrative and faculty autonomy, and costing the 
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institution too much in terms of money, talent, and energy.  Instead of being able to focus 
on the primary mission of teaching and scholarship, institutions must focus on protecting 
themselves from lawsuits.   
Notwithstanding such legitimate concerns, the law’s effect can also be seen as 
positive.  The role of law on campus might serve to make working environments safer 
and personnel policies fairer.  Thus, to judge the law’s full effect on a campus 
necessitates the realization that the law can both negatively and positively impact a 
campus environment and freedom of thought (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Poskanzer, 2002; 
Wright, 1985). 
The volume of federal litigation pertaining to faculty has escalated since 1972 
(Leap, 1995), though a recent study indicates that faculty may account for a declining 
share of those who file lawsuits (Helms & Jorgensen, 2009).  Frequently litigated are 
faculty employment disputes, which present an increasing concern to colleges and 
universities (Hendrickson, 1999).  Lawsuits against peer review committees, department 
heads, deans, and other administrators who make tenure, promotion, or retention 
decisions have risen (Curkovic, 2000; Leap, 1995).  While very few tenure denial 
lawsuits were filed in the 1970s, the 1980s saw a gradual increase with a continued 
upward trend into the 1990s (Franke, 2001; Hamill, 2003).  From the years 1974 to 2000, 
the number of published tenure denial decisions progressively increased with a total of 70 
published tenure denial decisions being reported in that time span (Hamill, 2003).  
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Statement of the Problem 
Equitable employment decisions are ideally reserved for the purview of the 
institution and its faculty, but the parameters are increasingly being imposed by the courts 
(Leap, 1995).  Difficult decisions to deny tenure, promotion, or retention to a faculty 
member hold substantial potential for legal challenges for colleges and universities 
(Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  Despite the ongoing debates about 
tenure, it still maintains its coveted status.  A denial of tenured status to an applicant can 
be very traumatic for a faculty member.  A negative tenure decision can interrupt a 
faculty career; sometimes a career can be completely ruined (Leap, 1995; Toma, 2011).  
As a result of such possible consequences, “[t]enure denials are among the administrative 
actions most likely to precipitate a lawsuit between a faculty member and his or her 
institution” (Poskanzer, 2002, p. 151).  
Tenure denial litigation is costly for both individuals and institutions (Franke, 
2000; Leap, 1995).  As is true with other types of litigation, the financial, emotional, and 
reputational burdens resulting from tenure litigation can be considerable (Kaplin & Lee, 
2006; Leap, 1995; Toma, 2011).  Traditionally deferential to academia, courts have 
usually sided with institutional autonomy and have been reluctant to interfere with 
matters of academic concern (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995; Toma, 2011).  Thus, few 
faculty have prevailed on the merits of discrimination claims, which are often the basis of 
tenure disputes (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; LaNoue & Lee, 1987).  While deference may be the 
norm, recent court opinions indicate that higher education institutions are not immune 
from the courts’ collective purview, particularly as to the requirements of federal 
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antidiscrimination legislation.  Courts are showing a greater willingness to insert their 
decisions into matters of academia.  In addition to emotional, financial, and reputational 
harms that result from litigation, the courts’ infusion of decision-making in place of the 
decisions of the institution exacts a toll on institutional decision-making and autonomy 
(Gajda, 2009; Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  Yet even when a court 
finds that an institution has acted in a discriminatory manner, fashioning an appropriate 
remedy is difficult (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995).   
Although employment related litigation in higher education has become common 
and can exact a great toll on institutional autonomy, faculty members, administrators, and 
relationships, most of the individuals who share in the governance of higher education 
have little training in preparation for mitigating or dealing with litigation and its 
ramifications.  As disciplinary specialists, faculty members who serve on peer review 
committees or who rise to administrative ranks typically gain training on the job.  
Employees who are trained as administrators are also not likely to have extensive legal 
preparation.  Administrators might hear of cases that receive popular attention, but 
knowledge of the occasional case does little to inform them of the causes, circumstances, 
or outcomes of employment litigation and how those factors may influence legal and 
policy choices.   
The equitable treatment of faculty in employment decisions significantly impacts 
the welfare of an institution (Leap, 1995).  Colleges and universities attract students, 
scholars, and funding based on the reputation of the faculty.  Learning what constitutes 
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the best faculty employment practices, particularly as to tenure policies and procedures, 
could help strengthen a campus and protect academic freedom. 
Many studies have previously looked at tenure and related issues, analyzing 
judicial law either as background, data, or both in order to make recommendations for 
higher education.  Given that colleges and universities typically prevail in employment 
litigation, most of the cases analyzed in previous studies concern institutional policies 
and procedures that were not found problematic to the extent that a remedy was granted 
to the faculty plaintiff.  Lacking in the data is a focus on cases for which the defendant 
institution did not wholly prevail.  A thorough analysis of cases in which the tenure 
process has broken down is needed in order to illuminate those policies and procedures 
that courts have found to be particularly egregious, such that it was necessary to fashion a 
remedy for the faculty plaintiff.  This research seeks to fill that void and to add to the 
literature in a meaningful way.   
Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of this study was to examine judicial influence on academic 
decision-making by identifying factors in the tenure process that have induced courts to 
rule against higher education institutions in litigation stemming from tenure denials.  By 
gaining a better understanding of why courts have inserted judicial decisions in place of 
institutional decisions in tenure related litigation, this study aimed to identify potential 
flaws in the tenure process, decrease institutions’ exposure to tenure decisions that may 




This study addressed the following questions:   
1. What policies and procedures employed by public and private colleges and 
universities have contributed to federal and state appellate courts’ unfavorable 
rulings against institutions in tenure denial litigation between the years 1972 
and 2011? 
2. What remedies have been granted to faculty who win tenure denial suits? 
3. What steps might colleges and universities take in the tenure process to 
minimize tenure denial litigation the possibility of an unfavorable decision in 
a tenure denial lawsuit? 
Conceptual Framework 
 Reflecting the interdisciplinary interests of this study, dual conceptual lenses of 
governance theory and the doctrine of judicial deference were considered.  In higher 
education, governance reflects a multilayered system of decision-making (Mason, 1972).  
Judicial deference is broadly linked with the concept of judicial abstention, which applies 
to judicial consideration of actions taken by agencies with specialized knowledge (Cohen 
& Spitzer, 1995-1996). 
Governance Theory    
Higher education governance theory provides a conceptual lens through which a 
multilayered decision-making process can be viewed (Mason, 1972).  The American 
Association of University Professors’ (AAUP) (2006c) 1966 Statement on Government of 
Colleges and Universities adopted the basic principle of shared authority by three 
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components that have a necessary interdependence for decision-making in the university:  
the board of trustees, the administration, and the faculty.  Basic principles included in the 
statement indicate that each component may have input on university decisions, and that 
different kinds of decisions require varying weights of input, depending on the decision 
being made.  Accordingly, in some situations, the administration will assume the 
initiative and will consult faculty at a later stage; in other situations, the initiative will be 
driven by the faculty, who will later seek the endorsement of the president and the 
trustees.  Consulting among the groups further aligns administrative decisions with 
faculty decisions in order to create a more unified whole (Kaplan, 2004; Mason, 1972). 
Governance theory assigns to the professoriate decisions that require professional 
expertise and judgment (Mason, 1972).  Faculty are assigned primary responsibility—
though the responsibility is shared with administration—for decisions as to curriculum; 
instructional subject matter and methods; faculty status, such as appointments, 
promotion, the granting of tenure, and dismissal; and aspects of student life that are 
linked to the educational process.  Effective planning and budgeting as well as resource 
allocation involve the input of the board and the administration.  Faculty status 
determinations, which are usually based on faculty recommendations, require joint effort 
in staff selection, promotion, the granting of tenure, and dismissal (AAUP, 2006c).   
Doctrine of Judicial Deference   
 The doctrine of judicial deference was also considered for this study in relation to 
academic decisions.  Pursuant to this concept, judges would be deferential to decision-
makers in academia unless there was a clear legal basis for not doing so.  Reviewing the 
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history of the doctrine, O’Neil (2010) posited that its origins could be traced to Trustees 
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819).  In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward (1819), the Court allowed for a “zone of immunity for academic decisions and 
actions” (O’Neil, 2010, p. 732).  Rationales for judicial deference in academia—or 
academic deference or academic abstention—include and are intertwined with policies of 
autonomy and academic freedom, judicial respect for academic governance, and a lack of 
expertise in the complex matters of academia (O, Neil, 2010; White, 2010).   
 As summarized by O’Neil (2010), scholars vary as to their perceptions of the 
usefulness and currency of judicial deference.  While some claim the doctrine remains 
vital (e.g., Katyal, 2003), others claim that it has lost its force (e.g., Gajda, 2009).  Still 
others warn that the doctrine has been used to shield colleges and universities from 
discrimination suits (e.g., Bartholomew, 2000).  Whether one shares the perspective that 
courts are overly deferential to academic governance, thus allowing controversial and 
discriminatory policies, or the perspective that courts unduly restrict the autonomy of 
colleges and universities, thus intruding upon decision-making and the pursuit of a 
unique mission, caution is in order when considering whether judicial deference is 
appropriate when applied to academic decisions.  Of particular concern in applying the 
doctrine is discerning whether a decision was purely academic, what and how the faculty 
contributed to the decision, and whether the positions of the faculty and institution were 
concordant (O’Neil, 2010).                 
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Significance of the Study 
Emotional issues such as faculty employment can inspire administrative decisions 
and policies that are driven by unexamined beliefs rather than by data (Trower & Honan, 
2002).  In response to the trend in litigation pertaining to tenure denial decisions, Franke 
(2001) appealed to higher education administrators to gain a better understanding of the 
risks involved in the tenure process so that better management decisions could be made in 
response.  Lee (1990) called scholars in both legal and education disciplines to extend 
research beyond positive or negative rulings, and posited that a deeper analysis would 
better explain the substantive content of the case.  Kent (2002) encouraged an “analysis 
and synthesis of case law to identify relevant categorical trends” (p. 65).  The collective 
lesson from these scholars is that basing arguments on data and drawing conclusions 
from systematic analysis is fundamental to the academy.   
  By systematically analyzing cases in which the tenure process has broken down, 
much can be learned about policies and procedures that are particularly problematic.  
This study will benefit higher education administrators who will be called upon to create 
and adhere to tenure processes that meet legal and equitable standards.  The data gathered 
and analyzed from judicial opinions can be used to influence how administrators frame 
problems in the tenure process and aid in their determination of which issues are most 
important in law and policy discussions.  Data can help administrators to “keep adjusting 
the compass,” in light of current policy strengths and necessary institutional adjustments 
(Trower & Honan, 2002, p.289).  A focus on initiatives that an institution can implement 
before actual legal disputes arise, a form of risk management through preventive process, 
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involves the ongoing cooperation between administrators and counsel who together set 
policy and legal parameters for the institution.  By carefully considering and planning for 
the interrelationship between law and policy issues, administrators and counsel can 
together strengthen an institution’s management choices (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).   
Although studying appellate opinions provides only a partial picture of the 
underlying issues of tenure litigation, to the extent that the information gleaned helps 
institutions develop fair tenure policies and procedures and create a better working 
environment, it will also benefit faculty who apply for tenure and those who serve on 
peer review committees.  The greater university community will also benefit from this 
study.  Amidst the pressures of increasing expectations and decreasing resources, higher 
education leaders must plot a strategy for how to remain viable and relevant in the public 
eye.  Equitable treatment and fair processes in employment decisions have important 
implications for an institution’s academic and social standing (Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 
2002).  Finally, the public as a whole will benefit from this study.  The professoriate 
serves the core function of the education system and contributes to the public good.  A 
quality environment in which faculty can thrive is advantageous to society.       
Olivas and Baez (2011) wrote:  “We know surprisingly little about the law’s 
effect on higher education, but virtually no one in the enterprise is untouched by statutes, 
regulations, case law, or institutional rules promulgated to implement legal regimes” (p. 
170).  The significance of this study is that it seeks to improve what is known about the 
law’s effect on higher education by better understanding the flaws in the tenure process 
that require judicial intervention, and placing that understanding within the conceptual 
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lenses of shared governance and judicial deference as to academic decision-making.  
With added knowledge, higher education institutions can better protect their reputation 
and academic freedom, foster a positive community, and attract the best faculty and 
students—things on which the survival of higher education depends.    
Definitions of Terms 
Tenure was the primary variable in this study.  It is operationally defined by the 
AAUP as follows:  “After the expiration of a probationary period, teachers or 
investigators should have permanent or continuous tenure, and their service should be 
terminated only for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or under 
extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigencies” (AAUP, 2006a, p. 4).   
For the purpose of this legal research based study, the following legal terms were 
identified, using Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th edition (Garner, 2009):   
1. Appellant: 
“A party who appeals a lower court’s decision, usu. seeking reversal of that 
decision” (p. 114 ). 
2.  Appellee: 
“A party against whom an appeal is taken and whose role is to respond to that 
appeal, usu. seeking affirmance of the lower court’s decision” (p. 115). 
3.  Burden of persuasion: 
“A party’s duty to convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors 




4. Burden of production: 
“A party’s duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue 
decided by the fact-finder, rather than decided against the party in a peremptory 
ruling such as a summary judgment or a directed verdict” (p. 223). 
5.  Burden of proof: 
“A party’s duty to prove a disputed assertion or charge” (p. 223). 
6.  Confidentiality: 
“Secrecy; the state of having the dissemination of certain information restricted” 
(p. 339). 
7.  De facto: 
“Actual; existing in fact; having effect even though not formally or legally 
recognized” (p. 479). 
8.  Defendant: 
“A person sued in a civil proceeding or accused in a criminal proceeding” (p. 
482). 
9.  Dictum: 
“A statement of opinion or belief considered authoritative because of the dignity 
of the person making it” (Pl. dicta.) (p. 519). 
10. Directed verdict: 
“A ruling by a trial judge taking a case from the jury because the evidence will 





“The act or process of making known something that was previously unknown; a 
revelation of facts” (p. 531). 
12.  Due Process: 
“The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles 
for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right 
to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case (p. 575). 
13.  Motion: 
“A written or oral application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or 
order” (p. 1106). 
14.  Movant: 
“One who makes a motion to the court or a deliberative body” (p. 1111). 
15.  Plaintiff: 
“The party who brings a civil suit in a court of law” (p. 1267). 
16. Pretext: 
“A false or weak reason or motive advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or 
motive” (p. 1307). 
17.  Prima facie: 






18. Procedural due process: 
“The minimal requirements of notice and a hearing guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments, esp. if the deprivation of a 
significant life, liberty, or property interest may occur” (p. 575). 
19.  Proffer: 
“To offer or tender (something, esp. evidence) for immediate acceptance” (p. 
1329). 
20.  Remand: 
“To send (a case or claim) back to the court or tribunal from which it came for 
some further action” (p. 1407). 
21.  Remedy: 
“The means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong; legal or 
equitable relief” (p. 1407). 
22.  Substantive due process: 





require legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to further a legitimate 
governmental objective” (p. 575).  
23.  Summary judgment: 
“A judgment granted on a claim or defense about which there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and upon which the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of 




24. Verdict:  
“A jury’s finding or decision on the factual issues of a case. [] Loosely, in a 
nonjury trial, a judge’s resolution of the issues of a case” (p. 1696). 
Organization of the Study 
 Five chapters form the basis for this study.  Chapter One lays the foundation for 
this study with discussions of tenure, tenure’s link to academic freedom, and the rise in 
judicial influence on higher education employment decisions and academic freedom.  
Also in the introduction are the purpose statement, research questions, an introduction to 
the conceptual framework, significance of the study, and definitions of key terms.  
Chapter Two offers a critical review of the scholarly literature on academic tenure and 
concomitant issues, the link between tenure and academic freedom, the tenure process, 
and tenure denial litigation.  Further, Chapter Two contains a review of studies on tenure 
litigation that that most closely relate to and set the stage for the present study.  Chapter 
Three explains the methods that were used in this historical legal research and qualitative 
study including the design, the sources of data, and the data collection and analysis 
procedures that were used.  Chapter Four reveals the findings of the study, with a 
summary of the data and a presentation of the findings as related to the conceptual lenses 
and research questions.  Finally, Chapter Five summarizes the findings and discusses the 
findings in context of the theoretical lenses and existing literature.  The chapter further 
offers recommendations in light of the study’s findings, thus providing an answer to the 
third research question.  Also in the final chapter are recommendations for further studies 




REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The complexities of tenure and its many related topics, in general, and tenure 
litigation, more specifically, implicate the impossibility of an all-encompassing literature 
review—the breadth and depth of literature related to tenure is simply too large.  As Chait 
(2002a) explained, “Tenure is a topic better illuminated by multiple spotlights than a 
single floodlight” (p. 2).  While numerous sources were consulted to develop 
understanding and expertise for this study, the review of the literature illuminates 
multiple spotlights related to tenure by framing the literature in five major sections.  The 
first section sets the stage by providing an overview of tenure concepts, perspectives, and 
concomitant issues.  Section two provides an underlying framework for tenure by 
discussing links between tenure and academic freedom.  Section three narrows the focus 
by examining the tenure process.  Narrower still, section four looks specifically at tenure 
litigation.  Section five then highlights tenure litigation scholarship in which case law has 
been examined for parameters of tenure as influenced by the judiciary.  By illuminating 
these five spotlights, this literature review provides background and context for the 
instant study.     
Academic Tenure:  Concepts, Perspectives, and Concomitant Issues 
 Any discussion of tenure is enhanced by a conceptual understanding of why 
tenure exists and of diverse perspectives on how well it serves its purposes.  This section 
begins with a consideration of what tenure is (and what tenure is not) by looking at both 
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academic and legal concepts of tenure.  It then turns to perspectives on tenure, both 
favorable and unfavorable, as considered through the lens of various constituents.  
Finally, this section provides a brief overview of changes in and alternatives to the tenure 
system.    
The Academic Concept of Tenure 
Academic tenure is rooted in the belief that the common good is best served by 
the pursuit of truth under the principles of academic freedom (Finkin, 1996; Greenberg, 
2012).  The American Association of University Professors explicated fundamental 
standards for faculty employment in its 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure.  In the 1940 Statement, the AAUP defined tenure as follows:  
“After the expiration of a probationary period, teachers or investigators should have 
permanent or continuous tenure, and their service should be terminated only for adequate 
cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or under extraordinary circumstances 
because of financial exigencies” (AAUP, 2006a, p. 4).  Following the definition, the 
AAUP provided interpretive comments regarding acceptable academic practice for 
appointments.  According to the AAUP, tenure serves to promote a means to an ends, 
specifically:  “(1) freedom of teaching and research and of extramural activities, and (2) a 
sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession attractive to men and 
women of ability” (2006a, p. 3).   
Specified in the 1940 Statement of Principles is that academic tenure requires:  (a) 
a written contract that clearly sets forth the terms and conditions of employment; (b) a 
probationary period with the length specified; (c) a notice period that precedes any 
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nonrenewal of a term period for an affected probationary faculty member; and (d) 
procedural standards for the termination of a tenured faculty member for cause (White, 
2010).  Based on these definitions and requirements, tenure policies assure a faculty 
member’s right to hold an appointment, once competence has been established.  Those 
assurances, according to the AAUP, are crucial to the success of an institution in 
fulfilling its obligations to students and to society; by protecting professors who espouse 
unpopular views, tenure protects academic freedom.   
 A conferral of tenure signifies that following a probationary period, which often 
lasts as long as six years, an institution has had a significant amount of time in which to 
assess the professional competence of the faculty member and “has rendered a favorable 
judgment establishing a rebuttable presumption of the individual’s professional 
excellence” (Van Alstyne, 1996, p. 5).  The individual has thus garnered the benefit of 
the doubt from the institution.  In the event of a question of professional fitness, the 
institution would have the obligation to show why the tenured faculty member had fallen 
short of the standards of excellence to an extent that the individual would be subject to 
dismissal (Van Alstyne, 1996). 
The Legal Concept of Tenure 
 From a legal perspective, tenure is an enforceable promise made by the institution 
that relates to the duration of the faculty appointment (White, 2010).  Although there is 
no claim to a guarantee of lifetime employment, Professor William Van Alstyne (1996), a 
former president of the AAUP, clearly stated that tenure “provides only that no person 
continually retained as a full-time faculty member beyond a specified lengthy period of 
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probationary service may thereafter be dismissed without adequate cause” (pp. 3-4, 
emphasis in original).  
 Pursuant to contract law, tenure means two things:  (a) an appointment of tenure 
has no specified end date; it is a contract of indefinite term; and (b) the appointment is 
subject to termination only for reasons and only in accordance with contractual 
procedures, as understood by the parties at the time they entered the employment 
relationship (White, 2010).  Sources of rights may emanate from an institution’s 
governing documents, state statutes and regulations, a faculty handbook, or an 
employee’s individual contract.  Tenure provisions that are found in a faculty handbook 
or policy manual will usually be construed by a court as an abrogation of the common-
law “employment at will” doctrine (White, 2010, p. 6).  Regardless of whether they 
become incorporated by reference in a faculty member’s appointment letter, the terms in 
the handbooks and manuals become part of the employment contract between the faculty 
member and the institution. 
Standards of employment to which faculty members are held accountable are 
determined within each institution, so long as those standards do not violate academic 
freedom and individual civil liberties.  In practical terms, tenure assures that professional 
security and academic freedom will not be questioned without the observance of full 
academic due process.  An award of tenure means that if any formal complaint were 
made about a professor who has tenure, there would be a rigorous procedure in order to 
determine the authenticity of causes given for dismissal, that the stated causes exist in 
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fact, and that the degree of stated professional irresponsibility warrants termination, 
rather than some lesser sanction (Van Alstyne, 1996). 
Generally, cause has been found to exist based on incompetence, illegal activity, 
or sexual harassment.  Claims of sexual harassment may be grounded in either claims of 
illegal activity or in a violation of university policies.  The more specific the claims, the 
clearer the case may be made for dismissal for cause.  Insubordination may also serve as 
a basis for a claim.  Claims rooted in subjective terms, such as incompetence or 
insubordination, typically involve a history of problems rather than an incident with one 
occurrence.  In reviewing dismissals, courts will typically defer to the institution and 
affirm the dismissal, so long as procedures were followed in a fair manner (Adams, 2006-
2007). 
Termination of employment can also arise separate from a faculty member’s 
problematic behavior or job performance (Poskanzer, 2002).  When based on institutional 
reasons that extend beyond an individual’s control, such terminations do not threaten the 
academic freedom bases of tenure.  A widely recognized “neutral” base for terminating 
faculty is for financial exigency (Poskanzer, 2002, p. 226).  So long as an institution acts 
in good faith, financial exigency that is “demonstrably bona fide” is a legitimate reason 
for terminating faculty positions (Poskanzer, 2002, p. 226).  Key issues for institutions 
facing such termination decisions include what qualifies as a financial exigency and who 
makes the decision as to when an institution is in such a dire situation as to rely on this 
reason for terminations.  Courts have placed the responsibility for determining whether 
an exigency exists on the college or university’s governing board; accordingly, the 
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institution has the burden for proving a financial exigency.  If a financial exigency is 
shown, additional decisions follow, such as what part of the institution should incur the 
losses, and what criteria are used to make the terminations.  The procedural protections 
that are mandated when a faculty member is terminated “for cause” are not required in a 
termination for financial exigency, because faculty members are being terminated for no 
fault of their own.  Rather, a scaled-down process is required that notifies the faculty 
member in writing as to the basis of the decision, furnishes the faculty member with a 
description of how the decision had been made, discloses to the faculty member 
information and data the contributed to the decision, and provides the faculty member 
with the opportunity to respond (Poskanzer, 2002 citing Johnson v. Board of Regents, 
1974).             
Perspectives on Tenure 
From the time that the academic profession initially sought tenure in 1915 to the 
present, the issue of tenure has raised much debate among proponents and opponents of 
the tenure system (Finkin, 1996; Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  As summarized by 
Poskanzer (2002), proponents of the tenure system make the following arguments as to 
the purpose and effect of tenure:   
 Tenure is the “linchpin of academic freedom” and of scholarship and knowledge, 
because it allows freedom of inquiry and sharing knowledge (p. 148). 
 Tenure assures honest faculty voices rather than those that are tied up with trying 
to gain favor with internal or external “vested interests” (p. 148).  
 Through job security, tenure serves to attract talented people to the professoriate. 
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 Tenure allows faculty to focus energies on research and teaching, rather than on 
“base economic incentives” (p. 149). 
 Through a “substantial cadre of tenured faculty,” tenure “promotes institutional 
stability, enhances shared governance, and builds collegiality and esprit de corps” 
(p. 149). 
 Because tenure is intended to be permanent, absent certain circumstances, a 
tenure application forces an institution to make tough choices about the quality of 
faculty and about future academic program needs.   
In contrast to those who propound tenure’s benefits, the voices against tenure 
have increased in recent decades.  Major arguments include that it removes incentives for 
productivity and unfairly relieves professors of the economic uncertainty suffered by 
other workers (Adams, 2006-2007; Bodah, 2000).  Poskanzer (2002) summarized 
additional negatives of the tenure system:   
 Tenure creates financial burdens on the college or university that are inflexible in 
terms of financial and pedagogical needs. 
 Tenure perpetuates traditional departments and disciplines while hindering new or 
unorthodox thinking. 
 Tenure’s “guarantee” of lifetime employment protects mediocre or “deadwood” 
faculty, absent employing and following cumbersome discharge requirements (p. 
150). 
 Research is disproportionately rewarded in tenure systems; thus, teaching quality 
may be eroded. 
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 Pressures of tenure systems may require institutions to make decisions too quickly 
about the work of a junior faculty member. 
 Tenure systems place undue pressure on junior faculty members to perform and 
respond. 
 Grievances and lawsuits arise under tenure systems. 
 Because tenure allows power to be concentrated in senior faculty members, it is 
“undemocratic” (p. 150). 
 With the First Amendment and contract law assuring academic freedom, tenure is 
not a precondition of academic freedom and should be uncoupled from it. 
 Tenure allows a “one-way street” whereby institutions make long term 
commitments to a faculty member, but the faculty member has no reciprocal 
commitment to the institution (p. 151).      
Faculty members’ viewpoints.   A faculty appointment carries prestige.  Society 
often views professors as being able to pursue their work separate and apart from the 
demands of the outside world.  Even so, untenured faculty members can face significant 
pressures as they go through the tenure and promotion process.  Advancing through the 
ranks of tenure and promotion takes years of service and extensive proof of professional 
accomplishments.  Pressures to publish, teach, and offer service to the profession and 
community are numerous.  In the years leading to a tenure decision, prospective 
candidates are faced with learning the culture and expectations of their organization.  At 
many institutions, uncertainty surrounds the reappointment, promotion, and tenure 
process.  Meetings are conducted in secrecy and participants do not discuss their 
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viewpoints or votes.  Furthermore, the process has become more strenuous over time, due 
to decreasing numbers of available tenure-track appointments (Leap, 1995). 
 A denial of tenure typically means that the faculty member has one more year of 
employment prior to termination.  In addition to losing a job and a “long and often hard-
fought battle,” a faculty member whose application for tenure is denied may feel rejection 
and alienation from the academic community (Leap, 1995, p. 4).  For academics, a 
lifelong association with school through years of graduate school that ends with tenure 
denial is often the first failure the individual has had to face.  For those who have realized 
during the process that their performance fell short of expectations, the blow of a denial 
may be softened.  For others who may have been led to believe that their performance 
was satisfactory or better, a tenure denial may be traumatic.  Moreover, the search for 
suitable employment elsewhere may be hampered by their failure to achieve tenure 
(Leap, 1995).   
Administrators’ viewpoints.  For administrators, the decision to grant promotion 
or tenure serves two key purposes:  to reward past performance and to provide a vote of 
confidence regarding a faculty member’s potential to help the institution succeed in 
reaching its future mission.  One major concern of administrators in making tenure 
decisions is that such decisions have financial implications, potentially for twenty or 
thirty years.  An award of tenure that does not meet an institution’s future needs can 
create problems such as an oversupply of academicians in some departments and an 
undersupply in others.  An award of tenure cannot be easily reversed through termination 
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or layoff procedures, so decisions carry great weight for an institution’s current and 
future needs (Leap, 1995).   
Legislators’ viewpoints.  An award of tenure is not an absolute right of an 
institution; rather, the right to grant tenure is given to public colleges and universities by 
state legislatures.  In light of some views about higher education’s substandard 
performance in providing the requisite talent to meet societal goals (e.g., Rosen, 2011; 
Warner, 2012), an institutional right to grant tenure may be questioned or taken away by 
the legislature.  Since institutions compete for public money, political representatives 
may be less sympathetic to a privilege of lifelong employment for tenured faculty, 
particularly during times of budgetary shortfalls and economic uncertainty.  As 
Greenburg (2012) explained, the job security and level of independence achieved with a 
grant of tenure may not be easily understood by the taxpayers who fund public higher 
education and pay soaring tuition.   
Legislative inquiry into tenure systems may also increase due to the expansion of 
higher education in the United States during the past 50 years, which has removed much 
of the mystery of the academy.  Once viewed as a somewhat cloistered environment, the 
move towards educating the masses has revealed more to the general public about the 
tenure system.  The problem, then, is not a lack of public understanding of the workings 
of higher education and the common good served by tenure; rather, “[t]he problem is that 
the public does understand when self-interest is tied to the common good” (Greenburg, 
2012, n.p.).      
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Changes in the Tenure System   
Differing perspectives and debates involving tenure from faculty, administrators, 
and legislators have inspired attacks on the tenure system (Altbach, 2011a; Zirkel, 1984-
1985).  In particular, the tenure system came under attack in the 1970s and again in the 
1990s.  During the fiscal crises of the 1970s, some universities addressed fiscal problems 
by firing professors, even those with tenured appointments.  Particularly hard hit were 
institutions such as City University of New York and the State University of New York 
System, which declared fiscal emergencies, fired a small number of academic staff, fired 
some tenured professors, and closed several departments and programs.  Although 
professors and the AAUP contested such firings, claiming they went against the implied 
lifetime employment arrangement offered through the tenure system, courts consistently 
ruled against professors and explained that tenure protects academic freedom but does not 
prevent firing due to fiscal crises.  Neither the 1970s nor the 1990s debates resulted in 
much change in tenure itself, although more recent reforms have been implemented such 
as post-tenure review.  Proponents laud such review as good management, while 
opponents deem it a second chance to get rid of under-performing faculty (Altbach, 
2011a). 
The growth of fiscal problems and deterioration of the job market over last two 
decades have again heightened debates about tenure (Altbach, 2011a).  Change is seen in 
the fact that a growing number of academics are not part of the tenure system (Benjamin, 
2010).  The recent rise in the proportion of faculty who are not on the tenure track has 
taken several forms.  As reported by Benjamin (2010), since the 1970s, the total faculty 
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headcount increased by almost 120 percent, part-time and nontenure-track positions have 
each increased at twice that rate, while full-time tenured positions have increased by only 
28 percent and probationary tenure-track positions have increased less than seven percent 
(Benjamin, 2010, p. 4).  As a result, nearly 40 percent of full-time positions and 70 
percent of all faculty positions are not on the tenure track (Benjamin, 2010, pp. 4-5).  
“[M]ost alarming,” according to Benjamin (2010), is the very small 6.8 percent increase 
in the probationary tenure-track positions, since these positions “represent the future of 
the profession” (Benjamin, 2010, p. 5).   
Using a fall 2007 report of tenure status by type of institution, Benjamin (2010) 
further stated that of the 50 percent of all full-time faculty who teach at public four-year 
institutions, two-thirds are either tenured or probationary tenure-track faculty (p. 5).  In 
addition, about three-fifths of the full-time faculty at private four-year nonprofit 
institutions are tenured or are on the tenure track, and so are more than half of the 16 
percent of faculty who teach full-time at public community colleges (Benjamin, 2010, p. 
5).  Benjamin (2010) attributed the increase in full-time nontenure-track appointments as 
at least partly due to the growth of the two-year institution sector, in which institutions 
may not employ faculty ranks.  Even so, full-time nontenure-track appointments are 
increasing at both public and private four-year institutions (Benjamin, 2010).  
Despite the decline in the proportion of tenure-track positions, however, there has 
not been a significant decline in the proportion of institutions that continue to offer 
tenure-track appointments to full-time faculty.  Reporting from a 2004 NCES National 
Study of Postsecondary Faculty institutional survey, Benjamin (2010) stated that 71.5 
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percent of all institutions continue to offer tenure, with tenure being offered at 64 percent 
of public community colleges, 100 percent of public doctoral institutions, 98 percent of 
public master’s institutions, 93 percent of nonprofit master’s institutions, 92 percent of 
nonprofit doctoral institutions, and 84 percent of nonprofit baccalaureate institutions (p. 
5).      
Collectively, these figures demonstrate that while tenure is not likely to become 
extinct, it does prevail disproportionately at institutions that provide graduate degrees and 
research opportunities.  Even at four-year and graduate institutions, nontenure-track 
appointments are largely used for instructional faculty in lower-division programs.  A 
two-tier system effectively exists, in many instances, as a contrast between lower-
division instruction and upper-division, graduate, and research instruction (Benjamin, 
2010).  
Some institutions have sought to reduce tenure’s privileges and increase 
institutional flexibility in dealing with tenure-track appointments.  Others are making it 
more difficult to achieve tenure by imposing tenure quotas and increasing the 
requirements. Still others are reestablishing tenure, after eliminating it (Altbach, 2011a; 
Baldwin & Chronister, 2002).  As institutions see positions open due to retirements, some 
are converting tenure-track positions into nontenure-track and part-time positions.  The 
numbers of full-time, nontenure-track staff are likely to continue to increase in number in 
response to institutions that are trying to increase flexibility in budgeting and 
management (Altbach, 2011a).    
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Strengthening the Process and Alternatives to Tenure 
With attacks on tenure rising, some have questioned whether the tenure process 
can be improved, while others have suggested alternatives to tenure.  Ideas for 
improvement have included changing the substance of the process and institutional 
reward systems, shifting the unit of analysis of productivity from the individual to the 
department, and making the tenure process more understandable such as through role 
modeling and leadership development (Rice & Sorcinelli, 2002).  Post-tenure reviews 
have also been suggested as a means to strengthen the process and identify professors 
whose productivity is not up to par.  Initially opposed to post-tenure reviews as costly and 
a threat to academic freedom, the AAUP later altered its stance to be tolerant of the 
practice, so long as any such review focused on faculty development rather than on 
accountability or disciplinary action (Chait, 2002b).   
Alternatives to tenure are increasingly being used.  One alternative to traditional 
tenure is the use of contracts, or employment for a specific term.  Under a contract 
system, a faculty member is initially appointed to a term, typically two to three years.  In 
the case of solid performance, terms are often renewed.  While contracts are 
overwhelmingly renewed and turnover is low, contracts have been criticized as harming 
academic freedom (Fishman, 2005).   
Another alternative to tenure is to offer financial incentives to faculty candidates 
who will eschew tenure or a tenure-track position.  Attributed to market forces, this 
alternative may offer an employee a choice between a tenure-track position and a higher 
starting salary or other appealing employment parameters.  Criticism of this method has 
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arisen because some academics see this option as not supporting the mission and values 
of higher education (Fishman, 2005).  Even so, many faculty members find attractive an 
increased salary and decreased work load in place of a tenure-track appointment.    
A third alternative to traditional tenure is to downplay faculty influence in an 
institution, while increasing the importance of administration.  This alternative critiques 
the value of faculty as being influenced by market forces.  Decisions about faculty are to 
be made in the context of the economic and managerial considerations of an institution 
(Fishman, 2005).   
Debates about tenure and tenure alternatives will continue.  Much discussion 
centers on their effectiveness in improving institutional performance and the resources 
required to implement any alternatives (Fishman, 2005).   
Tenure and Academic Freedom:  Inextricably Linked 
In practical and philosophical ways, academic freedom and tenure are entwined, 
so a thorough examination of tenure requires a parallel examination of the development 
and concept of academic freedom.  Many doctoral dissertations have recognized this 
entwining (Ancell,1978; Crittendon, 2009; Davis, 1980; Deering, 1985; Hamill, 2003).  
In addition to doctoral studies, many scholarly works have drawn positive correlations 
between academic freedom and tenure (Brown & Kurland, 1993; Finkin, 1996; Fishman, 
2000; Joughin, 1969; O’Toole, 1978; Vaccaro, 1972; Van Alstyne 1978, 1996).  One of 
the strongest arguments on the usefulness of tenure in protecting academic freedom was 
made in a study on faculty tenure conducted in 1973 by the Commission on Academic 
Tenure in Higher Education, which made forty-seven recommendations for strengthening 
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the future of tenure.  Also in the study publication were three informative essays:  an 
historical essay on American academic freedom, an essay on the legal dimensions of 
tenure, and an essay on faculty unionism and tenure.  More recently Adams (2006-2007) 
argued in favor of tenure in the promotion of job security and academic freedom, 
particularly as it pertains to research, scholarly activity, and societal benefits.  Tierney 
and Lechuga (2010) argued that academic freedom and tenure permit higher education 
institutions to act as “vehicles for public engagement” (p. 118).     
Not all commentaries about tenure deem it positively linked to protecting 
academic freedom, with critiques spanning four decades.  In 1965 Nisbet propounded that 
tenure and academic freedom should be considered separately, because academic 
freedom was necessary for all faculty members, not just those who were tenured.  Silber 
(1971) viewed the granting of tenure as encouraging sloth among academics.  Park 
(1972) deemed tenure harmful to academia in that it was an unfair, outdated, and divisive 
among faculty members who did or did not have tenure.  In 1997, Silber maintained that 
academic freedom and tenure were not inherently linked because both nontenured and 
tenured faculty members have academic freedom.  He further argued that tenure 
promotes infringements upon academic freedom in that tenured professors may compel 
nontenured professors to follow established departmental doctrine and to suppress their 
own intellectual interests.   
This section provides a background on tenure, with a focus on its connection to 
academic freedom.  First, academic freedom is defined using the parameters established 
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by the AAUP.  Next, cultural and legal foundations of academic freedom are reviewed.  
A review of tenure’s cultural foundations concludes the section.       
Definition and Parameters of Academic Freedom 
Whether tenure is viewed as a protector of or a detractor from academic freedom, 
the relationship between the two concepts is pertinent to fully understanding educational 
and legal issues surrounding tenure.  A champion of academic freedom, the AAUP 
sought in its 1940 Statement “to promote public understanding and support of academic 
freedom and tenure and agreement upon procedures to ensure them in colleges and 
universities” (2006a, p. 3).  The AAUP defined the parameters of academic freedom as 
follows: 
1.  Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the 
publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of their 
other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based 
upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution. 
2. Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing 
their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching 
controversial matter which has no relation to their subject.  Limitations of 
academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution 
should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment. 
3. College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned 
profession, and officers of an educational institution.  When they speak or 
write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or 
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discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special 
obligations.  As scholars and educational officers, they should remember 
that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their 
utterances.  Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise 
appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and 
should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the 
institution.   
(2006a, pp. 3-4).  Viewed by the AAUP as essential to the common good through the 
“free search for truth and its free exposition,” principles of academic freedom apply to 
both teaching and research (2006a, p. 3).  Research freedom is essential to the 
advancement of truth.  Freedom in teaching is fundamental to protecting the rights of 
both the teacher in teaching and the student to freedom in learning.  The statement makes 
clear that academic duties exist that are correlative with rights. 
Cultural Foundations of Academic Freedom 
Academic freedom is a right that is difficult to define and is claimed by both 
faculty members within institutions and by institutions themselves.  Professional 
freedoms and institutional autonomy are based on the rationale that the vigorous 
exchange of ideas is best fostered within a community of scholars.  Such an exchange 
then serves a public benefit.   
A good basis for understanding academic freedom in the United States comes 
from reading the works of Hofstadter and Metzger (1955), who wrote about the history, 
development, and philosophy of academic freedom in American higher education.  After 
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jointly publishing their initial work, Hofstadter (1955) and Metzger (1955) each 
published their study under separate titles.  Several doctoral dissertations have examined 
historical aspects of academic freedom (e.g., Lucas, 1967; Sullivan, 1971; Sutton, 1950).  
In addition, other scholars have sought to further understand and explain academic 
freedom (e.g., Baade, 1984; MacIver, 1967; Pincoffs, 1972).     
Academic freedom is foundational to knowledge creation and innovation.  In the 
context of academia, academic freedom correlates to the express rights of free speech and 
press granted under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Kaplin and Lee 
(2006) explained this to mean that the rights of speech and press cannot be effectively 
protected in the college and university environment unless academic freedom, as a 
corollary of free speech and press, is also recognized.  Associated with the concept of 
academic freedom, the halls of academe are commonly thought of as a “marketplace of 
ideas” in which competing ideas and open discourse can coexist.  Justice Brennan used 
the phrase “marketplace of ideas” in his concurrence in Lamont v. Postmaster General 
(1965), a landmark First Amendment case that discussed the free exchange of ideas.   
Historical influences.  A look back in history aids in discerning how academic 
freedom was understood by scholars in the past.  In American higher education, the 
concept of academic freedom dates back more than a century, but its roots go much 
deeper.  Dating to 399 B.C. Athens, where Socrates argued in his own defense against 
charges that he was corrupting the city’s youth, the heritage of academic freedom is rich.  
The origins of American academic freedom are more customarily traced to the Middle 
Ages and the European universities of Salerno, Bologna, Montpelier, Paris, and Oxford, 
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which were gatherings of scholarly guilds that were interested in advancing areas of 
expertise.  With humble beginnings, they served as model institutions for others that 
developed throughout Europe, England, and the United States (Hofstadter, 1955).   
 The organizational structure was important to the independence of the university.  
As autonomous corporations based on a gild system, their members elected their own 
governance and created their rules and systems of discipline.  An institutional framework 
arose from the corporate independence; the framework supported the idea that the 
members were men of learning who were to be defended from outside interference 
(Hofstadter, 1955). 
The freedom of the corporate body and the freedom of the individual scholar were 
not the same, nor were they absolute.  Two forms of authority governed the scholars; one 
was a positive form of authority, which referred primarily to external pressures, and the 
other was an authority of tradition, which grew from a desire for salvation (Hofstadter, 
1955).  It was, thus, a system of faith that prevailed authoritatively over intellectual 
freedom of the twelfth century.  When necessary, the Church intervened in academia to 
issue condemnation and censures of scholars who committed heresy (Hofstadter, 1955).   
 As heresy grew in the thirteenth century, Church doctrine became more 
structured.  A greater clash arose between scholars and the Church when scholars began 
to discuss issues that were condemned by the Church.  With the advent of Aristotelianism 
came new areas of inquiry, such as faith and philosophy (Hofstadter, 1955).   
 The period of corporate independence and relative scholarly freedom declined 
through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as the university became less a center of 
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intellectual inquiry.  Many nobles individually sponsored the work of scholars, and the 
corporate autonomy grew less secure.  The fourteenth century began the period in which 
the spheres of reason and faith were separate.  Medieval philosophy and science arose, 
and scientific teachings began to flourish in the fifteenth century.  In an effort to protect 
autonomy, university migration occurred to areas that did not have a university.  As the 
number of universities grew, universities became less mobile.  With better endowments, 
universities’ interests in their library collections and physical possessions grew, and 
intellectual inquiry suffered (Hofstadter, 1955).  
 A dramatic change in the university’s autonomy resulted from political changes in 
Europe.  As nation states developed, sovereigns, princes, and parliaments began to 
meddle in the internal affairs of the universities.  Scholars were hired by the political 
sovereigns, and autonomy and prestige suffered.  (Hofstadter, 1955).   
 During the Reformation of the sixteenth century, the Church again took an active 
role in suppressing scholarly inquiry.  The Church tried to suppress Protestantism and 
humanistic philosophy.  Religious authority was challenged by the rise of Protestantism, 
which added to the diversity of religious beliefs and furthered the right of the individual.  
Academic freedom thus had important foundations in the pursuit of religious liberty 
(Hofstadter, 1955).  
 A small group of universities such as Leyden and Helmstedt helped the concept of 
academic freedom to establish roots (Sutton, 1950).  Tolerance began to be practiced in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Pious men realized that if faith was forced, it 
would not be sincere and would create hypocrites.  The modern concept of academic 
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freedom grew from intellectual freedom to investigate free from religious controls.  An 
increasing number of scholars were granted freedom in their academic pursuits 
(Hofstadter, 1955).   
 Academic freedom was firmly established in most European universities by the 
end of the eighteenth century.  In the latter half of the nineteenth century, academic 
freedom evolved to a closer resemblance of what we know today.  Two factors are 
thought to have contributed to the current view of academic freedom:  Darwinism and the 
academic traditions of the German university (Hofstadter, 1955).   
 Darwinism.  Darwinian thought redefined the nature of “truth,” established a 
justification for tolerating error in intellectual inquiry, and advocated the standards by 
which research process and results may be verified.  Rather than being viewed as an 
absolute, truth was seen as being in a state of flux as knowledge was continuously 
explored in order to verify beliefs as true or false.  Darwinian standards did not allow 
undisciplined inquiry, but required verification and procedural rules (Hofstadter & 
Metzger, 1955). 
 Also significant in this era was the limit on administrative prerogative to judge the 
fitness of professors.  Faculties argued that professional standards were examined through 
the purview of experts who must be chosen from peers.  Tolerance and right of 
conscience were affirmed during this period, which supported a new rationale of 
academic freedom (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955). 
 German university heritage.  The mid-nineteenth century German universities 
also impacted the emerging conception of academic freedom.  German academic 
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philosophy, the tradition of akademische Freiheit, was comprised of the concepts of 
Lernfreiheit, the freedom to learn, and Lehrfreiheit, the freedom to teach.  Taken 
together, the terms are close in meaning to the English term “academic freedom.”   
Lernfreiheit provided a learning situation that was free of administrative coercion.  
This concept allowed students in German universities to have freedom in both their 
personal lives and in their academic activities.  Lehrfreiheit provided German professors 
the freedom to examine bodies of information and evidence and to report the findings in 
lecture or printed form.  Freedom of inquiry and teaching extended into the process of 
research and instruction.  Intellectual freedom permeated the atmosphere of the German 
university.  Subjective teaching was encouraged with the idea that intellectual growth 
was possible only if varying opinions could be presented.  Through such growth, the 
major purpose of the university could be realized.  In contrast to the few liberties granted 
to German citizens, the academic community enjoyed many rights (Hofstadter & 
Metzger, 1955). 
Contributing to American academic freedom, many scholars who first studied 
with German masters then transplanted Lehrfreiheit to the United States.  The term 
“academic freedom” became widely used in American academic rhetoric, and it was 
assumed that the concept defined the university.  Academic freedom was thus elevated to 
the status of necessity (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955). 
American university heritage.  While akademische Freiheit was accepted as a 
necessity to American higher education, the differences found in the American university 
led to America’s own unique theory of academic freedom.  Three areas of difference can 
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be identified:  the dissociation of Lernfreiheit from Lehrfreiheit, the proselytization of 
students, and the development of a system of the American-Constitutional system of 
individual rights and freedoms (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955).   
In contrast to the breadth of educational freedom experienced by a German 
university student, the American student was more restricted.  Based on a policy of in 
loco parentis, universities stood in place of the parent and largely controlled the student 
educational experience (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  To protect academic employment in its 
formative stages, academic leaders sought more to protect the institution than to protect 
education.  Universities have changed over time from this stance; in addition to 
experiencing the benefits of the academic freedom practiced by professors, students 
likewise enjoy more control over their learning experience. 
Differences between the German and American models of academic freedom also 
arose from the American Constitution, which provides for individual rights and freedoms.  
The United States system of government allowed for the freedom of Lehrfreiheit through 
guarantees provided in the Constitution.  Thus, academic freedom is not a separate right 
in America, and those in educational institutions do not possess that right above other 
citizens of the United States (Hofstadter & Metzger, 1955).           
The development and governance of American colleges and universities.   
Various scholars have arranged the complex development and governance of American 
higher education into patterns of issues (Altbach, 2011b), eras and ages (Hofstadter & 
Metzger, 1955; Metzger, 1973), or specific time periods of development (Baldridge, 
Curtis, Ecker, & Riley, 1978; Geiger, 2011; Veysey, 1965).  From various sources, this 
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section extrapolates elements of governance that arose during the formation of American 
higher education that provide context to the development of academic freedom. 
From the mid-1600s to the mid-1700s, the earliest colleges formed in the British 
colonies of America.  Each was established as an adjunct to a respective church, and each 
was crucial to the civil government of the colonies.  Expanding religious liberty was 
reflected in these colleges, and freedom of thought was a great asset of the eighteenth 
century college (Hofstadter, 1955).   
Established first in 1636, Harvard College had a unique organizational structure—
that of a nonresident board of trustees.  The structure was then borrowed by William and 
Mary, Yale, and other colonial colleges.  The lay board shared the institutional 
governance with internal clerical authority, and boards of trustees functioned to raise 
money and appoint presidents (Baldridge et al., 1978).  The shift from clerical boards to 
boards that were controlled by lay people also reflected the fact that, while the 
institutions were private, state support was part of the equation. (Heller, 2004).   
The unique feature of self-governing lay boards found in the United States played 
an important and lasting role in the way that policies were developed in and for higher 
education (Hofstadter, 1955; Thelin, 2004).  A concept adapted from Scotland, an 
external board became responsible for university governance, as opposed to faculty 
association governance, which had been the model at Oxford and Cambridge (Thelin, 
2004).  While lay people could broadly influence policy, they could not run the institution 
on a daily basis.  Because the lay boards were nonresident, power vested in a college 
president eventually also emerged and was a complement to lay authority.  The president 
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was powerful and could dictate rules that affected the school and students’ conduct 
(Hofstadter, 1955).   
A nonprofessional faculty served a tutorial role as they prepared for the ministry 
(Geiger, 2011).  Faculty members, who were more regularly involved in the institutional 
affairs and teaching, were viewed as too inexperienced and too temporary to govern the 
institution.  This conundrum opened the door for a strong presidential role (Hofstadter, 
1955).   
 The first truly “public” institutions that were chartered in this era showed up 
mainly in the South and Midwest (Heller, 2004, p. 50).  Heller (2004) described their 
control as “quasi-public”; even though the institutions received direct state subsidies, a 
high degree of autonomy was maintained by the trustees (p. 50).  Some institutions had 
self-perpetuating boards, which kept the institution well out of public reach.     
In the early 1800s, signs of trouble abounded as the underpinnings of republican 
education were dislodged, some institutions lost state support, and others steadily 
declined.  As some institutions declined and others flourished, questions emerged from 
the republican model regarding the ownership, educational content, mission, and 
governance of the institutions.  Efforts to construct a republican curriculum that 
contained both scientific and professional subjects collapsed—there were not qualified 
teachers, and students were not interested.  A restandardized classical curriculum and a 
reforming of the institutions resulted in a refocusing on collegiate missions.  A mix of 
public function and private control remained and created controversies (Geiger, 2011).  
Such problems caused an overall decline in academic freedom (Hofstadter, 1955).    
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The Dartmouth College decision.  While colleges continued to have both public 
and private aspects, the case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) 
provided resolution.  The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) decision is 
noteworthy in the history of American higher education because it influenced how later 
colleges were organized.  The court was faced with the question of whether the state of 
New Hampshire could alter the charter of the school.  Initially established by a royal 
charter of King George III in 1769, Dartmouth operated with a form of shared 
governance.  Control was vested in a Board of Trustees, and the board had delegated its 
power to Dartmouth’s president.  The state of New Hampshire tried to assert control over 
the college because of its chartering and support of the institution (Freedman, 2004; 
Heller, 2004; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1819).   
Particularly unusual to Dartmouth’s circumstances was that the college 
presidency had been shared between a father and a son, who had administrated the affairs 
of the school without the input of the board.  As the son’s presidential reign neared the 
end, the board was asked whether it would increase its influence on the college.  In a 
highly politicized move, the Democrats in the New Hampshire legislature passed a law 
that nullified the original charter and declared Dartmouth College a state university.  The 
New Hampshire Superior Court found in favor of the state, ruling that Dartmouth College 
was a public institution.  On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Daniel Webster argued 
for the defense of the college and its independence from the state.  Quoted in Heller 
(2004), Webster passionately argued that the case was not only of Dartmouth College but 
“of every college in the land” (p. 51).  He further asked:  “Shall our state legislature be 
 
46 
allowed to take that which is not their own, to turn it from its original use, and apply it to 
such ends or purposes as they, in their discretion shall see fit?” (Heller, 2004, p. 51).   
In a decision authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that the Dartmouth College charter was a contract as defined by the federal 
Constitution.  As such, the state of New Hampshire could not alter Dartmouth’s corporate 
charter.  The ruling shielded the college of the legislature’s intrusion and resolved the 
question of ownership of the college.  The decision made clear that private colleges had a 
right to exist separate from the state (Heller, 2004; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 1819).  Following the ruling, states began to focus public financial support 
for higher education to publicly controlled institutions while also phasing out most of the 
direct appropriations for private institutions (Heller, 2004). 
 Changing governance.  Governance in higher education also began to change 
towards the end of this era.  Knowledge and maturity became respected faculty traits.  
Presidents sometimes arose out of professionalized faculty ranks rather than being 
selected solely from the ministry.  That they had been formerly faculty members 
themselves allowed them greater empathy towards the concerns of faculty (Baldridge et 
al., 1978).  Presidents likewise transitioned from the role of speaking for the board to 
being an intermediary between the board and the professoriate.  Also emerging from 
some Eastern United States institutions was the idea that faculty should be appointed only 
with the consent of future colleagues (Hofstadter, 1955).            
In the early 1800s as the country expanded westward, there was significant 
growth in the number of private liberal arts colleges, many which were religious schools.  
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While hundreds opened, most did not survive (Thelin, 2004).  In the mid to late 1800s, 
German style universities that offered graduate education evolved.  Schools offering 
practical and advanced subjects were created, in part because of the Morrill Land Grant 
Act of 1862, and collegiate education grew to include students other than white males 
(Geiger, 2011).  At the same time, a lack of uniformity created tension between how 
public colleges and universities interpreted their role in serving the state, and how 
policymakers and the public viewed that role (Heller, 2004).         
In 1869 the paradigm of the American university evolved when Charles W. Elliot 
assumed the presidency of Harvard.  In professional schools, he replaced practitioner-
teachers with a learned, full-time faculty; put into place a mandatory curriculum, and 
eventually defined professional school as requiring a bachelor’s degree.  The Harvard 
model allowed for the development of the American university, in which the instruction 
of undergraduates would support a specialized faculty that taught graduate students 
(Geiger, 2011).   
A significant trend during the nineteenth century was a decline in academic 
freedom (Hofstadter, 1955; Gerber, 2010; Tierney & Lechuga, 2005).  A primary reason 
was the growth in the number of higher education institutions that exceeded the number 
needed in the country (Hofstadter, 1955).  Before the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, college teaching was not viewed as a very prestigious vocation.  After about the 
mid nineteenth century, presidents and governing boards exercised control over decision-
making with little input from the faculty (Gerber, 2010; Tierney & Lechuga, 2005).  Until 
the late nineteenth century, professors did not meet what might now be considered the 
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basic criteria as a professional (Gerber, 2010). Violations of professors’ academic 
freedom during the time period are “legendary and well documented” (Tierney & 
Lechuga, 2005, p. 8).  Two other events occurred in the nineteenth century that impacted 
academic freedom.  Educational reformers secured elective courses, less liberal 
education, and alternative scientific programs.  In addition, faculty governance began to 
emerge, due to weaknesses in governance by trustees (Hofstadter, 1955). 
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, colleges experienced significant growth in 
enrollment; many of those that failed to grow were closed.  Growth occurred in part from 
the assimilation of women into higher education and from the growth in component parts 
of the institutions such as units and specialties.  Academic freedom began to resemble 
academic freedom as we know it today, based strongly on Darwinism and the academic 
traditions of German universities.  The major disciplinary associations formed from about 
1890 to 1905.  Teaching positions increasingly became occupied by faculty members 
who contributed to the knowledge base of the disciplines, and universities influenced the 
definition of the academic profession.  Faculty members enshrined this definition by 
organizing the AAUP in 1915 to” champion their professional rights, particularly 
academic freedom” (Geiger, 2011, p. 54).   
 The extraordinary growth in higher education during this era was also due to the 
ability of some institutional presidents to attract vast financial resources.  With greater 
growth, the universities became more complex as presidents needed help in managing the 
administrative duties.  Both administrative and academic hierarchies developed during 
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this period.  Those in the academic hierarchy made academic decisions such as regarding 
curriculum, academic standards, and faculty hiring (Baldridge et al., 1978).   
During the 1920s, enrollments approximately doubled, and higher education 
became less elite and more geared towards the masses.  Hierarchy among institutions 
increased, as emergent forms of higher education offered different types of instruction for 
different students.  To develop a true liberal education while advancing the academic 
disciplines was a challenge that created tension (Geiger, 2011). 
 Prior to this era, faculty members were typically hired by administrators and lay 
boards, though other faculty members may have been consulted.  With increased 
specialization came increased faculty participation in governance because presidents and 
lay boards found it difficult to assess the performance of a faculty member.  In addition, 
the growth in institutional size made centralized control more difficult.  In light of these 
factors, the academic department became the primary community within which faculty 
members exercised personnel responsibilities.    
Following World War II, American higher education was in a state of turmoil for 
about thirty years.  The years were marked primarily by expansion and academic 
standardization, and institutions became more alike in terms of curricular offerings, 
faculty training, and administrative practices.  Soldiers returning from the war who were 
supported by the GI Bill and the significant increase in the numbers of students attending 
community college were primary reasons for the expansion (Geiger, 2011). Education 
during this period was described as transitioning from being for the elite, for the masses, 
and then universally for all.  A direct influence of the rapid expansion was student unrest, 
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precipitated in part due to deteriorating academic conditions (Altbach, 2011b).  Student 
unrest also arose due to debates on campus over the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights 
Movement.   
Also resulting from rapid expansion was an increased market for the 
professoriate.  As faculty demand was greater than faculty supply, the professoriate 
gained power within institutions.  Part of this power included making decisions that were 
related to teaching and research duties (Baldridge et al., 1978).  This was also the time 
frame in which the “multiversity” arose, defined by Kerr (1963) as “a whole series of 
communities and activities held together by a common name, a common governing 
board, and related purposes . . . [that] is neither entirely of the world nor entirely apart 
from it” (p. 1).           
The transitions that occurred in the 1970s led into a period in the 1980s in which 
the demographics, politics, and social relations of American higher education changed.  
The previous explosion in growth ceased in 1975, and the growth in full-time students 
crept slowly over the next twenty years.  Federal investment in higher education 
increased through the mechanism of student financial aid.  Federal regulation over higher 
education became ever more present and required greater access for women and 
minorities (Geiger, 2011).   
An era of privatization of higher education occurred in the 1980s (Geiger, 2011).  
Privatization includes, among other things, a retreat of public dollars from public higher 
education institutions with a corresponding increased reliance on private money and 
diversified revenue streams, and increased competition for resources (Morphew & Eckel, 
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2009).  Higher education’s increased revenues from the private sector in the 1980s 
resulted in a rise in tuition that outpaced the rise in median family income, which shifted 
the burden of college costs to students and parents.  College rankings and media publicity 
made selectivity an issue.  Some private colleges and universities prospered, while public 
institutions had to adapt to decreased public support (Geiger, 2011).   
Federal actions in the 1980s, such as the Bayh-Dole Act, encouraged the transfer 
of university technology to private industry.  The commercialization of research and the 
call for universities to contribute to economic development has contributed to greater 
federal, state, and private investment in academic research.  Not without controversy, the 
importance of research has increased relative to the weight of the importance of faculty 
instruction in the current era (Geiger, 2011). The ultimate challenge, according to Geiger 
(2011), is for the next generation “to sustain the immeasurable contributions that colleges 
and universities make to American society, let alone to improve them” (p. 64). 
Institutional governance is currently marked by a culture of tremendous unrest 
due to economic problems, a push toward privatization, the increase in a managerial 
structure, large numbers of graduates from colleges and universities, and a decline in 
enrollment.  Internal conflict has increased as institutional units compete for limited 
resources.  Such tensions affect faculty personnel decisions and inspire activities such as 
unionization.  Another result of the collective problems is that outside groups such as 
governments have pressured institutions to eliminate departments and restrict budgets 
(Altbach, 2011b; Baldridge et al., 1978).  Some have characterized the reforms that 
occurred near the end of the twentieth century as a “managerial revolution” in higher 
 
52 
education, where accountability and efficiency were sought (Altbach, 2011b, p. 25; 
Keller, 1983).  Rising undergraduate student tuition rates have led Congress to review 
college costs and make recommendations as to how to keep tuition increases in check 
(Ehrenberg, 2004).  While faculty members assert principles of self-government, 
academic freedom, and equality of relations, administrators seek to establish order, 
efficiency, a commitment to mission, and a working relationship with the legislature and 
constituencies to assure the success of the institution (Mason, 1972).        
With the increasing complexity of modern societies and the economy, higher 
education has expanded in response to public demands for a more highly trained 
workforce, and “curricular vocationalism” has built a greater link between higher 
education institutions and industry (Altbach, 2011b, p. 25).   As higher education has 
expanded and adapted to societal needs, so too has the management and governance of 
universities grown more complex (Altbach, 2011a, 2011b; Mason, 1972).   
Shared governance.  University governance literature weighs heavily on the side 
of needing a nonhierarchical approach for university decision-making.  Even so, the 
university is full of “quasi-hierarchical” features, which coexist with the concept of 
shared governance in higher education (Mason, 1972, p. 2).   The varied roles of the 
trustees, president, deans, and department heads, along with the multiple ranks of faculty 
members are facially similar to hierarchical chains of command, and differ from 
institution to institution (Hammond, 2004).  There is a split along chains of academic and 
administrative lines, but an absolute dichotomy between the two is “arbitrary and 
simplistic” and ignores how interrelated most decisions are (Mason, 1972, p. 7).  As an 
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example, financial and personnel decisions directly affect academic policy, and vice 
versa.   
In today’s institutions, boards of trustees, comprised of lay representatives, 
typically have legal control over the institution (Kaplan, 2004).  Boards control such 
responsibilities as property management, financial management, selecting administrators, 
appointing faculties, determining institutional mission and developments, and reviewing 
all programs and actions (Freedman, 2004; Kaplan, 2004).  Administrators face the 
challenges of negotiating the details of complex higher education funding (Johnstone, 
2011), managing increasingly entrepreneurial universities (Toma, 2011), and 
understanding and implementing the countless laws and regulations that have an 
influence throughout the entire institution (Alexander & Alexander, 2011; Kaplin & Lee, 
2006; Poskanzer, 2002).  Faculty members likewise continue to play a key role in higher 
education governance.  As the creators of new knowledge and key participants in the 
educational process, the faculty often prevails in educational decisions.  These decisions 
include, for example, admission standards, curriculum, graduation requirements, and 
faculty hiring and promotion processes.  Trustees retain the final authority on academic 
matters, but overturning administrative recommendations—which are influenced by 
faculty decisions—is rare (Altbach, 2011a; Ehrenberg, 2004; Kaplan, 2004).   
Accountability to external forces.  Even though faculty members participate in 
governance, pressures on the academic profession have negatively impacted the basic 
conditions of the academic work of faculty (Altbach, 2011a).  A decline in public support 
for the work of faculty (Anderson, 1992; Sykes, 1988), salaries that have remained 
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relatively stagnant for several decades (Bell, 1999), an uncertain job market (Altbach, 
2011a), and a greatly segmented academic profession (Altbach, 2011a) are pressures 
facing today’s professoriate that ultimately affect academic freedom. 
In the past several decades, the governance of academia has faced increased 
intervention by outside forces that may further threaten academic freedom.  Accrediting 
agencies have held higher education accountable to voluntary nongovernmental agencies 
for meeting certain minimal standards.  Institutional, system-wide, and state agencies 
may influence academia’s programs and quality (Altbach, 2011a; Schmidtlein & Berdahl, 
2011).  Pressures towards more structure have arisen from federal and state legislation on 
issues such as affirmative action and equal employment opportunity.  Assessment 
measures have increased; for example, some states have implemented performance 
funding in more recent years (Bogue & Brown, 1982; Bogue & Johnson, 2010; Heller, 
2004).  
Additionally, in the past four decades higher education has increasingly lost the 
privilege of self-regulation to courts.  Through judicial decisions has arisen an 
increasingly structured system of faculty rights and responsibilities.  Courts have 
guaranteed faculty the constitutional protections of freedom of speech, freedom of 
inquiry, and due process.  (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995; Olivas & Baez, 2011; 
Schmidtlein & Berdahl, 2011).   
The forms of organization and governance of higher education will continue to be 
influenced by the changing environment in which it exists.  Myriad and complex issues 
emerging in higher education will require that academics, organizations, and constituents 
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continue working together to address the challenges of the future.  Given the current 
financial strain and competition, the tension between how institutions view their role and 
how the public views that role will remain (Heller, 2004).  New accountability measures 
required by state and federal governments are likely to emerge (McLendon, 2003; 
Schmidtlein & Berdahl, 2011).  Research funding and control and the related issue of 
knowledge dissemination will face issues of quality and control.  The role of the private 
sector and the diversification of institutions will continue to reshape the academic system.  
In a globalized market, student and faculty mobility and global competition among 
academic systems will be ever present (Altbach, 2010b).   
Trends in governance.  With increasing criticism of the traditional forms of 
governance in colleges and universities as being inefficient and cumbersome, the rise of 
the “administrative state” will likely become more established through bureaucratic 
structures (Altbach, 2011b, p. 28).  Patterns of delegation and the practice of shared 
governance are neither absolute nor uniform and are adaptable (Kaplan, 2004).  Mason 
(1972) encouraged a “[c]omplementary social ordering” in the university whereby 
“[c]ollegialization” becomes a device for allowing the academic institution to adapt to 
emerging societal and academic demands through more intensive collaboration between 
the lines of command (p. 6).   
The development of the academic profession.  Historical and organizational 
influences on the development of the academic profession also underlie American 
academic freedom.  The model of professorial authority has evolved within the evolving 
institutions.  Although academe “enjoys relatively strong internal autonomy and 
 
56 
considerable academic freedom,” social, political, and economic societal trends of higher 
education have shaped the American professoriate (Altbach, 2011a, p. 228).         
Historical influences.  Medieval European influences can be seen in the self-
governing nature of the professoriate and in the concept of a university made up of 
communities of scholars.  German reforms in higher education in the nineteenth century 
strengthened the prestige and authority of the professoriate and linked universities and the 
academic profession with the state.  Professors were viewed as civil servants, and the 
universities were expected to contribute to Germany’s development.  Research became a 
responsibility of universities.  Developments at Oxford and Cambridge also influenced 
intellectual trends in the United States (Altbach, 2011a). 
The profession in its current form in America was most significantly influenced 
by the period of development beginning with the rise of land-grant colleges.  After the 
Civil War and the establishment of research-focused private universities in the late 
nineteenth century, the university became committed to public service and to “relevance” 
(Altbach, 2011a, p. 231).  Societal issues, applied scholarship, and professional training 
became a focus.  Private and public universities began to emphasize research and 
graduate training, and a doctorate became necessary to reach the upper levels of the 
academic profession.  The culture of research, graduate training, and professionalism 
began to undergird professorial values (Altbach, 2011a). 
After World War II and into the 1960s, massive growth occurred in all sectors of 
American higher education.  As student enrollments rose, the profession tripled, new 
institutions opened in every sector, and new departments formed.   The particularly rapid 
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growth of the 1960s created plans and expectations of continued growth.  Population 
shifts and fiscal crises of the 1970s ended the expansion, however, and the bulk of 
continued growth in enrollments has been among part-time students.  Corresponding with 
the temporary nature of the rapid expansion, the growth in faculty has more recently been 
along the nontenure-track lines (Altbach, 2011a).   
Altbach (2011a) posited that “[e]xpansion shaped the vision of the academic 
profession for several decades” (p. 232).  Postwar growth, the seller’s market for jobs, 
significant salary improvement, and access to research funds benefited the academic 
profession.  Mobility and career advancement were favorable, but institutional loyalty 
and commitment suffered.  To improve faculty retention, institutions lessened teaching 
loads and increased fringe benefits.  As external research funds became more available, 
some professors were able to rely less on their institutions (Altbach, 2011a).  Effects of 
the expansion are still felt in higher education today, as a legacy of “divisiveness and the 
politicization of the campus” has continued since the 1960s (Altbach, 2011a, p. 234).    
Today’s institutions of higher education are central to America’s postindustrial 
society; as such, the professoriate is pressured from many sources.  Constituents call for 
greater productivity, accountability, effectiveness, and social relevance.  Students 
demand vocationally oriented courses.  A lackluster job market has made gaining tenure 
more difficult, and the growth of part-time academic staff has risen to more than half of 
the professoriate nationwide—a growth of 376 percent between 1970 and 2001 (Altbach, 
2011a, p. 230).  Also increasing are the numbers of full-time, but nontenure-track faculty 
who hold limited-terms jobs and have a primary teaching role.   
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The academic profession, largely white, male, and Protestant a half century ago, is 
increasingly diverse.  Women have increased to about 36 percent of the total and about 
half of those who are entering academe (Altbach, 2011a, p. 231).  Racial and ethnic 
minorities have also increased in academe.  Recognizing variations in demographic, 
cultural, disciplinary, and other variations, Altbach (2011a) explained, “If there ever was 
a sense of community among professors in the United States, it has long sense 
disappeared” (p. 231). 
Organizational influences.  Academics live dually in two worlds:  that of a 
professional and that of an employee of a bureaucratic organization.  Faculty involvement 
in university governance arises from the consequence of the unique professional expertise 
of the professor, which makes the professor’s contributions to decision-making essential 
to the success of the university (Mason, 1972).  The description of faculty members as 
employees is not fully correct, because faculty are the primary authority on much of the 
“business” that is conducted in the university (Mason, 1972, p. 19).  To that point, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in National Labor Relations Board v. Yeshiva University 
(1980) that faculty members at private Yeshiva University could not unionize because 
they wielded power as managerial employees.  Thus, any analogy between employees 
and professors as to their relationships to employers and university administrators is 
tenuous (Mason, 1972).   
Although a framework of shared governance prevails, the realities of the 
American university create tensions with professors’ views of themselves as the 
traditional, autonomous scholar.  Altbach (2011a) reported on a 1990 survey that 
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described two-thirds of faculty members as having fair or poor morale, and 60 percent as 
having negative feelings about the “sense of community” at their institutions (p. 234).  He 
further reported that things have not recently improved. 
The concept of autonomy receives wide support in the literature, yet autonomy 
over a professor’s use of time and over research topics is greatly affected by external 
funding, politics, and technology.  State institutions are agencies of the state and are 
dependent on the state, either directly or indirectly, for financial support.  Collegial 
decision-making and autonomy have come into ever more conflict with the realities of 
complex organizational structures and bureaucracy, which have changed the formula of 
shared governance (Altbach, 2011a).   
External authorities have influenced the academic profession.  Through legislative 
action and the courts, governmental decisions impact the academic profession.  Federal 
and state regulations have influenced higher education actions in hiring and promotion.  
The courts, though historically reluctant to interfere with the internal workings of 
academic institutions, have reviewed and sometimes reversed academic decisions.  Laws 
have also affected faculty workloads and other accountability measures (Altbach, 2011a).   
The reward system in academe has created an imbalance between the academic 
roles of teaching, research, and service.  External constituents indicate that a greater 
emphasis on teaching and time in the classroom is needed.  Many of the same 
constituents criticize the underlying value and relevance of much of the research that is 
done in universities.  The reward system, on the other hand, is often linked to scholarly 
research and publications.  A decline in external research funding, greater competition for 
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funding, more orientation towards applied research, and closer links between universities 
and the private sector have affected and will continue to affect faculty roles.  Structural 
changes will likely change the research culture and motivate the professoriate to “focus 
attention on the customer” (Altbach, 2011a, p. 239). 
External pressures are in a constant tension with the traditional autonomy of the 
profession.  A bureaucratically arranged administration and a highly specialized and 
fragmented faculty contribute to a sense that shared academic purpose or community is 
lacking.  Accountability demands have increased, and decisions concerning class size and 
academic direction of the institution are often placed in the purview of system wide 
agencies and administrators.  Student demands reflect that consumerism is a central 
consideration.  Technology affects academic publishing and can blur lines across 
departments (Altbach, 2011a).    
While academic hiring and promotion largely remain the responsibility of the 
profession, this is not without the more recent influences of laws and regulations, tenure 
quotas, debates over curriculum relevance, or the occasional intrusion of the courts.  
Another problem of the current times is that the professoriate itself has failed to explain 
its central role in society and to promote the need for traditional academic values; the 
professoriate has remained central to the shared governance of institutions primarily 
through entrenched power and tradition.  If, as many scholars have predicted, higher 
education’s golden age of growth and public support is over, then academics are facing a 
period of significant change that could significantly weaken the power and autonomy of 
the professoriate (Altbach, 2011a).  While many pressures affect the autonomy of the 
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professoriate, Altbach (2011a) opined that American professors presently have a fairly 
high degree of academic freedom, particularly in areas of academic substance (Altbach, 
2011a).   
Legal Foundations of Academic Freedom 
Conceptually, the 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, as 
interpreted in 1970, provides instructors with the right to address their work without the 
fear of negative employment consequences (Toma, 2011).  Legally, infringements upon 
academic freedom can be adjudicated under constitutional principles, contract law, or 
state statutes and administrative regulations, depending on basis of the claims and the 
type of institution in which the claims arise.  While constitutional rights are usually the 
focus of the courts, the legal boundaries of institutional authority over academic freedom 
are initially provided under contract law.  Individual contracts and collective bargaining 
agreements of the faculty provide the parameters of the academic freedom rights.  AAUP 
documents including the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure, related interpretive documents, and other recommended regulations are 
sometimes referenced and incorporated into faculty contracts (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  
Documents that are incorporated by reference will be interpreted and enforced by the 
courts by referencing contract law principles.  If the documents are not incorporated by 
reference, courts may consider the documents as an important source for determining the 
custom and usage of the documents in academia (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).        
In private institutions, principles of contract law, which can be supplemented with 
principles of academic custom and usage, may be the sole restriction on administrators’ 
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legal authority to limit faculty academic freedom.  Special institutional missions may also 
make the courts’ involvement and interpretation of academic freedom infringement 
claims more complex.  For example, academic freedom expectations may be adjusted and 
differently interpreted at religious colleges and universities when deference to doctrinal 
authority is necessary (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  
Distinctions between public and private institutions can also influence the 
application of constitutional freedom of expression principles to academic freedom 
claims.  Constitutional academic freedom discourages actions such as institutional 
insistence upon loyalty oaths (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  Whether based in professional 
norms or on constitutional protections, however, academic freedom does not protect 
disruptive speech or unethical conduct, classroom speech that is unrelated to the content 
of the course, or behavior such as sexual harassment (Toma, 2011).  In both public and 
private institutions, the First Amendment protects faculty members as U.S. citizens from 
governmental censorship and actions that infringe upon their freedom of expression 
through speech, press, and association.  If a governmental body that is external to an 
institution restrains a faculty member’s freedom, First Amendment protections extend to 
faculty members at both public and private institutions.  When an internal restraint is 
placed on a faculty member’s speech, the First Amendment likely protects only faculty 
members at public institutions (Kaplin & Lee, 2006). 
Academic freedom does not depend upon appointment type, so less than full-time 
and nontenure-track faculty members have the same technical protections as tenured 
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faculty.  Conceptually, professors and researchers are protected against reprisal when 
their work conflicts with institutional interests or views of the public (Toma, 2011).      
Institutional and individual autonomy.  From 1957 to 1967 the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued seven decisions pertaining to academic freedom.  Of those, six involved 
institutions of higher education.  From 1968 to 1978 the Court issued eight more 
decisions pertaining to academic freedom, with six involving institutions of higher 
education.  Most of the Court’s opinions involving academic freedom during 1979 to 
1989 pertained to public schools (Van Alstyne, 1996).  Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
has emphasized the importance of free inquiry in a democratic society, it has not held that 
academic freedom is an express federal constitutional right—though some state statutes 
or regulations may offer express protections.  Many of the Courts’ statements regarding 
academic freedom hold no precedential value, a clear standard of its protections has not 
been articulated, and the academic freedom rights of individuals versus those of 
institutions are not always clearly distinguished (Toma, 2011).       
In early cases, the issue of academic freedom was from the perspective of 
protecting the faculty and institutions from unwanted outside influences, such as judicial 
interference.  Over time, cases then considered the protections of faculty from outside 
influences (Zirkel, 1984-1985) or from institutional intrusion (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  
From these perspectives, academic freedom has developed two distinct strains, 
institutional autonomy and individual autonomy (Zirkel, 1984-1985).  In some instances, 
the academic freedom interests of individuals can conflict with those of institutions.  
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When the court considers such conflicts, the right of institutional autonomy tends to 
outweigh the academic freedom rights of individual professors.   
Both institutions and individuals claim certain academic freedom rights. 
University or college interests are more likely to take precedence in decisions such as 
course content, teaching method, and faculty evaluation.  Research interests enjoy some 
of the strongest academic freedom protections, yet institutional interest can still prevail as 
more compelling.  And abusive or harassing behavior in the classroom is not protected by 
academic freedom principles (Toma, 2011). 
One of the early cases issued by the U.S. Supreme Court pertaining to academic 
freedom was Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York (1952), which 
concerned the First Amendment rights of a faculty member.  The focus in in the case was 
a New York statute that provided that a person who teaches or advocates, or is knowingly 
a member of an organization which teaches or advocates the overthrow of the 
government by force or violence would be disqualified from employment in the public 
school system.  While the majority found no constitutional infirmity in the statute, the 
minority view expressed by Justice Black condemned the statute as limiting the flow of 
ideas.  In Justice Douglas’s dissent, with which Justice Black concurred, he identified 
academic freedom as a subset of concerns arising under the First Amendment, stating.  
that “[t]here can be no real academic freedom” in an environment of “constant 
surveillance” that watches for “disloyalty” or “dangerous thoughts” (Adler v. Board of 
Education of the City of New York, 1952, pp. 393-394).   
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Paying homage to intellectual freedom in academia, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) relied on the First Amendment to safeguard a 
professor’s controversial lecture as an exercise of academic freedom.  Justice Frankfurter, 
writing for himself and Justice Harlan, announced in a concurrence what is now known 
as the classical statement of “the four essential freedoms” of the university (Kaplin & 
Lee, 2006):  
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most 
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.  Therein, the courts 
attempt to guard “the four essential freedoms” of the University – to 
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.      
(Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 1957, p. 263).  The plurality opinion, authored by Chief 
Justice Warren, explained that “there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner’s 
liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression—areas in which the 
government should be extremely reticent to tread” (Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 1957, p. 
250).  The Court went on to explain the importance of freedom of inquiry to the stability 
of society (Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 1957).  
 In another foundational case, Keyishian v. Board of Regents of State of New York 
(1967), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that academic freedom is essential to creating 
an atmosphere of inquiry in higher education (Tierney & Lechuga, 2010).  In Keyishian 
v. Board of Regents of State of New York (1967), the Court overturned a New York law 
that required all state university personnel to disclaim allegiance to the Communist party.  
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Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan connected academic freedom with the First 
Amendment, stating: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which 
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers 
concerned.  That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy 
over the classroom . . . The classroom is peculiarly the “marketplace of 
ideas.”    
(Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 1967, p. 603).  
Freedom of speech.  Freedom of speech claims that arise at public institutions are 
usually subject to the line of U.S. Supreme Court cases that extends from Pickering v. 
Board of Education (1968).  Under the Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) decision 
and the decision in Connick v. Meyers (1983), public university employees may discuss 
matters of public concern.  Even so, if the expressions severely conflict with institutional 
purposes and institutional needs outweigh the interests of the individual, an institution 
can assert interests (Toma, 2011).  
In Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) the Supreme Court considered whether a public 
employee spoke as a citizen on an issue of public concern.  The Court ruled that the First 
Amendment does not limit public employers from disciplining employees for statements 
that are made pursuant to their official duties.  While some lower courts have equated 
faculty members with public employees, Justice Souter warned in his dissent about the 
impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) on academic freedom (Toma, 2011).  In response 
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to Justice Souter’s dissent, the Court acknowledged the argument that was raised related 
to constitutional interests that may arise in scholarship or classroom instruction that were 
not accounted for in the employee-speech analysis.  Garcetti v. Ceballos’s (2006) 
language left open the issue as to whether its jurisprudence would be applied in the same 
way when applied to scholarship or teaching.    
Referencing Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) in its analysis, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit issued a 2011 decision in an academic freedom case, Adams v. The 
Trustees of University of North Carolina-Wilmington.  Adams, an associate professor of 
criminology at the university, is also a conservative commentator and author.  A former 
atheist, Adams was hired as an assistant professor in 1993 and was promoted to associate 
professor in 1998.  Following his conversion to Christianity in 2000, Adams claimed 
academic persecution that resulted in his denial of promotion to full professor, even 
though he had a strong record of teaching, research, and service for which he had won 
awards.  In 2010 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ruled 
in a summary judgment order that Adams’ nationally syndicated columns were not 
protected by the First Amendment, and that they represented “official” speech because 
the writings were referenced in a promotion application.  On April 6, 2011, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court on that matter and ruled that the 
speech, which was directed at a national or international audience on issues of public 
importance, was unrelated to Adams’s teaching duties or other terms of employment at 
the university.  The court ruled that writings and speeches on topics such as academic 
freedom and civil rights constituted “private” speech at the time it was made and thus 
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should receive the full protections of the First Amendment (Adams v. The Trustees of 
University of North Carolina-Wilmington, 2011).    
No unified theory of academic freedom.  While the issue of academic freedom 
has appeared in many cases, a unified theory of “academic freedom” is lacking.  The 
courts have appeared reluctant to create a working definition of the term.  Courts are 
seemingly reluctant to intervene in issues that are educational in nature.  Another aspect 
that may contribute to a lack of a unified theory is that the elements of academic freedom 
are analogous to civil rights granted to all citizens, thus it is incorporated into 
constitutional framework.  The conflict of rights between institutions and individual also 
raises debate (Ancell, 1978).  In Parate v. Isabor (1989), the court explained that the term 
academic freedom meant both the freedom of the academy to pursue its end without 
interference from the government and the freedom of the individual teacher to pursue his 
or her ends without interference from the academy.  The court also acknowledged that 
these two claims of academic freedom can sometimes conflict.  
Authors such as DeMitchell (2002), who concluded that academic freedom 
belongs to institutions, assert nonetheless that professors have rights when their interests 
align with those of their employers.  Although the AAUP supports the academic freedom 
rights of individual faculty members, it also concludes that institutions have rights when 
academic questions are at issue (Toma, 2011).  Toma (2011) asserted that “[t]he real 
issue in academic freedom may not be where rights exist, but if individuals, particularly 
those lacking in tenure, are positioned to assert those that do apply” (Toma, 2011, p. 97).   
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Cultural Foundations of Academic Tenure 
As expressed in the1915 AAUP Declaration of Principles, which is now titled 
Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, a primary 
purpose of tenure is to protect academic freedom (AAUP, 2012).  The AAUP’s 1940 
Statement advanced the concept that higher education institutions support the common 
good and that the common good is best reached through principles of academic freedom.  
Accordingly, the AAUP advocates for tenure to benefit the common good.  The concept 
of tenure originated in twelfth century Europe (Fishman, 2000).  Designed to safeguard 
academic freedom and job security, it is viewed in academia both as the foundation for 
great rewards and as a negative condition of employment (Adams, 2006-2007).     
In a 1973 essay for the Commission on Academic Tenure, Metzger provided an 
historical overview of academic tenure, with three eras or “ages of academic man” 
forming the basis of his essay:  The Era of the Master, in which tenure was granted as a 
privilege; The Era of the Employee, in which tenure was granted as a function of time; 
and The Era of the Professional, in which tenure was granted as judiciality—a function of 
procedures and regulations (Metzger, 1973, p. 94).  For each era, Metzger (1973) 
discussed the influence of tenure on the academic work force and on academic life.  
Metzger’s (1973) eras are summarized in order to provide an overview of the historical 
roots of tenure.  The historical development of tenure is best considered in conjunction 
with, not separate from, the development of academic freedom and American institutions.   
Scholars as masters.  From the emergence of teaching in the Middle Ages until 
the Reformation, teaching in a university—or stadium generale—was a privileged 
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occupation.  In the turbulence of the times, rulers of church and state sought to protect 
scholars’ safety in their journeys and domiciles.  Other sovereigns followed suit in 
protecting university scholars from harm.  In addition to physical comfort, material 
comfort was provided through the equivalent of income and fringe benefits (Metzger, 
1973).   
Favors could be retracted, however, so medieval scholars also sought the benefits 
of immunity from the reach of power and corporate autonomy for the ability to assist and 
defend themselves (Metzger, 1973, p. 96).  Through the formation of communities and 
societies, they created collective rules and regulations and sought the right to sue and be 
sued as a single juristic person.  Metzger (1973) explained that the “two distinct yet allied 
ambitions” of autonomy and immunity formed the earliest roots of modern academic 
tenure (p. 96). 
The benefits scholars sought were not solely academic; elements of prestige and 
status were likewise important.  In return for what they received by way of privilege, they 
gave back in ways such as clarifying tenets of religious faith and practicing the tools of 
dialectic logic.  Universities became diplomatists and created for society many educated 
persons who could fill religious and secular positions (Metzger, 1973). 
In the Middle Ages, credentials were controlled by the Church.  Through 
struggles in the local hierarchy between external licensure and diocesan discipline, 
tensions arose regarding faculty self-assertion. This matter came to a head in the 
thirteenth century, and eventually, the process of qualification was granted to the faculty 
(Metzger, 1973).  Battles against diocesan discipline were also fought.  Metzger (1973) 
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recounted stories of faculty playing the distant against the local; forming advantageous 
alliances, even with the state against the church; and displaying academic claim to 
competence.  An intermingling of shared and special privileges marked an early 
approximation of what tenure meant in the Middle Ages.  Tenure at that time meant an 
admission to a corpus that was possessed of a legal personality with considerable 
governmental power.  Admission to this power was granted by license over which the 
masters had command.  As a privilege, tenure was a declaration of opposition to any 
academic sanction that came from a nonacademic source (Metzger, 1973).  
Every faculty member lived under common rules and compelling vows.  Under 
the rule of peers, scholars subscribed to written regulation and received religious truth.  
Sanctions such as fines, suspension, or expulsion could be given, but not without a formal 
hearing of charges and for the appeal of adverse decisions.  Most often, it was the novice 
theologian rather than the experienced teacher who came under peer scrutiny.  It was not 
the function of medieval tenure to limit the tyranny of colleagueships (Metzger, 1973). 
Also significant in the system was terminology that indicated those masters who 
were removed were banished, rather than discharged or dismissed.  A master was not an 
employee of a university, but rather one of its corporate directors.  If he had not been 
hired, then he could not be fired.  The loss of academic privileges, in addition to a loss of 
earning a living, indicated ostracism, perhaps a blockage of the study of advance degrees, 
and could result in being excommunicated from the Church (Metzger, 1973). 
As trends became more hostile to an academic system based on privilege, a 
transition occurred between vitality and dissolution.  The Protestant Reformation added 
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strikes to a system that was headed towards an increasingly secular professoriate and 
state dependence.  The Reformation removed the barriers of inside and outside.  After the 
seventeenth century, the universities became less sectarian, and the politics of religion 
subsided.  In the eighteenth century the locus of authority in religious matters shifted 
from church and state to the individual.  In the nineteenth century the ideology of 
research emphasized knowledge as a public good, which resulted in a resurgence of 
autonomy and immunity.  Professors in the nineteenth century exercised administrative 
powers, set educational standards, awarded academic degrees, and extended licenses to 
novices to teach.  They also established rules and regulations about elections, discipline, 
and governance.  This alliance between state and corporation relied on the state for 
appropriations and ministerial consent in certain administrative matters.  Thus, the master 
in these regions was effectively a member of higher civil service, with unusual prestige 
and scope (Metzger, 1973).   
The English universities were also affected by the Reformation.  The English 
kings further influenced academic offices and had a greater influence on academic 
autonomy.  College tutors were paid to prepare young scholars of the fifteenth century for 
the rigors of study, with the ultimate goal of the theological degree.  During the 
Reformation, tutors absorbed teaching and administrative functions of the university 
(Metzger, 1973). 
Scholars as employees.  Metzger’s (1973) Era of the Employee began with the 
1650s corporate charter by the General Court colony of Massachusetts Bay to Harvard.  
The document retained a Board of Overseers made up of a body of ministers and 
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magistrates who had governed the institution.  It left undetermined the boundaries 
between the inner and outer powers between the governing and teaching roles of the 
college.  The charter was seen as having demoted the Board of Overseers.  With the 
nomination of tutors to the corporation, it effectively asserted the autonomy of academics 
(Metzger, 1973).   
This vision did not hold on due to Harvard’s limited funds and a high turnover 
rate of tutors.  The overseers chose the president, set the salaries of tutors, and maintained 
control of the college.  It was not until 1707 that the overseers began to relax their power, 
and not until 1780 that the “republicanized corporation became entirely lay” and the 
overseers became a “vestigial body” (Metzger, 1973, p. 113).  Other colleges were 
formed similarly, and lay control triumphed in America.  To some extent, a lack of a 
scholarly class in America contributed to this formation.  The shift to lay control came at 
the same time as faculty privileges were diminished everywhere (Metzger, 1973). 
Early tenure policies signaled that teaching and governance began to be 
dissociated.  As a result, the relationship between faculty and corporation became 
contractual, founded on a promised exchange of value.  In a collegial relationship that is 
multilateral, there is a presupposition that it will last.  With the promise between parties 
and an exchange of salary for a service, the consideration of time enters the relationship.  
This relationship marked the beginning of the regulation Metzger (1973) labeled “tenure 
as time” (p. 116).   
Through a lengthy review, Metzger (1973) traced the tenure as time concept to 
Harvard’s beginnings.  He surmised that Harvard began to apply the rule of “up or out,” 
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with the “out” dictated by the limit on time spent in temporary service and the “up” made 
possible by a system of ranks (Metzger, 1973, p. 121).  Other organizations likewise 
began to use lower ranks as proving grounds.  Even so, professors were allowed up but 
were not typically forced out, thus resulting in a sort of indefinite tenure (Metzger, 1973).  
During the nineteenth century, one year appointments competed with indefinite 
tenure.  Reappointments under the one year system required a de novo test.  Metzger 
(1973) explained that the “austere system of appointing all faculty members for a year” 
and reappointing only those who passed a new review “brought on annual sieges of 
springtime nervousness that imperilled [sic] the efficiency of the faculty” (p. 122).  From 
1860 to 1914, the trend was away from the harsh mode.  In 1910, a survey of the 22 
Association of American Universities showed that none of the institutions made all of the 
faculty members submit to annual reappraisal, but for the most part, faculty members 
who were appointed at the rank of instructor were appointed for one year (Metzger, 
1973). 
On one end of the spectrum, indefinite tenure meant that the recipient of an 
indefinite appointment was not removable except for grave dereliction, such as a neglect 
of duty, physical or mental incapacity, or serious moral lapse.  The German model 
interpreted tenure this way, and American professors who made it through the ranks may 
have expected this.  On the other end of the spectrum, indefinite tenure might have 
assured a recipient that he could keep his place as long as he remained proficient.  
Administrative judgment could have deemed him not proficient, but the professor still 
had the presumption of proficiency, until proven otherwise.  Metzger (1973) reported that 
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research of many sources does not identify which end of the spectrum best described the 
meaning of indefinite tenure of that time.  Largely, all appointments were legally 
temporary and instantly extinguishable.  In practice, academic matters depended on the 
people and the place (Metzger, 1973). 
Scholars as professionals and the formation of the AAUP.  Metzger’s (1973) 
Era of the Professional signaled the beginning of professors joining together in 
association.  In 1913, eighteen full professors on the faculty of Johns Hopkins University 
sought to go beyond disciplinary societies to form an organization that would support 
their institutional and societal interests.  With a favorable response, the American 
Association of University Professors was formed (Metzger, 1973).  First, it was proposed 
that the organization form general principles about the tenure of the professional office 
and grounds for the dismissal of professors.  This proposal was focused on standardizing 
the tenure process and making the rules favorable to the interest of professors.  Second, it 
was proposed that a committee be established to investigate any administrative 
interferences with freedom by harming the professional standing or opportunities of any 
professor.  Effectively, this proposal would set up a committee of professors who would 
investigate administrative conduct that was associated with dismissals. The “marriage of 
these two concerns in one professional plan of action” was of historical significance; 
together these proposals were to protect tenure and academic freedom (Metzger, 1973, p. 
136).  The last two schemes became prevalent in academic thinking:  first, the faculty 
was to judge the fitness of a current member when it was brought into dispute, through 
fair procedures separate from the administration; and second, there was to be a link 
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between tenure and judiciality.  The goal was to make academic discharges more difficult 
than they had been by interposing a body of faculty members between the administration 
and the board, with a faculty trial before a dismissal (Metzger, 1973). 
The AAUP and the American Association of Colleges (AAC) (now the  now the 
Association of American Colleges and Universities) jointly developed a 1925 Conference 
Statement, which was developed to address gaps in the initial 1915 Declaration and 
included such provisions as peer review for charges against tenured faculty and faculty 
input in hiring decisions for junior faculty (Metzger, 1993).  The AAUP 1925 Statement 
supported granting tenure to those faculty members who held long-term appointments 
(Fishman, 2000).      
In 1940 the AAUP and the AAC developed the 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure.  This statement provided a key link between academic 
freedom and tenure.  Employment security and due process in case of dismissal were key 
features of the 1940 Statement (AAUP, 2006a, Fishman, 2000).  The force provided in 
the 1940 Statement was moral rather than legal.  Even so, it served as a framework to aid 
faculty and institutions in dealing with certain employment conflicts (Lucas, 1994).   
Following the 1940 Statement was a supplement, the 1958 Statement on 
Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings (AAUP, 2006b).  Released by a 
joint committee representing the AAC and the AAUP, the 1958 Statement formulated the 
due process that should be observed in academia for dismissal proceedings (AAUP, 
2006b).  Since then, gendered references have been removed, and the 1940 Statement is 
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accepted in higher education, is endorsed my many professional organizations, and is 
incorporated into many faculty handbooks.   
While the AAUP sets the standards, institutional differences may include the 
extension of protections to guest speakers, adjunct faculty, or students.  Other differences 
might be found such as the length of probationary periods or credit for prior teaching 
experience (Chait, 2002b).          
The Tenure Process 
 Thus far, this literature review has dealt with an overview of tenure and the 
intertwining of academic freedom and tenure.  These concepts are foundational to the 
personnel policies found in higher education institutions today and may aid in developing 
a greater understanding of tenure and its significance in academia.  Narrowing the focus, 
the review now turns to a closer examination of the tenure process.  This section begins 
with an overview of the process for gaining tenure, and continues through a discussion of 
the criteria used in evaluation, grievance procedures for unsuccessful candidates, 
confidentiality of the peer review process, and changes that have been recommended for 
the process.     
The Process of Gaining Tenure 
Underlying most relationships between an institution and its faculty members is a 
relationship based in contract.  Contracts may be written or implied and may culturally or 
formally incorporate policies and practices found in institutional and organizational 
policy documents.  Policy documents, faculty handbooks, or individual contracts may 
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state the tenure and promotion process, which is formalized in most institutions (Kaplin 
& Lee, 2006).   
The tenure review process begins upon a faculty member’s hiring for a tenure 
track position.  Process timing and standards required can vary widely from institution to 
institution.  Most commonly, tenure is granted at the same time that a faculty member is 
promoted from assistant to associate professor.  Faculty members who are not likely to 
receive tenure may be terminated before the year that they will be up for tenure, and 
faculty members who are excellent candidates for tenure may be promoted early, during 
their period of probation.  During the probationary period, the renewal of a contract does 
not mean an absolute receipt of tenure at the end of a faculty member’s probationary 
period (Leap, 1995).   
A persistent challenge for departments, chairs, and deans is to provide open and 
candid advice to tenure-track faculty members.  Some faculty peers may be inclined to 
share only positive feedback.  Evaluations that do not signal areas of difficulty can be 
harmful at a later time and instigate litigation (Franke, 2010).  For the faculty applicant, 
he or she may be unaware of weaknesses and taken by surprise when a contract is not 
renewed.  For the institution, consistently positive evaluations—even if weak—may 
make it more difficult to support a claim that its reasons for nonrenewal of a contract 
were nondiscriminatory.       
Criteria and standards vary widely for assessing tenure qualifications.  For 
example, smaller institutions may place a high value on teaching skills, while larger 
research institutions may place a premium on scholarship.  Criteria and standards may 
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also vary between departments or colleges within an institution, or professors may 
negotiate aspects of their tenure track within their contract.   Institutional needs and fiscal 
constraints also play into the tenure process and decisions that are made.  Changes in 
institutional programming needs and budgetary constraints would likely alter an 
institution’s planning and its long range staffing needs (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995).      
Most commonly, the tenure process begins with a contract lasting one to three 
years, and the contract may be renewable with continued satisfactory job performance.  
Expressed in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure is the 
AAUP’s “seven-year, up-or-our rule,” under which a faculty member is provided with a 
six-year period of probation (Leap, 1995, p. 44).  Typically during the sixth year of 
employment, a faculty member’s teaching, scholarship, and service are evaluated through 
the faculty member’s submission of a dossier substantiating her or his contributions in the 
area of scholarship, teaching, and service (Leap, 1995).  When a faculty member goes up 
for tenure, the process is often suspenseful and takes a large part of an academic year.   
Peer review.  In decisions of tenure, and related decisions of hiring and 
promotion, an institution’s current faculty members have a voice in determining the 
future faculty.  Poskanzer (2002) deemed this “guildlike control over hiring and 
promotion” of value to the institution, because it aids in assuring that “decisions about the 
quality of scholarship are made by experts” (p. 158).  Within a multi-layered, shared 
governance format, the process begins with a peer evaluation in the faculty member’s 
department (Hammond, 2004; Leap, 1995).  Initial recommendations are largely in the 
hands of tenured senior faculty who serve on a department’s peer review committee. A 
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faculty member’s disciplinary training and personal concerns may greatly influence their 
control over tenure, hiring, curricular, and faculty-retention decisions and input (Adams, 
2006-2007; Hammond, 2004).     
Including the faculty voice has not always been a common feature of tenure 
decisions.  Franke (2001) reported that a 1959 survey conducted by Byse and Joughin 
found that only 26 of 80 institutions involved faculty in tenure recommendations.  Byse 
and Joughin later recommended in 1967 that tenure procedures should involve decisions 
by faculty (Franke, 2001).  Today, most all institutions include faculty input in tenure 
recommendations (Franke, 2001).  Peer review is viewed as a mechanism for a university 
to monitor employees and make informed hiring and promotion decisions (Adams, 2006-
2007).    
While peer review committees have established a place in promotion and tenure 
decisions, they are not favored throughout academia. Tenured faculty members who have 
established academic records may limit innovation and creativity among new faculty.  
The fear of research and ideas that they see as unorthodox or threatening may result in a 
negative vote for tenure.  This view has led some to believe that tenure, instead of being a 
protector of academic freedom, is actually a hindrance to academic freedom (Leap, 
1995).  
Additional reviewers.  Most tenure decisions include in the process input from 
external reviewers and internal peer review committees, department heads, college deans, 
and other academic administrators.  Upon the recommendation of the initial peer review 
committee, a faculty member’s file is forwarded through the process, including the 
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department head and the dean of the college.  Customarily nonbinding, the decisions of 
the committee, department head, and dean are then forwarded to an institution’s chief 
academic officer for the final authoritative decision on reappointment, promotion, or 
tenure.  Only in cases of a split vote among the peer review committee, department head, 
or dean is the chief academic officer likely to reverse a decision.  The focus of the top 
academic officers is typically the financial and institutional commitment to a decision to 
grant promotion or tenure.  Even so, conflicts can arise between the influence of the 
faculty and the influence of the administration (Leap, 1995).     
The tenure process concludes either with a vote of approval by the institution’s 
board of trustees (though some decisions that have no adverse action are not reviewed by 
upper-level administrators or governing boards) or with a denial of tenure.  An evaluation 
that deems a faculty member’s performance as meritorious and that views his or her 
research and teaching expertise as being aligned with institutional needs likely results in a 
grant of tenure.  A faculty member who is not deemed worthy of tenure is subsequently 
put “on notice” with a one-year terminal contract (Leap, 1995, p. 45).  During the 
terminal year, tensions can arise from hurt feelings of the applicant and divisiveness 
among departmental peers who have split views about the tenure decisions.  Much of the 
unsuccessful applicant’s attention may be turned from teaching, research, and service 
commitments and towards the grievance process or job search.  When that contract ends, 
the employment relationship between the institution and the faculty member terminates.  
A second way in which probationary faculty members can be denied tenure is through the 
nonrenewal of a term contract (Leap, 1995).    
 
82 
Criteria for Evaluating Faculty Performance 
 A grant of tenure is based on standards that are unique to each institution.  
Personal characteristics and accomplishments as well as institutional needs are 
incorporated into reappointment, promotion, and tenure decisions.  Three major criteria 
are most often used in faculty performance evaluation:  (a) record of research and 
publications; (b) teaching effectiveness; and (c) service to the public, profession, or 
institution.  The ability of a faculty member to work well with others is also evaluated, 
and can emerge as either a separate category or as a consideration that exists as a crucial 
component of the other three major categories.  The emphasis placed on each category 
differs from institution to institution.  For instance, while a small college may favor 
teaching ability, a doctoral granting institution may favor research.  The emphasis placed 
on each category may also differ within an institution but among departments or colleges.  
As an example, extension service faculty members at a land-grant institution may have 
higher expectations for outreach and service than would be placed upon a social science 
faculty.  Such diversity has limited the formulation of standard criteria in faculty 
evaluation (Leap, 1995).  For the purposes of the following discussion, working 
relationships will be discussed separately as a fourth category, collegiality.   
Measurability of criteria.  Within the categories of criteria used for evaluating a 
faculty member applicant are factors that are both objective and subjective.  Objective 
factors are those that can be observed and measured or counted, such as years of service, 
scores on a numerical student feedback evaluation, number of articles published, or the 
number of committees on which an applicant served.  Subjective factors, on the other 
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hand, are those that are open to interpretation by those assessing the applicant, such as the 
reputation of a faculty member’s graduate degree awarding institution, value of service 
activities, or quality of teaching.  A faculty member’s ability to work in harmony with 
others is also an area that is widely open to subjective interpretation (Leap, 1995).  
 The use of subjective criteria in reappointment, promotion, and tenure decisions 
raises the possibility of reviewers masking discriminatory attitudes behind subjective 
standards.  Congress recognized this possibility when it decided in 1972 to include 
academic institutions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is further 
discussed later in this review.  In a discussion, Congress noted that the central problem of 
employment discrimination was not blatant discrimination but rather hidden biases that 
could be used to systematically exclude women and minorities from discrimination.  
Such biases could be hidden under facially neutral employment criteria (Leap, 1995). 
 In addition to masking possible discrimination, the use of subjective criteria and 
their lack of measurability raises additional debate about tenure and promotion decisions 
as potentially harmful to academic freedom.  A scholar who responds unfavorably to an 
applicant’s tenure application may do so based on his or her own beliefs about the value 
of an applicant’s research or about the quality of an applicant’s service activities.  
Likewise, a voting scholar may feel threatened by the scholarly viewpoints of an 
applicant.   
Courts and criteria.  Courts have confirmed the need for institutions to be clear 
in establishing standards and procedures for the evaluation of tenure candidates.  As an 
example, the court in Taggart v. Drake University (1996) determined that the university’s 
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evaluation procedures created an enforceable contract.  In light of the contract, the court 
ruled that Drake University did not need to provide more criteria than what the contract 
specified.   
Record of research and publications.  A faculty member’s record of research 
and publications is commonly referred to as scholarship.  Scholarly activities often form 
the primary basis for promotion, tenure, and compensation activities, particularly at four-
year institutions.  Those who promote an emphasis on research and publications view 
knowledge creation as lying at the heart of higher education.  By publishing, ideas can be 
challenged and improved.  In addition, proponents argue that it is a more objective 
measure of faculty performance than is teaching effectiveness, with external and internal 
evaluations of publications being regularly practiced (Leap, 1995). 
 Opponents of the focus on research and publications argue that such activities 
detract from excellence in teaching.  Particularly at the undergraduate level of teaching, 
the skills necessary for classroom teaching are quite dissimilar from those required to 
perform valuable research.  The highly specialized scholarship that is often pursued in 
universities is criticized for its time-consuming nature, lack of relevance, and narrow 
constraints (Leap, 1995).   
The publication of research results in peer-refereed journals is the gold standard 
for quality in academia.  This focus on research is attributed to the onus upon universities 
to create knowledge through research and to disseminate knowledge through teaching.  
As technology and knowledge rapidly change, scholars who have an active research 
agenda are thought to be the most aware of changes.  Professors who actively engage in 
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research may then be best poised to bring new ideas and intellectual prowess into the 
classroom.  Accordingly, a focus on research effectively brings the focus to teaching.  
The acclaim brought to an institution based on a researcher’s excellence is likewise 
valued.  By gaining attention and prestige through quality research, a college or 
university can then attract quality faculty, grants, and external funding (Leap, 1995).          
 Assessing a faculty member’s record of research and publications is performed 
using objective and subjective factors.  A quantitative summary of publications, while 
seemingly objective, does little to assess quality or impact of the publication.  Differences 
arise among disciplines, peer review committees, department heads, and deans as to the 
value of various journals, based on their focus and orientation as theoretical or practical 
(Leap, 1995).   
 Reviewing a faculty applicant’s scholarship can also be influenced by the use of 
external evaluators.  In order to assess the quality and impact of a scholar’s research, 
letters are often sought from professors who are affiliated with other universities.  Peer 
reviewers who attempt to assess a colleague’s highly specialized research may benefit 
from the expertise of an external reviewer who knows more about the applicant’s 
research.  Potential accusations that a decision was discriminatory may be thwarted by 
the use of an outside reviewer, though the same biases that can affect internal reviewers 
can be found in external reviewers.  Perceived fairness can also increase when a faculty 
candidate is able to name his or her reviewers (Leap, 1995).   
Teaching effectiveness.  A criterion for promotions and tenure, student reaction 
to a professor’s teaching effectiveness has been deemed by the Eighth Circuit Court of 
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Appeals as a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory factor on which to evaluate tenure 
candidates” (Leap, 1995, p. 92 quoting Brousard-Norcross v. Augustana College 
Association, 1991, p. 976).  Even so, teaching effectiveness can be difficult to measure.  
Criteria used can lack reliability and validity; students who complete questionnaires 
about their professors’ performance may deem them useless and a bother to fill out 
(Leap, 1995). 
 The stated importance of teaching effectiveness, given by college and university 
administrators, is often perceived differently by faculty.  Differences in perceptions can 
be exacerbated by a lack of definition of what constitutes effective teaching.  The 
diversity of characteristics that make up a good teacher, the cultural diversity of students, 
and the individualized nature of the learning experience are among the factors that make 
defining effective teaching particularly difficult.  In addition, who does the rating, the 
conditions under which the rating was performed, and other issues of quality that extend 
beyond a teacher’s control may greatly affect the perceived quality of a teacher’s 
effectiveness.  Thus, while scores on a professor’s evaluation may appear to be objective 
measures, the selection and design of a measure of teaching effectiveness is replete with 
subjectivity (Leap, 1995).  
Service to the public, profession, or institution.  Also subjective in measure, 
service activities are usually included as part of the formal appraisal process and can 
include service to the community or public, to the profession, and to the university.  At 
most institutions, service is not highly valued in the tenure and promotion process.  Even 
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so, commitments to service can be very demanding and can infringe upon an applicant’s 
time for scholarship and teaching (Leap, 1995). 
Collegiality.  Establishing and maintaining good working relationships with 
administrators, colleagues, and students is an unwritten expectation of faculty members.  
Disputes may arise from personality and disagreements over professional issues and 
schools of thought.  As well, disputes may be caused when faculty members harm 
working relationship and create ill will among colleagues (Leap, 1995).  Increasingly 
used to evaluate faculty, considerations of an applicant’s collegiality qualifications can 
increase the political stakes of the tenure process.  
Courts have viewed collegiality as a valid basis upon which colleges and 
universities can make tenure, promotion, or termination decisions for many years 
(Connell & Savage, 2001; Connell, Melear, & Savage, 2011; Leap, 1995).  Collegiality is 
usually deemed by the courts to play an important role in the ability of higher education 
institutions to fulfill their missions.  Even so, case law did not focus on the term 
“collegiality” until 1981 in the Fourth Circuit case of Mayberry v. Dees (Connell & 
Savage, 2001), in which the court introduced the collegiality as a distinct criterion for use 
in tenure and promotion decisions.  The court defined collegiality as “the capacity to 
relate well and constructively to the comparatively small bank of scholars on whom the 
ultimate fate of the university rests” (Connell, Melear, & Savage, 2011, p. 532 quoting 
Mayberry v. Dees, 1981, p. 514).  Since Mayberry v. Dees (1981), most courts that have 
addressed a faculty member’s working relationship with colleagues in consideration of an 
employment related decision have upheld the use of collegiality as a factor (Connell, 
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Melear, & Savage, 2011).  In a review of court cases from 2000 to 2010, Connell, 
Melear, and Savage (2011) found the most heavily litigated area in collegiality cases is 
that of tenure and subsequent nonreappointment of a nontenured faculty member.  In a 
great majority of cases, courts have given almost unanimous support for consideration of 
collegiality (Connell, Melear, & Savage, 2011).      
Despite the courts’ acceptance of the use of collegiality as a factor, it is an issue 
that is at the forefront of higher education policy debates (Adams, 2006-2007; Connell, 
Melear, & Savage, 2011; Johnston, Schimmel, & O’Hara, 2010).  The debates raise many 
questions as to whether one’s ability to fit in or to get along should be used as a 
requirement, whether it should be considered as a separate factor or as part of other 
factors, and what weight it should be given.  Arguments for using it as a factor include 
the need for faculty to work well within and for the benefit of a system, the fact that most 
all hiring and promotion decisions involve some measure of collegiality, and courts’ 
acceptance of the factor as legitimate.  Arguments against considering collegiality as a 
separate consideration include that considering collegiality could constitute a breach of 
contract, if it was not specifically mentioned in the contract as a criterion for tenure and 
promotion decisions; that the subjective nature of collegiality could allow its 
consideration to be used as a pretext to mask unlawful discrimination; and that using 
collegiality as a distinct criterion could harm academic freedom (Adams, 2006-2007; 
Connell & Savage, 2001). 
The debate, at least in part, arises from the varied perceptions of collegiality that 
exist in higher education (Adams, 2006-2007; Connell, Melear, & Savage, 2011; 
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Johnston, Schimmel, & O’Hara, 2010).  Academics tend to view collegiality as an ability 
to fit in, to be a team player, and to contribute usefully to academic responsibilities.  
Fulfilling responsibilities such as mentoring, recruiting, and administrative roles may all 
be factors.  Many court decisions, which largely agree with the views of academia, have 
described both collegial and uncollegial behaviors, and have differentiated collegiality 
from congeniality (Connell, Melear, & Savage, 2011).   
Another aspect of the debate is that the professoriate is not fully in agreement 
with having collegiality as a fourth criterion.  Critics note the amorphous nature of the 
construct, and the AAUP has advised against including it as a separate entity, while 
recognizing the importance of respect for the opinions of others as well as for each other 
(Adams, 2006-2007; Johnston, Schimmel, & O’Hara, 2010).  Johnston, Schimmel, and 
O’Hara (2010) recommended delineating and validating behavioral indicators through a 
model of collegiality, as a tool for effective job descriptions and reviews.  They argued 
that using a model would help to better communicate expectations and to address the 
academic freedom concerns raised by the AAUP.  Zirkel (1984-1985) suggested that 
when an institution does adopt collegiality as a criterion, it should be defined clearly and 
interpreted narrowly in order to not impede the flow of ideas.  The support of courts for 
collegiality as a factor and an increasing use of the factor by departments, schools, and 
institutions reflect a growing trend in the realization by faculty and administrators that 
collegiality is an important factor to consider in long-term, binding decisions such as a 
grant of tenure (Connell, Melear, & Savage, 2011).               
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Grievance Procedures       
A faculty member who receives an unfavorable decision in reappointment, 
promotion, or tenure may be angry or frustrated (AAUW, 2004).  Measures employed by 
an institution to mitigate hurt feelings can help lessen the likelihood of litigation.  
Meeting with a candidate to explain the decision and to listen to the candidate’s concerns, 
for example, may soften an unexpected blow (Franke, 2010).  As part of the process, an 
unsuccessful applicant is typically offered the opportunity to appeal the decision through 
established grievance procedures.  Public institutions are bound by state administrative 
laws, which typically require a plaintiff to exhaust all remedies through the grievance 
procedure prior to resorting to the court system.  Private institutions, which are not 
typically deemed agents of the state, are not bound to the administrative laws of the 
states.  Even so, courts may require plaintiffs from private institutions to follow any 
available internal grievance procedures before bringing a case in court (Kaplin & Lee, 
2006). 
A grievance committee, comprised of faculty outside of the faculty member’s 
department, is typically established through the faculty senate, as an independent 
committee, or as part of a collective bargaining agreement.  The grievance committee 
serves three primary functions:  (a) to help resolve the dispute between the faculty 
member and the institution as to whether tenure or promotion was deserved; (b) to 
determine whether due process was afforded to the faculty member; and (c) to ensure that 
the adverse personnel decision was not made based on the faculty member’s race, sex, or 
age or for other potentially illegal reasons (Leap, 1995). 
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 A grievance committee is likely to admit certain pieces of evidence, such as the 
scholarship of the applicant.  The committee also might accept testimony from various 
interested parties.  After receiving the evidence, the grievance committee then submits a 
recommendation to the chief academic officer, who may then sustain or reverse the 
adverse personnel action.  Grievance procedures that are clearly established and followed 
help to assure that a faculty member who has been denied reappointment, promotion, or 
tenure is granted due process and the opportunity to learn more about his or her 
individual situation.  Likewise, conflicts may be diffused by allowing a grievant to 
understand more about the strengths and weaknesses of his or her case.   A grievance 
procedure can also help the parties involved in the process to make reasonable personnel 
decisions that are based on pertinent information (Leap, 1995).   
Although a thorough discussion of collective bargaining and its role in 
reappointment, tenure, and promotion practices is beyond the scope of this literature 
review, it is important to note that the collective bargaining process can nonetheless 
affect the grievance procedure.  For example, unionized faculty members who are 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement may have options such as binding 
arbitration.  Unionization also may preclude faculty members from using an internal 
grievance mechanism if they have filed suit through the EEOC or through courts (Leap, 
1995). 
Confidentiality of Peer Review 
 Evaluation proceedings are conducted in private; faculty members are not usually 
granted access to details about deliberations at the various levels of review (LaNoue & 
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Lee, 1987; Leap. 1995).  Even so, the faculty member is typically notified of the progress 
of the application and whether his or her application has received favorable review at 
each stage of the process.  When a review is unfavorable, tension can arise when an 
unsuccessful applicant’s desire to have more information about the decision conflicts 
with the institution’s need to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.  Especially 
challenging is an unsuccessful faculty member’s demand for access to confidential files 
and other documents when pursuing tenure denial litigation (Leap, 1995). 
 A party’s ability to access pertinent evidence that is crucial to his or her case is 
fundamental to the full and fair litigation of a case.  In academia, this raises questions of 
whether recommendations and discussions made during the peer review process must be 
provided and whether identities of committee members can be redacted if and when the 
information must be provided.  Peer review evaluations, letters of recommendation, and 
committee deliberations, for example, may be replete with evidence of discriminatory 
treatment by a reviewer involved in the process (Leap, 1995).  
Qualified privilege.  While an unsuccessful applicant in a tenure decision is 
likely to seek information about an adverse decision, an institution’s officials and legal 
counsel may strive to keep peer reviewers’ discussions confidential, claiming that certain 
information is protected by a qualified privilege and is not subject to disclosure (Leap, 
1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  Subpoenas requesting information have been challenged on 
issues of overbreadth, irrelevancy, confidentiality, and guarantees under the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, among others (Leap, 1995).   
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Limited professional relationships enjoy a qualified privilege to protect the 
confidentiality of communications.  Such protections honor the public interest in 
protecting open and honest communications in relationships that outweigh a societal need 
for disclosure of sensitive information.  Examples include attorney-client, priest-penitent, 
husband-wife, and newspaper reporter-informant.  Courts have been divided on whether 
universities enjoyed a qualified privilege for tenure proceedings, as confidentiality in 
academia does not fall into a traditionally recognized category.  Trending towards greater 
access, courts have eroded institutional protections and have allowed faculty members 
and the EEOC access to confidential peer review materials (Leap. 1995).     
On the one hand, institutions argue that compelling disclosure of sensitive 
materials and discussions would place a damper on the entire process and detract from 
open and honest conversations.  Without guarantees of confidentiality, peer reviewers 
and administrators would be less likely to candidly assess an applicant’s work, which 
could erode the entire tenure and promotion process.  On the other hand, if promotion and 
tenure documents receive unlimited qualified privilege protections, a plaintiff’s chances 
of proving a valid claim of employment discrimination are minimal if the plaintiff is 
denied access to pertinent evidence.  Because evidence may be circumstantial and 
nuanced, it must be gleaned from personnel records and testimony of the reviewers 
(Leap, 1995).   
Academic freedom.  Some who argue in favor of greater openness and less 
confidentiality or privilege contend that academic freedom would be enhanced.  
Removing any confidentiality protections or privileges would bring openness to the 
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process beyond a small group of scholars.  Negative employment decisions made in 
response to a faculty member’s unpopular ideas implicates the protections of the First 
Amendment and academic freedom.  In such instances, the threat to academic freedom 
arises from within the institution, rather than external from it.  With greater openness, 
peer review committees who may be inclined to deny tenure to a faculty member solely 
based on his or her unpopular views would be exposed to greater scrutiny.  Others who 
argue in favor of confidentiality or privilege submit that reviewers who are assured 
confidentiality might be more thorough in their deliberations.  Whether secrecy improves 
the quality of decision-making or protects or diminishes academic freedom has been 
greatly questioned (Leap, 1995).     
Discovery rules.  The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) are liberal as to a faculty 
member’s ability to obtain information on any relevant matter, so long as the information 
is not privileged.   Any proposed evidentiary privilege must be analyzed through the lens 
of four sources:  (a) federal statutes, (b) U.S. Supreme Court Rules, (c) common-law 
principles, and (d) U.S. Constitutional principles.  The explicit right of institutions of 
higher education to use a qualified privilege to protect tenure and promotion files does 
not exist; rather, any right granted by courts has arisen under the auspices of institutional 
academic freedom (Leap, 1995).   
 FRE 501 allows those who are defending an institution against charges of 
employment discrimination to work within the liberal discovery rules.  If necessary to 
protect a party from unreasonable requests and associated difficulties, a court may require 
a litigant to exhaust all other alternative means to obtain the desired materials prior to 
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requiring a party to disclose confidential information.  Competing interests are weighed 
by a court including the social benefits of discovery as a means to eliminate employment 
discrimination and the private interests of the college or university in preserving 
academic freedom and the work of the peer review and administrative committees (Leap, 
1995).  
Common law rules may also be called upon in information discovery.  An 
institutional claim of common law academic privilege will necessitate a court’s 
examination of the interests of the plaintiff.  Free accessibility of evidence is strongly 
supported in the common law.  As well, the congressional extension of Title VII to higher 
education institutions supports the right of a faculty member to obtain confidential 
promotion and tenure files (Leap, 1995).    
Qualified privilege and the courts.  Disparity has existed in courts’ willingness to 
protect the claimed qualified privilege of academia in reappointment, promotion, and 
tenure records and proceedings.  Academic freedom interests of the individual and the 
institution have been weighed and debated as well as the integrity of the peer review 
process.  While some courts have recommended a balanced approach and a weighing of 
interests, other courts have rejected the qualified privilege protection.  Prior to 1990, 
plaintiffs had a difficult time in the process of discovery of peer review materials.  
Institutional claims of academic freedom were successful in many Circuit Courts, though 
not in all.  Plaintiffs who sought to show discriminatory intent under a Title VII claim 
experienced particular difficulty extracting the information necessary to show 
discriminatory intent, particularly when institutions could obtain protective orders 
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allowing them to redact certain information from the peer review materials.  Courts 
grappled with the question as to whether defendants could be compelled to disclose 
confidential discussions and votes of the peer review committee, pursuant to evidentiary 
rules (Leap, 1995).   
The U.S. Supreme Court in University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) (1990) squarely addressed this issue and upheld the 
EEOC’s need to be able to obtain peer evaluation materials.  The Court also refused to 
require the EEOC to demonstrate a specific need for the evaluations before it could 
obtain them.  In addition, the Court refused to adopt a balancing test proposed by the 
university or to create a special academic privilege.  Several important considerations 
grounded the Court’s decision, including:  (a) Congress extended Title VII to higher 
education institutions in 1972, without including a special privilege; (b) Title VII 
provides the EEOC with broad access to relevant evidence; (c) sanctions are available 
under Title VII if the EEOC discloses confidential information; and (d) peer evaluations 
are subject to harboring evidence of discrimination (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995).   
While the University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC (1990) court clarified an 
institution’s responsibility to provide peer review materials when those materials were 
requested by the EEOC to investigate an employment discrimination claim, and when the 
materials were shown to be relevant, the case left open two issues.  First, it left 
unanswered the rights of a faculty member to obtain peer review files, when the claim 
was not pursued through the EEOC.  Second, it left unanswered the question of seeking 
the files when the claim was based on something other than Title VII.    
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Participation in the process.  Poskanzer (2002) called the overall tone of the 
Court’s decision in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC (1990) “rather hostile to higher 
education” (p. 153), in that it rejected higher education as being unique.  He raised further 
questions as to the rigor of peer review and the possibility that reviewers would be 
unwilling to put anything in writing (Poskanzer, 2002).  This and other legal 
developments advocating disclosure may discourage members of peer review committees 
and administrators from keeping detailed records of their deliberations.  Letters of 
evaluation and comments on research and publication may be superficial and guarded 
(Leap, 1995).  Poskanzer (2002) asserted, however, that both scholars and institutions 
“should be comfortable making and expressing hard-headed judgments about quality,” 
and that those who have “nothing to hide . . .[have] nothing to fear” (p. 154).                   
State public disclosure laws.  Some public disclosure laws have arisen in states 
allowing access to public documents, data, and meetings.  Courts continue to resolve 
whether these laws require access to promotion and tenure documents.  The uncertainty 
of the evolving law may discourage reviewers and administrators from keeping detailed 
records of deliberations about a particular candidate (Leap, 1995). 
Changes in the Tenure Process 
  The promotion and tenure system has been criticized as outdated and in need of 
significant overhaul (Fishman, 2005; Tierney & Bensimon, 1996).  Tierney and 
Bensimon (1996) urged changes in the socialization process, with particular emphasis on 
mentoring and setting clear expectations.  Fishman (2005) advocated that tenure 
processes should “evolve to attenuate” the problem of disparity of policies that are 
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particularly harsh to women on the tenure track.  Suggestions for increased flexibility in 
the process have included extending the probationary period for those recently hired 
professors who need it and allowing for part-time status (Fishman, 2005).  
Tenure Denial Litigation 
Higher education and the tenure system developed with little influence from the 
courts.  Before the early 1970s, scant literature existed that focused on—or even 
mentioned—court cases and their influence on colleges and universities.  Brubacher 
opined in 1973:  “Time was when higher education was a self-governing community and, 
internally, a law unto itself.  Recently, all of this has changed” (p. 267).  The 1991 
amendments to Title VII that allowed plaintiffs to try federal discrimination cases before 
juries rather than judges contributed to a substantial increase in the number of 
discrimination lawsuits (Franke, 2010).      
Franke (2001) reported that the number of employment discrimination cases had 
risen from 8,400 in 1990 to 23,700 in 1998.  She stated that the number of tenure denial 
cases was unavailable, but suggested that they, too, had increased.  Since data sets about 
tenure awards and denials, internal appeals pursued, lawsuits filed regarding tenure 
denial, or number of dismissal proceedings against tenured faculty do not exist (Franke, 
2010), commonalities and inferences about lawsuits and relevant policies and procedures 
about tenure denial claims must be derived from court proceedings of cases that reach 
litigation and associated media accounts.   
As litigation involving higher education has become more prevalent, so too has 
the number of scholarly articles pertaining to legal influences increased.  The literature 
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has evolved to reflect “[t]he increasingly intimate relationship between government and 
higher education” and the reality “that colleges and universities are in and of the world, 
not removed and protected from it” (Schmidtlein & Berdahl, 2011, p. 83). The gravity, 
substantial stakes involved, and emotional toll that tenure and promotion decisions exert 
make such decisions among the actions of a department “the most fundamentally 
important kind of conflict an academic unit can experience” (Hearn & Anderson, 2002, p. 
506).     
Because understanding the court system is imperative to understanding the 
progression or significance of cases in tenure litigation, a brief review of the court system 
in the United States is first covered in this section.  Next, the concept of judicial 
deference will be discussed.  Reasons for the rise in tenure litigation will then receive 
attention, followed by the costs of litigation, and the burden of proof when presenting a 
case.  The legal bases for tenure litigation then receive full attention. This section then 
revisits the criteria for evaluation in the context of cases that have considered those 
criteria.  Finally, a brief discussion of remedies is provided.      
The Court System 
   United States federal and state courts perform three primary roles when dealing 
with problems involving colleges and universities, including:  (a) settling controversies 
by applying appropriate laws or principles of laws to a specific set of facts, (b) construing 
or interpreting acts of the legislature, and (c) determining the constitutionality of 
legislative enactments (Alexander & Alexander, 2011).  The U.S. court system is one 
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branch of the three parts of the tripartite system.  It is provided for by the constitutions of 
federal and state governments (Alexander & Alexander, 2011). 
Federal courts.  Article III of the U.S. Constitution states, in part:  “The judicial 
power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior 
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish” (U.S. Const. Art. III § 
1).  Pursuant to this provision, the Supreme Court of the United States is the highest 
court, and Congress has established a network of “inferior” courts including District 
Courts, Courts of Appeals, and Special Federal Courts.  Most education cases that go 
before the Supreme Court are taken on a writ of certiorari, a process by which a case is 
removed from an inferior to a superior court.  Rulings from the Supreme Court become 
precedent.  Decisions of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals are significant and binding 
in within the jurisdiction of a particular circuit.  The decisions are particularly instructive 
when no appeal of the opinion has been made, the Supreme Court has affirmed the case, 
or the Supreme Court has refused to hear the case on appeal.  Federal District Courts are 
courts that have original jurisdiction to hear a case.  Issues of law arise when two District 
Courts or two Circuit Courts reached disparate results under similar facts.  Such instances 
usually result in an appeal to a higher court, which then resolves the issue (Alexander & 
Alexander, 2011).   
State courts.  State court systems are organized similarly to the federal court 
system.  The constitutions of the various states provide for the separation of powers 
within the state and provide the framework for a state’s court system.  The primary state 
courts are usually provided for by constitution.  Operation of the constitutional courts is 
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usually provided for by the constitution and delegated to the powers of the legislature.  
State courts usually include courts of general jurisdiction, courts of specific jurisdiction, 
small claims courts, and appellate courts.  The appellate courts are found in all states and 
are usually called Supreme Courts or Courts of Appeals, though the names of the courts 
may vary from state to state.  Some state systems, like the federal system, have 
intermediate appellate courts.  State court decisions serve as precedent only within the 
borders of that state.  Even so, a decision rendered in one state can be persuasive as to 
how another state’s court might rule when faced with similar facts.  Opinions rendered in 
the highest court in the state have the most influence (Alexander & Alexander, 2011).    
Courts and Deference to Higher Education  
In general, courts have been reluctant to impose their views upon institutions of 
higher education in the realm of employment decisions (Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  
Tenure denial decisions, in particular, are not likely to be reviewed by courts.  When 
cases are reviewed, a denial of tenure will likely be affirmed, so long as the institution 
followed its own prescribed procedures or if bad faith on the part of the institution is not 
obvious. Such deference is rooted in a claim of lack expertise by the court, an 
institution’s collective professional judgment, and the long lasting effects on an 
institution’s decisions particularly as to economics (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995).   
Courts are particularly reluctant to function as super-tenure review committees 
(Leap, 1995).  Tenure cases require a court to weigh an institution’s autonomy against a 
faculty member’s civil rights.  The subjectivity inherent in the system is particularly 
challenging for the courts.  Frequently cited for the principle of judicial deference to in 
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academic employment decisions of tenure, the court in Lieberman v. Gant (1980) 
expressed frustration over the review of a lengthy, multi-year, fact intensive case and 
described in dicta the court’s extremely deferential stance.     
The anti-interventionist attitude that has been expressed by some state and federal 
courts in employment discrimination litigation has been criticized.  Although the concept 
of academic freedom my theoretically be at the core of the doctrine of judicial deference, 
courts have recognized that not every academic decision requires deference.  For 
example, in response to the majority opinion in Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System (1985), Judge Swygert expressed in a dissenting opinion 
a lack of distinction between a tenure decision and any other employment.  The judge 
noted the courts’ willingness to intervene when subjective judgments made about blue-
collar workers were suspicious.  Because lawyers are trained in academia, the judge 
reasoned, courts are even better prepared to scrutinize decisions made in the academic 
world than in the blue-collar world.  Judge Swygert explained that the use of outside 
experts could be employed to correct for any lack of academic expertise, particularly in 
the assessment of the quality of a faculty member’s research and scholarship (Leap, 1995 
citing Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 1985).   
Scholars have also criticized the anti-interventionist attitude of courts as having 
created different standards for selection and promotion systems, based on the social and 
economic status of the particular jobs being reviewed.  Increased complexity of a job 
increases the courts’ demands for more convincing evidence that an employer engaged in 
illegal employment discrimination (Leap, 1995).  As cited in Leap (1995), Bartholet 
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(1982) attributed such deference to judges’ identification with—and thus upholding of—
employers with whom they identify.  Since judges came from and benefited from 
academic systems, they are more likely to profess a lack of expertise and to respect the 
decision-makers involved.  The unfamiliar language surrounding academic employment 
decisions may make judges want to leave the decisions to academicians (Leap, 1995). 
While courts lean towards deference, Leap (1995) reported an “increased 
willingness of federal courts to invade the sanctity of college and university personnel 
decisions” (p. 68).  In rendering decisions, courts examine documentation surrounding 
reappointment, promotion, and tenure decisions.  Courts focus on procedural fairness and 
substantive reasonableness, with deference to the professional judgment to the 
institutional professionals.  One aspect of consistency is to make sure that decisions are 
fair among candidates.  Another is to assure consistency over time for a particular 
candidate (Franke, 2010).  Consistency must be weighed, however, in the context of the 
highly individualized nature of tenure decisions.  “[T]he inconsistent evaluations might 
each be correct when differing audiences and circumstances are taken into account” 
(Franke, 2010, p. 4 quoting Bresnick v. Manhattanville College, 1994, p. 329).  
Reasons for the Rise in Litigation 
From the 1970s forward, promotion and tenure have become more difficult to 
achieve (Altbach, 2011a; Leap, 1995).  The 1970s brought fiscal problems in institutions 
and a deterioration in the faculty job market that resulted in difficulty for young 
professors to be promoted.  Tenure quotas were imposed at some institutions, while other 
institutions raised their standards for awarding tenure.  The complications that gave rise 
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to debates in the 1970s again surfaced in the 1990s, stimulated by many of the same 
concerns as the earlier period (Altbach, 2011a). 
Practices that have contributed to the rise in lawsuits include a lack of institutional 
support or resources, thus making it difficult for a faculty member to achieve acceptable 
performance; an institution’s failure to adhere to its own policies and standards; political 
rather than academic reasons; an institution’s failure to apply promotion and tenure 
standards consistently; and peer review committees’ prejudices (Leap, 1995).  Added to 
these problems is that institutions are moving towards using more part-time and 
nontenure-track faculty lines, as budgetary constraints and program needs alter the 
landscape.  A decline in the number of tenure-track positions available in combination 
with more stringent qualifications for achieving tenure make lawsuits even more likely 
(Hendrickson, 1999).  Moreover, while court intervention may be seen as intruding upon 
the academic freedom of some academicians who wish to make decisions about who can 
join their ranks, other faculty members may insist that in bringing a lawsuit they are 
seeking protection of their own academic freedom, by challenging the status quo 
decisions of a peer review committee.             
The Costs of Litigation 
No matter who prevails in a tenure denial case, litigation is costly (Franke, 2001; 
Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  For faculty members who bring suit, the litigation process 
alters participants’ lives and their working environment (LaNoue & Lee, 1987). 
Litigation represents the commitment of great emotional and financial resources and can 
leave individuals feeling emotionally and financially drained.  Plaintiffs must prepare for 
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cases and often become alienated from their department or colleagues as they transit ion 
from colleague to adversary. 
Academic departments may be divided as to the correct position on a case.  Being 
advised by a lawyer may mean that individuals must be more cautious about their 
conversations and actions.  Tensions are likely to increase in the network of departmental 
interactions, and once cordial relationships may become strained or nonexistent.  
Collectively, the issues may create an undercurrent that leads to dysfunction in the 
department and greater university community (Leap, 1995).   
From an institutional perspective, being sued or threatened with suit can harm the 
informal cultural context and the more formal structures of the institution.  Institutions 
that defend a tenure claim must commit staffing and financial resources.  Although costs 
are often fixed for staffing resources, particularly in institutions that have in-house 
counsel, the resources directed towards litigation are diverted from other departments and 
from the core mission of the institution.  Added to the great financial burdens of long and 
protracted administrative hearings and litigation are the costs of layers and procedures for 
making decisions (LaNoue & Lee, 1987).    
Moreover, litigation highlights problems that exist at the convergence of cultural, 
managerial, and legal factors (Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  As Poskanzer (2002) 
explained, “Intra-university disciplinary hearings and extra-university lawsuits are 
extreme forms of unresolved community conflict” (p. 257).  Litigation is likely to 
heighten that conflict.  When an issue must be adjudicated by the courts, both parties are 
seeking to win rather than to build a mutually acceptable solution to a management 
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problem.  The negative publicity of a case may harm an institution’s ability to attract the 
best and brightest faculty and students.     
Burden of Proof   
A plaintiff’s decision to sue a college or university for wrongful discharge or 
discrimination requires that evidence is gathered to support the claim of an illegal 
employment decision.  Evidence is gathered from personnel folders, faculty handbooks, 
depositions and testimonies, letters and memoranda, records of scholarship, and teaching 
evaluations.  Statistics may likewise be used to support a claim an illegal employment 
decision.  Initially and ultimately, the plaintiff has the burden of proof.  This means that 
the plaintiff will have to convince the judge or jury, as trier of fact, of his or her 
qualifications to receive tenure or promotion, and that the facts of the case will support a 
claim for discrimination or some other claim (LaNoue & Lee, 1987; Leap, 1995). Upon 
meeting an initial burden of proof, the defendant institution must then show that its 
decision was grounded in proper reasons.  An institution’s proof must be sufficient to 
convince a judge or jury that its decision was appropriate (LaNoue & Lee, 1987; Leap, 
1995).  Defendant institutions may also demonstrate that the plaintiff did not satisfy at 
least one of the criteria, that it used proper decision-making criteria, and that it followed 
requisite procedures.   
Legal Bases for Tenure Denial Suits 
A measure of autonomy is provided to faculty and institutions in making 
employment decisions.  Even so, decisional autonomy must be exercised under the 
umbrella of federal, state, county, and municipal laws—many of which overlap.  Such 
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laws support the concept of diversity in academia and exert a significant influence over 
faculty employment (Poskanzer, 2002).       
For higher education case law, a fundamental distinction exists between public 
and private institutions.  Those that are state actors—colleges and universities that are 
considered to be part of the state or local government—are bound by different 
constitutional standards than those that are deemed private institutions.  Thus, an 
institution is considered a private institution will have more flexibility in setting 
institutional conduct mandates than will a public institution, which is bound by 
constitutional dictates.  Colleges and universities that are overseen, funded, and 
maintained by the state are most likely to be considered state actors.  Private, 
denominational institutions are somewhat straightforward as nonstate actors.  Not all 
institutions are easily categorized as state or nonstate actors, however, and some 
seemingly private institutions may be held to constitutional mandates.  Thus, courts must 
often engage in factual inquiry to determine an institution’s status (Poskanzer, 2002). 
Discrimination and breach of contract claims are the most often used legal 
theories for bringing a tenure denial claim (ACE Report, 2000).  Across the United 
States, discrimination laws vary widely in their protection of different classes of 
individuals and provide varied remedies for aggrieved parties.  Each law has rules and 
guidelines as to the manner in which it must be followed (Poskanzer, 2002).  
Discrimination occurs when an employer uses a characteristic that is considered protected 
under the law to make an employment decision, rather than basing an employment 
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decision solely on a candidate’s qualifications (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  In this section, the 
major sources of federal and state laws for tenure denial claims are discussed. 
Federal laws.  Federal laws have particular importance due to their 
comprehensive nature and remedies, national scope, and broad applicability (Kaplin & 
Lee, 2006; Poskanzer, 2002).  While numerous federal laws pertain to employment and 
nondiscrimination issues, some are more likely than others to influence faculty and 
administrators in the academia, and more specifically, in tenure, hiring, and promotion 
decisions.  Federal laws discussed below include Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
as amended; the Civil Rights Act of 1991; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) and the 1990 amendments, the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act; 
Affirmative Action; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, and 2008 amendments, the ADAAA; U.S. Constitutional Amendments; the Post-
Civil War Civil Rights Acts; Title IX; and Executive Orders 11246 and 11375.  
  Title VII.  The most comprehensive federal employment discrimination law and 
most often invoked is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (AAUW, 2004; Kaplin & 
Lee, 2006).  Title VII covers discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex 
(gender), and national origin (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Poskanzer, 2002).  Employers with at 
least 15 employees are covered by Title VII; as such, virtually all higher education 
institutions are covered.  Although higher education institutions were initially exempt 
from Title VII (Franke, 2001), the law was extended in 1972 to cover public and private 
educational institutions (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  Surrounding the passage of the 
amendments was much congressional debate about the pervasiveness of sex 
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discrimination in higher education employment practices.  While the congressional 
debates that preceded the passage of Title VII in the 1960s lacked legislative history 
specific to institutions of higher learning, and the courts adopted an anti-interventionist 
policy regarding personnel decisions in higher education, the 1972 amendments served as 
a milestone for changing a policy that protected colleges and universities from 
employment discrimination charges (Leap, 1995).   
Exceptions to the general prohibition against discrimination exempt religious 
institutions from Title VII religious discrimination claims (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  
Pursuant to Title VII, religiously affiliated educational institutions may hire and employ 
faculty of a particular religion.  To receive the exception, a college or university must be 
owned or substantially supported by a religious corporation, association, or society.  
Institutions in which the curriculum is directed towards the promulgation of a religious 
doctrine also qualify for the exemption (Leap, 1995).     
Title VII is enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), which may investigate discrimination charges and initiate lawsuits against 
violators in court or issue right-to-sue letters to complainants.  An individual may file a 
Title VII claim in federal court once she or he has been issued a right-to-sue letter by the 
EEOC.  Individual claims must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days following the 
occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within 300 days if a 
claim was first filed with a state or local civil rights agency (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)).  Because personnel decisions in colleges and universities 
commonly have multiple layers, and faculty members may have an additional terminal 
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year on their contract, following tenure denial, the timing issue of a claim can be difficult 
to pinpoint (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  
Sexual harassment is a violation to Title VII (and other state nondiscrimination 
laws) because an individual experiences harassment in the workplace and it is based on 
her or his sex.  Male or female workers may be the victims of sexual harassment or the 
perpetrators of sexual harassment.  With quid pro quo harassment—the exchange of 
sexual favors for employment benefits, or the threat of negative action if sexual favors 
are not given—the employer may be held liable, even if the victim had not reported the 
harassment.  The standards are clear that the accused harasser must have the power to 
affect the employee’s terms and conditions of employment.  Sexual harassment that 
involves a hostile or offensive work environment, which can be created by virtually 
anyone that the target employee encounters due to the employment relationship, also may 
result in the employer being liable if the allegations are proven and if the employer 
cannot demonstrate an appropriate response when it learned of the harassment.  The 
standards for establishing this type of harassment are less clear, and the case to be made 
is fact intensive (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).    
The 1972 amendments making Title VII applicable to higher education were 
particularly aimed at ending discrimination against women and blacks, as expressed in 
extensive recorded congressional testimony (Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  Another 
amendment to Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, reversed in whole or in part seven 
of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and addressed other employment 
discrimination problems as well.  Particularly significant to colleges and universities was 
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that it increased potential financial liability for a guilty verdict of intentional 
discrimination.  For cases in which compensatory or punitive damages are sought, the 
amendments allow a party to the case to demand a jury trial.  
 The two basic types of Title VII claims include disparate treatment and disparate 
impact.  A disparate treatment suit is grounded in a claim that an individual was denied a 
job, promotion, or tenure, or claims a less favorable treatment than other applicants or 
employees because of his or her race, sex, national origin, or religion (Kaplin & Lee, 
2006).  Under a theory of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show intentional 
discrimination by a peer review committee or academic administrators based on race, sex, 
age, or other impermissible grounds (Leap, 1995).  Statistical analyses or institutional 
hiring, reappointment, promotion, or tenure decisions may be used.  Qualitative 
comparisons and documentation of practices are other examples of possible proof (Leap, 
1995).   
 Disparate treatment.  Disparate treatment cases use the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine test for establishing proof.  The test arose from two Supreme Court cases, 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green (1973) and Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine (1981).  In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green (1973), the 
Court developed a burden-shifting paradigm. Later in Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine (1981), the Court clarified that the employer’s burden within the 
paradigm (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).      
The resulting McDonnell Douglas-Burdine test is a three-stage procedure.  In the 
first stage, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she or he is a member of a protected class.  
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Every person can meet this requirement for Title VII, because “race” applies to 
discrimination against any racial group and “sex” applies to males or females.  In the 
second stage, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she or he was qualified for the job.  
Proving qualifications can invoke particularly vague and subjective issues surrounding 
the reappointment, promotion, and tenure of professors.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held in Lynn v. Regents of the University of California (1981) that 
objective qualifications, such as the plaintiff’s years of experienced or number or articles 
published, should be considered during the early stages of the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine test.  Subjective criteria, on the other hand, should be considered during the later 
stages of the process, so as not to make the burden of proof a one-step process and not to 
defeat the underlying purpose of the test (Leap, 1995).   
 Stage three of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine test requires that the position for 
which the faculty member was rejected or not reappointed must remain open and the 
employer must continue to try to fill the position with candidates whose qualifications are 
equivalent or inferior to those of the plaintiff’s.  Thus, the tenured positions must have 
been open at the time the plaintiff was denied tenure at relatively the same time period in 
which the plaintiff was denied tenure.  An issue of timing can be difficult to prove, 
because promotion and tenure decisions do not necessarily result in immediately 
replacing an unsuccessful candidate with a successful candidate (Leap, 1995) 
If a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case, the Court may choose to enter a 
summary judgment for the defendant institution, thus ending the case.  On the other hand, 
once a plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case by establishing the 
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McDonnell Douglas-Burdine criteria, the burden of proof then shifts to the college or 
university to articulate a job related, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
personnel decision.  Financial exigency, changes in an academic program, or inadequacy 
in research productivity might all be considered legitimate reasons.  A volleying of the 
burden of proof may then shift back to the plaintiff, who may present evidence that the 
defendant’s actions were, in fact, discriminatory and that the defendant’s explanation is 
merely pretext for discrimination (Leap, 1995). 
Even when the burden shifts to the higher education institution to show 
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the original and ultimate burdens of proof 
remain with the plaintiff faculty member.  The defendant institution need not offer a 
substantial defense of its decision not to promote or grant tenure to a faculty member so 
long as there is not any evidence of discrimination.  Disparate treatment cases ultimately 
rest on whether a faculty member would have been granted a favorable employment 
decision but for her or his race, sex, national origin, or other protected classification 
(Leap, 1995).    
 Another aspect of disparate treatment cases is when a complaint is based in 
circumstantial evidence.  In the nonacademic case of Saint Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks 
(1993), the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a court must rule in favor of a 
plaintiff once it determines that the employer’s reasons for its actions lacked credibility.  
The Court held that a plaintiff in a Title VII cases must not only show that the employer’s 
reasons for its personnel decision were pretextual, but that a plaintiff must also show that 
illegal bias was the true motive for the employment decision.  Thus, while pretext may 
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form the basis for inference of discrimination, a court must still consider all relevant 
evidence in making a determination of whether the employment practices were illegal 
(Leap, 1995).                  
 Disparate impact.  While most Title VII litigation involving academia involves 
claims of disparate treatment, several class action complaints have been brought against 
higher education institutions pursuant to a disparate impact theory.  Disparate or adverse 
impact suits are based on a claim that an employer’s neutral policy has a discriminatory 
impact on the claimants (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  One major point of contention in a class 
action is usually the definition of the class, which can significantly impact the degree of 
liability that a college or university may have.  Faculty in a class action suit have the 
burden of proving either (a) a system wide pattern or practice of disparate treatment, or 
(b) a facially neutral policy that affected one or more groups unfavorably.  Class actions 
must meet the following requirements:  (a) the number of persons in the class must be so 
numerous that filing multiple claims is impracticable, (b) there must be questions of law 
or fact that are common to the class, and (c) the claims or defenses of the faculty 
members and the college or university must be typical of the claims and defenses of the 
class (Leap, 1995). 
Disparate impact cases have arisen following the U.S. Supreme Court case, 
Griggs v. Duke Power (1971).  Duke Power discriminated against black employees who 
worked in their North Carolina facility by limiting their employment primarily to low-
paying, unskilled jobs.  Following the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, blacks could no longer be prohibited from obtaining better-paying jobs.  Duke 
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Power then required a high school diploma of its employees and the passage of 
intelligence and aptitude tests.  Because the tests were not significantly related to job 
performance, and because they effectively disqualified more black applicants than white, 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that these requirements were illegal.  Leap (1995) 
described the Griggs v Duke Power (1971) case as “probably the most significant of all 
equal employment opportunity cases because it established the concept of disparate 
impact and held that even unintentional discrimination may be illegal” (p. 22).  The 
ruling helped effectuate the civil rights laws that deal with employment discrimination 
(Leap, 1995). 
Comparisons between faculty members and statistical analyses are often used to 
prove disparate treatment or disparate impact.  One option for the comparative approach 
is for a faculty member to claim that her or his credentials are at least as good as those of 
the faculty members who have already been promoted or tenured.  Another approach is 
for the faculty member to contend that her or his position was filled by a less qualified 
person.  Courts are skeptical of comparisons because of the discretion they grant to 
institutions in employment decisions and because it is difficult to compare teaching, 
research, and service among diverse faculty members.  The weight given to each category 
of criteria can, and usually does, differ in and between departments, as well as between 
institutions.  Past performance and future potential are important to an employment 




Use of statistics.  Statistical analyses may also be used to demonstrate patterns of 
discrimination in faculty employment decisions.  Approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States (1977) and Hazelwood School 
District v. United States (1977), the primary purpose of statistical comparisons is to show 
that a plaintiff would have received favorable treatment but for his or her race, sex, 
national origin, or other protected classification.  In disparate impact cases or class action 
suits, statistical analyses may serve as the basis of the suit.  In disparate treatment cases, 
statistics are commonly used with other evidence.  Even so, the use of statistics often fails 
due to such flaws as unreliable or incomprehensible measures, confusion between 
relevant and irrelevant data, comparisons between things that are not comparable, gaps in 
the requirements of a statistical procedure and the data characteristics, and disregard for 
the possible effects of chance.  These problems can contribute to judicial bias against 
statistics.  Thus, while the courts do allow statistical proof, particularly at the prima facie 
stage of the academic case, statistical tests alone do not often provide proof of illegal 
discrimination and must be supplemented with qualitative or anecdotal evidence of illegal 
employment practices (Leap, 1995).                 
Parties who prevail in a Title VII suit may be granted remedies including 
reinstatement, back pay, compensatory and punitive damages (for disparate treatment 
discrimination), and attorneys’ fees.  Front pay may also be available if a plaintiff 
demonstrates that the discrimination reduced their ability to earn a future income at the 
level that they would have earned without the discrimination (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).        
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Civil Rights Act of 1991.  An amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 strengthened civil rights laws for persons bringing 
discrimination suits against their employers.  It provided for the right to trial by jury on 
discrimination claims and introduced the possibility of punitive and compensation 
damages.   
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  For persons age forty and older, the 
ADEA prevents adverse employment decisions based on age rather than qualifications or 
ability to perform a job competently (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  
It is contained within the Fair Labor Standards Act and is subject to the requirements of 
that Act (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  Pursuant to section 631(d) of the ADEA, there existed a 
“special rule” that allowed compulsory retirement for tenured professors in higher 
education institutions (Leap, 1995, p. 31).  Until January 1, 1994, higher education 
institutions could thus require tenured professors to retire when they became 70 years 
old; the ADEA no longer allows for the involuntary retirement of tenured professors at 
age 70 (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995).  It is permissible under the ADEA, however, 
for higher education institutions to offer retirement incentives to older faculty, so long as 
they do not coerce a faculty member to step down (Leap, 1995).  Colleges and 
universities may offer tenured professors retirement incentives with supplementary 
benefits that are reduced or eliminated on the basis of age, provided there is compliance 
with certain provisions (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).     
Few faculty have filed cases pursuant to the ADEA against colleges and 
universities, as compared to the numbers of cases filed pursuant to Title VII.  
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Discrimination cases based on age commonly focus on whether the plaintiff has the 
physical ability to meet the requirements of the position.  Unfair treatment and pay 
inequities often receive greater focus than do issues of reappointment, promotion, or 
tenure (Leap, 1995).    
The EEOC is charged with enforcing the ADEA (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 
1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  Similar to Title VII, both public and private institutions must 
adhere to the ADEA, and charges of discrimination may be rooted in theories of disparate 
treatment or disparate impact (Poskanzer, 2002).  Also similar to Title VII, the plaintiff 
must first make a prima facie showing of age discrimination, and the burden then shifts to 
the employer to show that (a) “age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business” at issue (ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 
623 (f) (1); Kaplin & Lee, 2006); (b) distinctions among employees or applicants were 
“based on reasonable factors other than age” (ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f) (1); Kaplin & 
Lee, 2006); or (c) in disciplinary or discharge cases, the action was taken “for good 
cause” (ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f) (3); Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  In 1990 the ADEA was 
amended to include the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, which strengthened the 
protections for older workers’ employee benefits from age discrimination.   
Affirmative action programs.  Affirmative action programs are designed to assist 
members of underrepresented groups to gain access to jobs that have historically been 
limited because of discriminatory practices.  A series of executive orders and laws require 
higher education institutions that receive federal funding to adhere to principles of 
affirmative action.  Adhering to such programs can be particularly difficult, because the 
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lines between legal affirmative action and reverse discrimination can be unclear.  While 
colleges and universities must strive to employ female and minority faculty, they are not 
required under the auspices of affirmative action to hire or promote females or members 
of minority groups who lack the requisite qualifications (Leap. 1995).          
 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.  The 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 provide 
protection against discrimination when persons who are otherwise qualified for 
employment have a range of physical or mental disabilities (Leap, 1995).  Enacted with 
the goal of bringing persons with disabilities into the mainstream of society, the laws 
apply to employers who have at least 15 employees and require that reasonable 
accommodations must be made that permit an employee with disabilities to do the job.  
Employers are not required to make accommodations that create an undue hardship 
(Poskanzer, 2002).  The ADA Amendment Act of 2008 (ADAAA) became effective in 
2009 and made changes to the definition of “disability” under the ADA.  Through the 
changes, congress made it easier for an individual to establish that he or she has a 
disability, by encouraging broad construction of the term.   
Relatively few cases have been filed regarding wrongful discharge or employment 
discrimination for disabled faculty members (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995).  
Procedurally different than Title VII requisites, a public employee does not have to file 
discrimination charges with the EEOC before proceeding with an ADA claim.  Likewise, 
the Rehabilitation Act allows nonfederal employees to circumvent the administrative 
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agencies and file charges directly in federal court.  This aspect could decrease the time 
needed to resolve disability discrimination cases (Leap, 1995). 
U.S. Constitutional Amendments.  In considering employment discrimination 
law, the Constitution has its greatest importance in areas that are not covered by any 
federal statute, such as discrimination based on ages less than 40 or discrimination based 
on residence (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  The Constitution is less desirable for challenging 
employment discrimination than many statutory laws because standards of proof in 
constitutionally-based suits are more rigorous (i.e., varying levels of judicial scrutiny 
apply for different claims; proof of violations is heavily dependent on interpretation of 
precedent), and the EEOC or other investigatory agency does not drive the inquiry and 
enforcement.  For those who do not meet statutory requisites, however, the Constitution 
may provide an avenue into federal court (Poskanzer, 2002). 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution have been 
interpreted to prohibit discriminatory action by the federal and state governments, 
respectively (Leap, 1995).  The Fifth Amendment generally prevents the abuse of the 
authority of the federal government in a legal proceeding.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
generally prevents the abuse of authority of state and local governments and assures 
substantive and procedural rights to citizens.  Before the constitutional amendments can 
be applied in employment discrimination cases, there must be some degree of 




Equal Protection.  In state institutions, faculty members may pursue civil rights 
actions against a college or university, using the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
protection clause.  The equal protection clause requires the government to treat similarly 
situated individuals in a similar manner and may be invoked when institutions engage in 
racist, sexist, or other discriminatory behavior (Leap, 1995).  The level of scrutiny, or 
standard of review used by the courts, varies with the type of discrimination being 
challenged (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  Even when the equal protection standards are very 
demanding, such as for race and sex discrimination, it is common for courts to strike 
down discriminatory actions only when they are found to be intentional—excepting the 
federal statutes, which do not always require a showing of discriminatory intent (Kaplin 
& Lee, 2006). 
Due Process.  If an institution does not adhere to a prescribed promotion, tenure, 
grievance, or other civil service procedure, and if the lack of adherence is detrimental to a 
faculty member, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may be invoked 
(Leap, 1995).  The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states 
shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” An 
example of a liberty interest includes a negative employment decision that causes an 
employee difficulty in obtaining employment elsewhere (Poskanzer, 2002).  Property 
interests are raised in the case of tenure termination, but a tenure denial may or may not 
infringe a property or liberty interest that triggers due process protections (Kaplin & Lee, 
2006).  In a tenure decision, the institutional procedures themselves do not create a 
property interest (Kaplin & Lee, 2006 citing Siu v. Johnson, 1984). 
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Due process includes both substantive and procedural due process.  Substantive 
due process claims may be brought by a faculty plaintiff who asserts that an employment 
decision was made for arbitrary, irrational, or improper reasons. If an institution has not 
interpreted its own policies correctly, substantive due process claims may be made (Leap, 
1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  To make claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the interest 
at stake is fundamental pursuant to the U.S. Constitution (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  
Substantive due process rights in continued public employment have not typically found 
favor with federal courts (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).    
If an institution’s decision would infringe a property or liberty interest, procedural 
safeguards are required by the Constitution, before the decision becomes final.  The 
requisite procedures include notice and an opportunity for a hearing.  The institution must 
notify the faculty member of the decision and the reasons for the decision, and must then 
provide a fair opportunity for the faculty member to challenge the institution’s reasons at 
a hearing before an impartial body (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).   
Two seminal U.S. Supreme Court cases that established that faculty members 
have a right to a fair hearing whenever a personnel decision deprives them of a “property 
interest” or “liberty interest” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause 
include Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) and Perry v. Sindermann (1972) (Kaplin & Lee, 
2006; Poskanzer, 2002).  In Roth (1972) and Perry (1972), which are the primary cases 
on faculty contracts, the Court distinguished between faculty members who are under 
continuing contracts and those who are employed under contracts that have expired 
(Kaplin & Lee, 2006). 
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In Board of Regents v Roth (1972), the Court was asked to consider whether the 
professor had a right to a statement of reasons and a hearing, pursuant to the U.S. 
Constitution.  The respondent was hired as an assistant professor at Wisconsin State 
University for a fixed term of one year.  Pursuant to a state statute, all state university 
professors were employed for one-year terms and became eligible for tenure only after 
four years of continuous service.  The professor was notified by February 1 that he was 
not to be rehired, no reason was given, and no hearing was offered.  The Court held that 
the professor had neither a “property” nor a “liberty” interest that had been violated by 
nonrenewal; thus, his Fourteenth Amendment rights had not been violated, and he did not 
have to be given a reason or a hearing for the nonrenewal (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  
In Perry v. Sindermann (1972), the professor was re-hired for ten consecutive 
one-year contracts, and then was not rehired.  Relying on tenure guidelines that 
originated from the Board of the Texas College and University System and on an official 
faculty guide’s statement regarding faculty tenure, Perry argued that the Board, in not 
rehiring him, had violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process.  
The Court ruled that the professor had established a genuine claim to de facto tenure, and 
thus had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment (Kaplin 
& Lee, 2006). 
Roth (1972) and Perry (1972) demonstrate that rules, policies, or institutional 
practices, as well as understandings between the faculty member and the institution can 
create an entitlement to continued employment and thus a property interest (Kaplin & 
Lee, 2006).  These cases also exemplify the intertwining between constitutional rights 
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and issues of contract.  While procedures alone or promises to observe procedures do not 
rise to the level of constitutionally protected property, a contractual claim may still arise 
under state law (Poskanzer, 2002).  Contractual claims under state law are further 
addressed below in the discussion of state laws.                      
Post-Civil War Civil Rights Acts.  The Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871, which 
may be invoked instead of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, effectuate the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which 
granted rights to former slaves.  Applying to both public and private employers, the 1870 
Act (also referred to as the 1866 Act) prohibits race discrimination in the making and 
enforcing of contracts.  Provisions of the act exist as codified statutes, with Section 1981 
being commonly used in employment discrimination claims.  The 1871 Act bars anyone 
acting pursuant to state or local laws from depriving an individual of constitutional or 
legal rights.  Particularly useful against firms that have fewer than 15 employees, which 
are not covered by Title VII, the laws can also be used against higher education 
institutions when a plaintiff has missed the deadline to file within the time period of Title 
VII.  In addition, compensatory and punitive damages are not limited under the post-Civil 
War laws (Leap, 1995).  Provisions of the act exist as codified statutes, with Section 1983 
being commonly used in employment discrimination claims.  
 Title IX.  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 disallows sex 
discrimination in educational programs or activities that receive federal financial 
assistance.  Title IX applies to both employees and to students.  What constitutes 
programs or activities is greatly controversial (Leap, 1995).  While Title IX can be used 
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as a basis for employment discrimination suits, it is more often used as a basis of gender 
equity suits in intercollegiate athletics (Poskanzer, 2002). 
 Executive Orders 11246 and 11375.  Paralleling Title VII, Executive Order 
11246, as amended by Executive Order 11375, prohibits discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  Unique to the Executive 
Orders is that they apply only to contractors and subcontractors who received $10,000 or 
more in federal government contracts and federally assisted construction contracts.  
Private higher educations that receive federal funds are covered by the orders, and they 
must establish an affirmative action program (Poskanzer, 2002).  However, church-
related educational institutions are exempt from the orders (Kaplin & Lee, 2006). 
 The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs is responsible for enforcing 
the requirements of the Executive Orders.  If the Executive Orders are violated, the 
primary remedy is a cutoff of federal funds and/or debarment from future contracts.  The 
courts have found no private right of action in the orders (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).        
State laws.  In addition to federal laws, state laws are sometimes invoked in 
tenure denial litigation.  State equal employment opportunity laws and constitutions may 
be used as a basis for some claims (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995).  Common law 
claims are also raised in certain instances of employment litigation.     
Nondiscrimination laws.  Discrimination claims are increasingly being brought 
pursuant to state nondiscrimination laws.  Distinct from Title VII, many state laws do not 
have caps on damages.  Establishing a prima facie case may also be easier under some 
state laws than under Title VII.  Many states and the District of Columbia offer specific 
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prohibitions on discrimination based on sexual orientation in both the public and private 
sectors (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).     
Breach of contract.  Faculty are connected to their institutions through terms and 
conditions of their employment contract.  Written or unwritten, the rights and obligations 
that exist between an institution and its faculty are determined by contracts.  Contracts 
may spell out a faculty member’s teaching, research, and service obligations as well as an 
agreed upon salary.  Further guidance as to a faculty member’s obligations may be 
incorporated into the contract via faculty appointment letters, handbooks, organizational 
policies, or institutional custom (Poskanzer, 2002).     
Plaintiffs often rely on the law of contracts as a basis for tenure denial litigation 
(ACE Report, 2000).  Interpretation of a contract is dictated by state common law (Kaplin 
& Lee, 2006; Poskanzer, 2002).  The nature of academia and the special relationship 
between a higher education institution and its faculty often complicates the development 
and interpretation of faculty contracts.  State courts differ in their views as to whether 
oral promises and incorporated documents create binding contracts (Kaplin & Lee, 2006). 
While a court will typically first look to the plain language found in a contract, 
and written agreements in contracts will typically override any alleged oral agreements, a 
court must also fill in missing terms and pieces.  To do so, a court will consider the intent 
of the parties.  A court looking to discern the intent of the parties may consider academic 
custom and usage to help determine what the parties might have decided, had they 
addressed a particular issue that is not addressed in the contract.  Academic custom and 
usage includes the established practices and understandings of a particular institution.  
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Academic custom and usage is not necessarily a written source of law, and even if 
written, it tends to be less formal than institutional rules and regulations.  Policy 
statements, internal memoranda, and expert testimony may serve to inform a court about 
an institution’s custom and usage and thus help to guide a court’s interpretation of a 
contract.  As an example, in the previously discussed due process case Perry v. 
Sindermann (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court looked to academic custom and usage to 
analyze a professor’s claim that he was entitled to tenure (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).         
Tort law.  Few tenure denial litigation claims are grounded in tort.  Theories used 
in tort claims may include defamation, fraud, and infliction of emotional distress, among 
others (Hamill, 2003).       
Evaluation Criteria and Litigation 
Tenure denial claims often involve complex issues and interactions (Franke, 
2001).  Multi-layered decision-making by peers and administrators as well as the 
subjectivity of the criteria are factors that contribute to the complexity of tenure litigation.  
Rather than taking issue with the criteria on which tenure is based, tenure denial claims 
frequently take issue with the fairness with which the institution administered the criteria 
(Leap, 1995).  Tenure denial litigation has created the need for institutions to review their 
policies and procedures and to strive to make the application of criteria fair (Hendrickson, 
1999; Poskanzer, 2002).        
Subjective criteria, as discussed previously, are frequently the issue upon which 
cases dealing with wrongful discharge are based.  Evaluations that are made on personal 
attributes pose a difficult dilemma for courts when faced with the tension between 
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academic judgments and possible discrimination.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System 
(1985) grappled with the issue of the decision-maker also serving as the source of the 
qualifications:  “The courts have struggled with the problem since Title VII was extended 
to the university and have found no solution . . . winning the esteem of one’s colleagues 
is just an essential part of securing tenure” (Leap, 1995, p. 73 quoting Namenwirth v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 1985, p. 1243).  It is this 
subjectivity that invites the potential for the use of proscribed criteria to enter the 
promotion and tenure process—decision-makers could discriminate by choosing those 
candidates based solely on their race or gender. 
 Another focus of the case law is whether a faculty member did more than meet 
the minimum criteria set forth in an institution’s faculty manual or handbook.  Courts 
have typically held that a faculty member’s achievement of the minimum standards does 
not per se warrant a favorable decision.  For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
explained in Kumar v. Board of Trustees, University of Massachusetts (1985) that “in the 
selection of a professor, judge, lawyer, doctor, or Indian chief, while there may be 
appropriate minimum standards, the selector has a right to seek distinction beyond the 
minimum indispensable qualities” (Leap, 1995, p. 75 quoting Kumar v. Board of Regents 
of the University of Wisconsin System, 1985, p. 11).    
Litigation based on record of research and publications.  Faculty scholarship 
that was deemed insufficient to merit favorable employment decisions has been the 
subject of employment discrimination cases.  Courts have been generally accepting of the 
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use of scholarship as a facially neutral, job-relevant requirement for making 
reappointment, promotion, or tenure decisions, and courts are typically reluctant to 
substitute their judgment for that of the institution regarding the merits of scholarship, 
unless there is evidence invidious discrimination or significant procedural irregularities.  
The difficulty of measuring research output and evaluating one person’s scholarship as 
compared to another’s was noted in Chang v. University of Rhode Island (1985), in which 
the Court explained that such comparisons of scholarship were “no easy task” (Leap, 
1995, p. 90 quoting Chang v. University of Rhode Island, 1985, p. 1253).  
Litigation based on teaching effectiveness.  In Brousard-Norcross v. Augustana 
College Association (1991) and Fields v. Clark University (1992), two employment 
discrimination cases in academia that concerned teaching effectiveness evaluations, the 
plaintiffs complained that biased sampling measures were used as a means of dismissing 
the faculty members.  Neither case resulted in the plaintiffs being able to persuade the 
court that the biased sample was used to engage in illegal discrimination (Leap, 1995).   
Litigation based on service to the public, profession, or institution.  Wrongful 
discharge or employment discrimination cases rarely arise from a professor’s failure to 
perform service activities.  In 1995 Leap found no cases that led per se to an unfavorable 
personnel decision, but did find one instance in which an inadequate service record 
contributed to an unfavorable promotion decision (Leap, 1995 citing Ottaviani v. State 
University of New York at New Paltz, 1989).     
Litigation based on collegiality.  Courts have found it acceptable to make 
adverse employment decisions on matters of collegiality, so long as such circumstances 
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are not rooted in illegal discriminatory motives.  Because group dynamics depend on 
personal relationships, the motives and influences can be complex. In addition to 
substantive claims, faculty members who are denied tenure based on problems with 
collegiality can also claim that the institution’s promotion and tenure guidelines or its 
employment contracts failed to reference collegiality or related criteria.  Even so, courts 
may be reluctant to second guess tenure decisions and may view collegiality as essential 
to departmental functioning, even if not precisely expressed in the terms and conditions 
of an appointment (e.g., Bresnick v. Manhattanville College, cited by Leap, 1995).       
Remedies in Tenure Litigation 
In considering remedies, a court will examine the faculty contract, handbook, and 
policy documents to determine whether policies and procedures have been adequately 
followed.  For example, if timely notice regarding a faculty member’s tenure denial is not 
provided, a court may award damages pursuant to the contract (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  
Upon a judgment from the court that is rendered for the plaintiff, three common types of 
remedies may be granted:  damages, or a monetary award to a prevailing party; 
restitution, or the effort to prevent the defendant from benefiting from the plaintiff’s loss; 
and coercive remedy, or the enjoining of a party through the issuance of an injunction, 
which orders the losing party to do something or to stop doing something (Alexander & 
Alexander, 2011).   
In employment discrimination cases, relief sought commonly includes back pay, 
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees (Leap, 1995).  In disparate 
treatment cases, compensatory and punitive damages may be awarded, subject to 
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statutory monetary caps.  In disparate impact cases, employers who have discriminated 
may be required to adopt and carry out affirmative action plans (Poskanzer, 2002).  In 
rare instances, a court may even provide tenure or promotion to full professor as damages 
to the aggrieved faculty member (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  
Such a remedy is provided primarily when monetary damages cannot make the plaintiff 
whole, and when the institution is found to have discriminated against the faculty 
member  Although the vast majority of tenure and promotion cases are decided in favor 
of the institution, several other grants of tenure by various courts have raised the question 
of whether courts and civil rights agencies are intruding jupon academic freedom by 
affecting appointments, particularly in Title VII cases.  In such instances, judgments 
about academic quality can become theoretical, the line between process and substance 
can become blurry, and the consequences of correcting injustice can compete with the 
consequences of not doing so (Poskanzer, 2002). 
In response to several U.S. Supreme Court cases, Title VII was amended by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.  Prior to 1991, discrimination cases based on sex, religion, and 
disability were remedied primarily through an award of back pay.  Compensatory and 
punitive damages were awarded only to plaintiffs in race and national origin cases.  The 
1991 law allowed all plaintiffs to be awarded compensatory and punitive damages in 
intentional discrimination suits.  The amendments also allowed a jury trial in 
discrimination cases, which made it more attractive for faculty to bring suit.  Even in 
absence of intentional discrimination, Title VII provides that courts may order remedies 
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including back pay, retroactive seniority, and certain affirmative action measures as 
deemed necessary (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995).   
Tenure Litigation Scholarship  
Topics related to tenure are numerous and diverse.  The aim of this section is to 
narrow the focus of the literature review to tenure litigation studies, and to provide 
context for the instant study.  In particular, this section includes a review of selected 
studies that are either directly or closely related to tenure, promotion, or retention 
litigation.  Beyond frequency counts or numbers of wins and losses, the studies reviewed 
are grounded in explaining the policies and reasons for the outcomes of the cases with 
attention given to relevant findings, conclusions, and recommendations.  The need for the 
instant study is then presented in the context of the pertinent conclusions and 
recommendations. 
Selected Studies  
Ancell (1978) sought to identify the then-current legal profile of academic tenure, 
and to identify major trends in and practical effects of the shift in rules surrounding 
academic employment.  The study was organized into three main sections:  (a) the 
philosophical and historical bases of academic tenure, with a strong focus on academic 
freedom, which tenure was designed to protect; (b) the legal bases of tenure and pertinent 
judicial interpretations; and (c) the legal status of tenure, including issues and trends.  
Ancell (1978) concluded that academic freedom is not a legal right directly enforceable 
by the courts; academic tenure protects academic freedom and is grounded in both 
tradition and law; disputes that were once handled collegially were being taken to the 
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courts; courts were having a greater influence on academia; and the academic community 
must communicate to courts the principles and values deemed essential to academic 
freedom and tenure.     
DiBiase (1979) looked to Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) and Perry v. 
Sindermann (1972), and 80 other cases to examine tenure principles that have been 
internalized by the courts, in post-1972 cases, as well as alternative-to-tenure principles 
and how they may conflict with tenure principles.  Among several findings, DiBiase 
(1979) stated that tenure, as understood in academia, had not been fully upheld by the 
courts, and that courts had not substituted legal principles for basic principles of the 
profession.  She also found that certain tenure principles were violated by alternative-to-
tenure configurations.  DiBiase (1979) stated that tenure in the academic world is unique, 
and that it is up to the professoriate to clarify its parameters.  Further, the onus is on the 
profession to “stop the disintegration and repair the foundation” of tenure, or else actions 
that would endanger tenure could continue (DiBiase, 1979, p. 222). 
Phelps (1979), also with a primary focus on Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) and 
Perry v. Sindermann (1972), examined the legal meaning of tenure in Tennessee public 
higher education, as influenced by state and federal court decisions.  Looking at 138 
cases, Phelps (1979) found the judiciary supportive of tenure, as a means to preserve 
academic freedom.  A major concern of the courts in employment termination cases was 
due process.  Courts were not concerned with the governance of higher education 
institutions, but compliance with terms of employment was a concern.  He further found 
plaintiffs in sex or race discrimination claims to be usually unsuccessful.  Phelps (1979) 
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recommended that institutions establish and follow well-defined policies and procedures 
in order to prevent litigation.  
Boissé (1985) focused a study on cases brought in federal district courts during 
the years 1961 to 1980 in which tenured and nontenured faculty members brought 
charges against their institutions.  The four broad areas of litigation included loyalty oaths 
or the abridgment of freedom of speech, termination, nonretention, and discriminatory or 
unequal treatment.  Boissé (1985) found that institutions were successful in most 
lawsuits.  In his conclusions, Boissé (1985) advised that institutions should carefully 
document their procedures and that the procedures should be strictly followed. 
O’Neal (1992) examined cases and legislative history pertaining to Title VII and 
sex discrimination in higher education to determine employment discrimination issues 
and developments.  Deeming these topics as areas of rapid growth for colleges and 
universities, O’Neal (1992) explained that the judiciary had become increasingly 
involved in such issues.  She recommended that institutions have written and uniform 
policies with which institutions comply.     
Timm’s (1994) study zeroed in on the peer review process in promotion and 
tenure decisions in higher education.  Using 93 court decisions from 1984 to 1990, the 
study included descriptive statistics of frequencies and percentages as well as qualitative 
data to assess the implication of the court decisions for colleges and universities.  
Looking at the independent variables of burden of proof, confidentiality, and 
documentation, and the dependent variable of the successful litigant, Timm’s (1994) 
analysis showed no significant relationship between the level of burden of proof and 
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being the successful litigant.  In addition to the issue of peer review, Timm (1994) 
identified six other points of law that were more often raised by litigants, including 
property interests, discrimination, letters of employment, civil rights, immunity, and due 
process.  She stated that courts will review procedural issues, but are reluctant to preempt 
academic experts in academic qualifications and decisions.  Recommendations from the 
study included that institutions increase their awareness of fair procedures, that the 
procedures are clearly written and established, and that procedures are followed as 
written and codified by the institution.  Further, peer review committees must be trained 
to fully understand the needs of the department, the process, relevant legislation, and the 
fact that full confidentiality could not be assured.   
Leap (1995) conducted a study on wrongful discharge and employment 
discrimination litigation in which he analyzed over 130 lawsuits that arose from faculty 
claims of discrimination in tenure, reappointment, or promotion decisions during the 
years 1972 to 1994.  Discrimination issues included those of sex, race, national origin, 
religion, handicap or disability, and age.  Leap (1995) concluded that the courts showed 
“an almost inordinate degree of respect for the complex faculty personnel decisions” that 
must be made in higher education institutions (p. 209).  He also found that courts exert 
influence over decisions in academia “only to the extent necessary to ensure that illegal 
employment discrimination has not occurred” (p. 209).  Leap (1995) also noted little to 
indicate that courts are willing to challenge promotion and tenure decisions, unless the 
court finds convincing evidence of disparate treatment or disparate impact.  A third 
finding of Leap’s (1995) study was that it is particularly difficult to prove illegal 
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employment discrimination, due to the considerable leeway courts have granted to 
institutions in justifying adverse promotion and tenure decisions.   And he opined in his 
review that an important question remained unanswered as to “under what conditions the 
courts should be willing to drop their anti-interventionest posture and examine promotion 
and tenure decisions” (pp. 69-70).         
A report published jointly by the American Council on Education, the American 
Association of University Professors, and the United Educators (ACE Report) (2000) 
identified four practices that institutions can employ to reduce the likelihood that a tenure 
denial will result in litigation, including:  (a) clarity in standards and procedures for 
tenure evaluation, (b) consistency in tenure decisions, (c) candor in evaluations, and (d) 
caring for unsuccessful candidates.  Clear standards and procedures should be 
communicated to all tenure-track faculty members, including the actual criteria and the 
respective weight given to the criteria.  Consistency in tenure decisions includes a 
consideration of comparative elements and fairness among candidates and over time in 
the treatment of one candidate.  Honest advice includes constructive criticism and 
evaluations that present a realistic prognosis.  Caring for an unsuccessful candidate might 
include meeting with the candidate prior to the adverse decision and assisting an 
individual with seeking another position. 
Troxel (2000) examined 81 state and federal cases from during the years 1993 to 
1998 in order to ascertain the value of statistical evidence in employment discrimination 
litigation. Troxel (2000) organized the cases under either a disparate treatment or a 
disparate impact theory, and found that few disparate treatment cases made it to full trial.  
 
137 
In the majority of the cases, the institutions prevailed, even with the use of statistics.  
Troxel (2000) found that statistical evidence was used in conjunction with other 
evidence, such as historical and anecdotal evidence.  She identified that a plaintiff who 
presents statistical evidence combined with other evidence would have “a good chance of 
surviving summary judgment and may prevail in an employment discrimination case, 
regardless of the evidence presented by the institution” (p. 227).  She also suggested 
strategies that could improve communication and collaboration between institutions and 
their attorneys and offered risk management measures for minimizing future lawsuits.  
Troxel (2000) encouraged the use of employment law training to faculty, staff, and 
administrators; clear, concise, written policies and procedures; consultation with general 
counsel; examination of court cases for applicability to an institution; and internal audits 
for legal compliance.            
Hamill (2003) examined federal tenure denial litigation in 70 cases involving 
private colleges and universities during the years 1972 to 2000.  He reported a steady rise 
in the number of faculty tenure denial cases, with Title VII sex discrimination cases being 
the most frequently litigated; that 75% of cases involved Title VII, The ADA, the Equal 
Pay Act, and the ADEA; and that procedural irregularities arose under contract theories. 
Hamill (2003) also reported a small number of cases using underlying tort theories.  
Noting that institutions were the “clear winners” in a majority of the cases, Hamill (2003) 
attributed this factor to judicial deference to academic administrators’ and trustees’ 
decisions and to academic freedom (p. 127).  He further acknowledged that institutional 
success was rooted in thorough, clearly written tenure policies and procedures; an 
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inability for plaintiffs to show that they were qualified for tenure; and a difficulty in 
proving discriminatory animus on the part of the institution.  In considering a prima facie 
case, courts varied on their handling of plaintiffs’ qualifications for tenure, with great 
deference being granted to the institutions.  Among Hamill’s (2003) recommendations 
were that institutions should be fair and effective in their tenure policies; policies should 
be clearly articulated; the pre-tenure process should be strengthened; grievance 
procedures should be available and followed; and risk management procedures should be 
put into place.        
Amacher and Meiners (2004) considered tenure and its relationship within the 
structure of higher education.  The authors looked to both state and federal case law 
involving disputes between a faculty member and a university on the issue of tenure, 
ranging from the earliest cases of tenure pre-1945 to 2003.  The cases included issues of 
Title VII, disabilities, Fourteenth Amendment due process violations, First Amendment 
violations, and contract violations.  Amacher and Meiners (2004) found that “the large 
majority of the suits were disposed of in favor of the university so long as it had followed 
proper procedure” (p. 21).  They further posited that discrimination exists but that it “is 
not a major issue of academic freedom in the context of faculty retention” (p. 21).  In rare 
cases in which faculty were dismissed for incompetence or dereliction of duties, the 
faculty member would prevail when proper procedure had not been followed.  To 
summarize, the authors explained that “universities must follow proper procedure 
regarding contracts” and must not “violate certain speech rights” (Amacher & Meiners, 
2004, p. 25).   
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The American Association of University Women (AAUW) (2004) published a 
study that focused on women who looked to the courts following a denial of tenure.  
Reviewing 19 post-1981 cases, the report documented the process in cases supported by 
the AAUW Legal Advocacy Fund.  The AAUW (2004) stated that most tenure denial 
cases are brought pursuant to Title VII.  After documenting the claims and challenges 
faced in presenting the cases, the report made several findings and recommendations.   
Among other things, the study found that the odds in sex discrimination cases do not 
favor plaintiffs, but that many plaintiffs found the fight worthwhile, regardless of the 
outcome.  The AAUW (2004) advised that policies should be designed to comply with 
antidiscrimination laws, and that faculty and administrators should understand and 
comply with the policies. 
Steadman (2005) analyzed 98 court cases in which issues of tenure and academic 
freedom were litigated during the years 1982 to 2003.  She sought to determine the role 
of the U.S. courts in defining tenure for academia.  Steadman (2005) concluded that 
courts tend to show great deference to higher education institutions in such cases, unless 
the court finds evidence of discrimination.  In addition, she concluded that discrimination 
is difficult for faculty plaintiffs to prove.  Steadman (2005) advised that in order to avoid 
or mitigate litigation, faculty and administrators must be knowledgeable about and should 
closely follow tenure policies and procedures in their institutions.   
Crittendon (2009) analyzed 96 federal court cases that were decided during the 
period of 1980 to 2007 that pertained to Title VII and tenure denial in higher education.  
Statistical analyses were used to measure the extent of any association between case and 
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or plaintiff characteristics and case outcomes; and qualitative and legal research methods 
were used to analyze the interplay between federal courts, faculty, and higher education.  
The statistical analyses showed no significant relationship between the independent 
variables (sex, plaintiff’s race, Title VII claim, and institution class) and the dependent 
variable of case outcome.  A statistically significant relationship was found between the 
independent variables of court level and decision period and the dependent variable of 
case outcome.  Crittendon (2009) found that faculty plaintiffs who claim race and or sex 
discrimination pursuant to Title VII tend to make multiple allegations of discriminatory 
conduct; such allegations include themes of procedural irregularities, ambiguous policies, 
disparate treatment, and hostile environments.  Discrimination was reported as difficult to 
prove under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine Standard, and the data suggested that most 
faculty do not succeed in showing that institutional reasons for tenure denial are merely 
pretext.  Most often, faculty tended to be unsuccessful in their suits on appeal. Crittendon 
(2009) opined that courts are not likely to question the merits of institutional employment 
decisions and reported that faculty who brought cases in the 1980’s had greater success 
rates than did faculty who brought cases in the 1990s and 2000s.         
Justification for the Current Study 
 Several themes emerge from a review of the previous tenure litigation research.  
An overarching theme in the studies reviewed is that institutions win in a majority of the 
cases.  As well, standards and procedures for tenure evaluation should be clearly written 
and articulated to tenure-track faculty members, should include guidance as to the criteria 
used in assessing faculty member, and should be applied in a fair and consistent manner. 
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The studies also showed that courts do not wish to serve in the place of academics as 
“super tenure committees”; rather, courts are respectful of academic freedom concepts 
and are likely to be deferential to institutions.  
Over time, the varied studies have utilized myriad matrices of institutional type, 
court levels, and years; thus, the courts’ interpretation of and influence on tenure, as 
analyzed through the lens of case law, has received significant and thorough scholarly 
analysis.  In recommending further study, some authors have suggested a focus on public 
or private institutions, an assessment of cases in different courts, a limitation on different 
time frames, or an analysis of institutional policies and academics’ knowledge of those 
policies.  Steadman (2005) uniquely recommended that a study should focus on 
comparing cases in which courts have reversed tenure decisions, and suggested that such 
cases could reveal errors in the tenure process.  Similarly, Leap (1995) considered the 
question of under what conditions should courts willingly drop their interventionist 
position in order to be involved in tenure decisions.  Emanating from Steadman’s (2005) 
and Leap’s (1995) perspectives, this study sought to fill a gap in the literature by 
analyzing a data set comprised solely of cases in which the defendant institution did not 
prevail—though the data was not limited to cases in which a denial of tenure was actually 
reversed.  Since previous studies indicated that defendant institutions most often prevail, 
the data search for this study casted a wide net in order to locate cases in which the 
plaintiff faculty member prevailed, on at least one issue.  It covered public and private 
institutions, state and federal appellate courts, and an extensive span of years.  By delving 
into cases in which the courts intervened into academic tenure decisions, this study 
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sought to focus on tenure practices that the courts deemed so egregious that plaintiffs’ 
rights prevailed above institutional decision-making.  This study could be particularly 
useful to administrators and academics who seek to improve the tenure process, manage 
risk, and protect academic freedom.  The study could also bring greater focus to 




METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to examine judicial influence on academic 
decision-making by identifying factors in the tenure process that have induced courts to 
rule against higher education institutions in litigation stemming from tenure denials.  By 
gaining a better understanding of why courts have inserted judicial decisions in place of 
institutional decisions in tenure related litigation, this study aimed to identify potential 
flaws in the tenure process, decrease institutions’ exposure to tenure decisions that may 
result in litigation, and decrease the influence of the courts on tenure decisions. 
Research Questions 
This study addressed the following questions:   
1. What policies and procedures employed by public and private colleges and 
universities have contributed to federal and state appellate courts’ unfavorable 
rulings against institutions in tenure denial litigation between the years 1972 
and 2011? 
2. What remedies have been granted to faculty who win tenure denial suits? 
3. What steps might colleges and universities take in the tenure process to 
minimize tenure denial litigation and the possibility of an unfavorable 
decision in a tenure denial lawsuit? 
This chapter presents the research design of the study and discusses both the 
qualitative and legal aspects of the design.  Next, the chapter explains the research 
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methods, including a discussion of the data collection procedures, the data analysis plan, 
the case briefing method, and tenets of analogical reasoning.  The delimitations and 
limitations of the study are then presented, followed by a discussion of the study’s 
trustworthiness and ethics.     
Research Design 
To achieve the purpose of the study, this study was guided by a qualitative 
research design that uses a legal research method.  Some scholars have broadly 
characterized qualitative research methodology to include legal research, which can be 
used to illustrate legal trends (Creswell, 2007; Merriam, 2009).  Merriam (2009) further 
described the study of law as an “antecedent” to what is known as qualitative study (p. 
19).  Schimmel (1996) espoused qualitative methods and legal studies that are conducted 
from a policy perspective as complementary research methods.  For research that is 
complex and for which there are shared disciplinary interests, Russo (1996) suggested 
that a combination of complementary research strategies can be useful for clarifying 
research questions and providing greater alternatives for solutions than when using only 
one method.  The complex nature of tenure litigation decisions and the interdisciplinary 
interests of the legal and education communities make a qualitative strategy that employs 
a legal research method suitable to this study. 
Qualitative Research   
Qualitative research has varied definitions and encompasses many purposes.  
Merriam (2009) posited that the commonality among the myriad definitions is “the notion 
of inquiring into, or investigating something in a systematic manner” (p. 3).  Creswell 
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(2007) defined qualitative research, in part, as “the study of research problems inquiring 
into the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (p. 37).  
Broadly, Creswell’s (2007) definition emphasized a process of research that flows from 
“philosophical assumptions, to worldviews and through a theoretical lens, and on to the 
procedures involved in studying social or human problems” (p. 37).  Current trends in 
describing the characteristics of qualitative work, as summarized by Creswell (2007), 
indicate that the focus is increasingly on “the interpretive nature of inquiry and situating 
the study within the political, social, and cultural context of the researchers, the 
participants, and the readers of a study” (p. 37).  The emergence of themes or patterns in 
qualitative research can further help explain the particular phenomenon (Creswell, 2007). 
In the current study, the process and procedures employed were those used in 
traditional legal research, as further discussed below.  The problem of tenure denial 
litigation and the consequences it imposes were interpreted within the context of the legal 
and higher education communities, particularly as unsuccessful litigation is indicative of 
legal and managerial concerns inherent in the institution.  By identifying themes or 
patterns that emerged, this study aims to assist higher education counsel and 
administrators in assessing the policies and procedures involved in making tenure 
decisions and in considering the implementation of practices that may improve an 
institution’s tenure policies and help avoid tenure litigation.     
Traditional Legal Research    
Legal research, often called the “traditional” legal case method (Russo, 1996, p. 
33), relies on the use of primary and secondary sources of authority.  Primary sources of 
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law used in legal research include constitutions, statutes, cases, regulations, and orders.  
Mandatory authority is primary authority that is binding in a particular jurisdiction.  This 
means that a court in that jurisdiction must follow existing primary sources that are 
relevant, or in unusual circumstances, overturn the precedent.  Secondary sources of law 
are materials that serve to help explain, interpret, or find primary legal resources.  
Examples of secondary sources include legal treatises, textbooks, advisory opinions, and 
legal dictionaries.  Secondary sources are not binding and are weighted differently as to 
the persuasive nature to a court (Redfield, 2011).   
Precedent systematically grounds case law; present court decisions serve as 
guidance for future court decisions.  Such reliance on precedent respects the doctrine of 
stare decisis, which means that courts will abide by decided cases (Redfield, 2011).  
Purposes of this doctrine include predictability and reliability in the law (Redfield, 2011), 
as well as evenhandedness in the administration of justice, guidance, and control of the 
volume of litigation (Wren & Wren, 1986).  Loosely translated as a judicial principle of 
social policy and “a critical aspect of the rule of law” (Alexander & Alexander, 2011, p. 
7), this court-created doctrine means that “when a court has applied a rule of law to a set 
of facts, that legal rule will apply whenever the same set of facts is again presented to the 
court” (Wren & Wren, 1986, p. 80). 
In practice, determining how stare decisis is implemented can be somewhat 
complicated in the American system of courts, but an explanation using categories or 
branches of the system is useful (Alexander & Alexander, 2011).  Referencing an 
explanation by Henry Campbell Black, Alexander and Alexander (2011) elucidated the 
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principles of stare decisis.  Inferior courts are strictly bound to follow the decisions of 
courts that have appellate or revisory jurisdiction over them.  Any judgment that is 
rendered by the highest court in a state or federal judicial system is binding in all other 
courts if the issues of the case fall under the peculiar or exclusive jurisdiction of the court 
making the decision.  A court of last resort has a duty to follow its own precedent unless 
the court is fully determines that the precedent was wrong and that overturning the prior 
decision will be less problematic than adhering to it.  If a court does not have precedent 
that controls a particular decision, it may consult and be guided by applicable decisions 
of other courts.  Judicial comity will direct a court to accept and conform to a decision of 
another nonbinding court in order to secure a consistent administration of the law, but not 
if doing so would violated the court’s own convictions of what the law is (Alexander & 
Alexander, 2011).   
While acknowledging the doctrine of stare decisis, the rule of law does change.  
Even when the facts of two cases are very similar, nuanced differences will exist.  
Lawyers arguing a case may draw similarities or distinctions between their case and 
precedent (Wren & Wren, 1986).   A court may also acknowledge that precedent is 
wrong, which will result in the court changing or overruling its opinion (Redfield, 2011). 
Research Methods 
In this study, the researcher selected and reviewed court cases pertinent to tenure 
denial in higher education in which the institution was the unsuccessful litigant on at least 
one issue.  Legal research known as the “traditional” legal case method (Russo, 1996, p. 
33) was used to collect and analyze data for this study.   Blending historical and case 
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study concepts, Russo (1996) described the traditional legal case method as “a form of 
historical-legal research that is neither quantitative nor qualitative” (p. 34).  Russo (1996) 
further explained legal analysis as seeking “to make sense of the evolving reality known 
as the law” (p. 35).  “Rooted in the historical nature of the law and its reliance on 
precedent,” systematic legal inquiry that seeks to interpret and explain the law looks at 
the “past, present, and future” (Russo, 1996, p. 35).  This reliance on precedent—or stare 
decisis— suggests that prior relevant and controlling decisions should be used to aid in 
the interpretation of the law in a subsequent case and has resulted in some researchers 
calling this form of inquiry historical-legal research (Russo, 1996).   
Because legal opinions served as the data to be analyzed in this study, the legal 
case method was suitable for analyzing primary legal sources for explanatory and 
predictive purposes.  While an ongoing interplay between data collection and data 
analysis is inherent in the legal case method, collection and analysis procedures are 
addressed separately below. 
Data Collection Procedures   
Data examined for this study consisted solely of primary source reported cases 
from the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the states’ highest 
appellate court decisions.  Cases selected and reviewed related to tenure denial litigation 
in higher education, in which the institution was the unsuccessful litigant on at least one 
issue, during the years spanning 1972-2011.  Primary source case law was located 
through the Westlaw and LexisNexis online databases.  Westlaw and LexisNexis services 
are major online networks of searchable databases that support computer based legal 
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research.  Through these databases, a wealth of court cases, statutes, interpretive 
materials, and public records may be accessed.  To get an overview of the case law and 
issues, preliminary searches in both databases used terms that included:  “tenure,” “tenure 
denial,” “academic freedom,” “faculty employment,” “peer review,” “faculty evaluation,” 
“higher education,” “colleges,” “universities,” and “discrimination.”  The terms were 
searched in multiple combinations and juxtapositions.  Three targeted searches were then 
conducted, which were developed with the assistance of a Westlaw reference librarian 
and a professor of law in a law library. 
The first targeted search was run in Westlaw, using a WestlawNext search feature 
as further outlined by category:  Terms:  “denial of tenure at university”; Content: Cases; 
Jurisdiction: All State & Federal (State and Federal Supreme Courts, Federal Courts of 
Appeal); Date: All dates after 12/31/1971; Reported Status: Reported.  This search 
returned 512 cases.  Case summaries were then read to screen the cases for additional 
delimiters,  including only the states’ highest courts, plaintiffs prevailed on at least one 
issue, no class action suits, and only four year or doctoral institutions.  The delimiters are 
further addressed in the subsequent Delimitations and Limitations section. 
The second targeted search was run in Westlaw with the following query in the 
ALLSTATES database:  CO(HIGH) & SY,DI(TENUR! /10 (GRANT! DEN! REFUS!)) 
& SY,DI(COLLEG! UNIV!) & da(aft 1/1972 & bef 12/2011).  The state search yielded 
106 cases.  The same search was run for federal courts, with the adaptation of using the 
“search for a database box” and entering cta, sct.  The federal search also eliminated the 
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CO(HIGH) part of the query.  The federal search yielded 177 cases.  All case summaries 
were further screened using the study’s delimiters, as further discussed below.   
The third targeted search was run in the LexisNexis database as outlined for each 
category:  Legal subtab; States Legal – U.S.; view more; Combined States; Find Cases; 
By Court; Highest Courts All States.  Using a terms and connectors search and the LN-
SUMMARY segment, the following query was then entered:  TENUR! w/15 (GRANT! 
Or DEN! Or REFUS!) and (college or university) and date (geq (1/1/1972) and leq 
(12/31/2011).  The state search yielded 126 cases.  For federal cases, the search was 
entered as outlined for each category:  Legal Subtab; Find Cases; U.S. Courts of Appeal 
Cases, Combined; Search Selected.  At the search screen, the same query was entered as 
was used for the state cases.  The federal search yielded 826 cases.  All case summaries 
were further screened using the study’s delimiters.   
Of the cases retrieved in the three targeted searches, 33 fit the study’s purposes, 
22 federal and 11 state.  The WestClip Notify service was also used for identifying any 
cases that were decided after the initial search that met the study criteria during the 
research period.  No cases were retrieved through this service. 
Data Analysis   
Cases that were identified as pertinent to the research questions were reviewed for 
current validity and value as precedent.  Both Westlaw and LexisNexis citator tools were 
used to follow the procedural progress of the cases through the court system and to 
examine the treatment of the cases by other case law.  Using both services allowed for 
cross-checking of the cases and the related information.   
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Also utilized in this study were secondary resources including law review articles; 
education journal articles; other journal articles; and dissertations and monographs 
pertaining to tenure in general, and issues coexistent with tenure.  Coexistent issues 
included the intertwining of academic freedom and tenure, the tenure process, tenure 
litigation and its legal theories, and tenure litigation scholarship.  Information from 
scholarly journals and texts served to supplement and aid in the interpretation and 
discussion of the case law data. 
 Using similar search terms as used in the primary source search, the Westlaw and 
LexisNexis databases were used to search for legally oriented secondary sources.  
Nonlegal scholarly journals, texts, and monographs were located through electronic 
searches of the University of Tennessee’s Online Catalogue.  Research was conducted 
through catalogue database searches including, for example: electronic journals, the 
ERIC education periodical database, Pro-Quest Dissertations, and the Social Science 
Research Network database.  Each resource located through preliminary searches was 
examined for additional citations to pertinent resources.  Finally, websites of professional 
organizations that consider interdisciplinary interests of law and education were searched 
for official statements, emerging issues, and scholarship.  Websites included, for 
example, the American Association of University Professors, the Education Law 
Association, and the National Association of College and University Attorneys. 
Case briefing.  Cases were briefed to extrapolate the information that was 
pertinent to the research questions, with a particular focus on the policies and procedures 
that were central to a court’s reasoning for deeming an institution the unsuccessful 
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litigant.  A case brief is “an analytical summary of an opinion” (Redfield, 2011, p. 38).  
Case briefs are used to reduce lengthy judicial opinions into the most essential 
components of the decision.  Many formats exist; researchers can employ the method that 
best enables them to clarify thinking, understand the judicial opinion, and create useful 
reference notes (Redfield, 2011). 
This study used a common format for briefing a case (Redfield, 2011; Statsky & 
Wernet, 1995), which was adapted for the needs of this study.  Generally, each case brief 
included:  Name of the case, including parties’ names; Citation, identifying the court and 
year; State in which the litigation occurred; State in which the defendant institution was 
located;  Procedural posture, including who brought the suit and how the lower courts 
ruled; Issue presented, including the legal theories of the plaintiff; Facts, particularly 
whether the institution is public or private, factual allegations of the plaintiff, and those 
facts on which the court focused in its reasoning; Issue or question presented; Relevant 
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions; Analysis, or the court’s explanation for 
reaching the holding on a particular issue; Holding, including the resolution to the case; 
Disposition and remedies as a result of the litigation; and Notes, including any pertinent 
issues that are crucial to further understand or clarify the case. 
Reasoning by analogy.  Referencing the case briefs, this study employed 
reasoning by analogy or example to examine and analyze the legal interpretation of 
tenure denial litigation in the federal and state court decisions.  The legal thought and 
writings of Edward Levi undergird reasoning by analogy, which is the “most familiar 
form of legal reasoning” (Sunstein, 1993, p. 741).  Levi (1949) described the legal 
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reasoning process in a three step outline: “similarity is seen between cases; next the rule 
of law inherent in in the first case is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to 
the second case” (p. 2).  (The rule of law referred to means the law that is established in 
that decision.)  This process of legal reasoning provides a “dynamic quality” to the law, 
allowing the facts of cases that are considered similar to earlier cases to shape legal 
standards and establishing that to ascertain whether factual situations are similar or 
different is the most important step in the legal process (Levi, 1949).  Levi (1949) 
explained this forming and re-forming of legal rules as a process through which rules 
were first built and then broken down in response to society’s changes.   
According to Sunstein (1993), analogical reasoning maintains currency, 
represents the most common form of legal reasoning, and is central to the common law 
method.  Even so, this method of reasoning requires that the researcher must ascertain the 
relevance of factual similarities and differences (Sunstein, 1993).  The four “different but 
overlapping features” of analogical reasoning presented by Sunstein (1993) include: (a) 
“principled consistency;” (b) “a focus on particulars;” (c) “incompletely theorized 
judgments;” and (d) “principles operating at a low or intermediate level of abstraction” 
(p. 746).  Principled consistency requires that cases be made coherent; some principle 
must be used to harmonize cases that have seemingly disparate outcomes (Sunstein, 
1993).  Key to determining relevancy, a focus on the particulars requires a bottom-up 
approach to analysis that “develops from concrete controversies” of a particular case, yet 
is not without theoretical components (Sunstein, 1993, p. 746).  Relevancy 
determinations in analogical reasoning also require that judges and lawyers make 
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judgments, even though a comprehensive theoretical underpinning is lacking (Sunstein, 
1993).  The fourth feature of Sunstein’s (1993) determination of relevancy in analogical 
reasoning requires that the principles be developed using some abstraction when noting 
similarities and differences among facts—a sort of juxtaposition against the call to focus 
on the particulars (Sunstein, 1993).       
Despite Sunstein’s (1993) arguments as to the currency, commonality, and 
centrality of analogical reasoning to common law, this approach to legal analysis raises 
debate among legal scholars.  Debates emerge as to whether precedent is a legal standard 
or merely a social practice, what justifies precedential constraints, whether analogical and 
deductive reasoning are different, the role of analogical reasoning in judicial decisions, 
the relationship between analogical and precedential reasoning, and the relationship of 
reasoning by analogy on the development or presupposition of rules.  Furthermore, some 
contest the uniqueness or value of legal or judicial reasoning (Edlin, 2007).   
Weinreb (2005) challenged scholars’ views that analogical reasoning is logically 
flawed.  For example, he explained that scholars such as Levi and Sunstein, while 
promoting the virtues of analogical reasoning, actually advocated “selling reason short” 
(p. 67).  According to Weinreb (2005), Posner attributed the prevalence of analogical 
reasoning to “slipshod judicial work habits and a failure to come to grips with real issues” 
(p. 67).  Other scholars viewed analogical reasoning simply as “ordinary deductive 
inference” or no reasoning at all (Weinreb, 2005, p. 67).  The theories that tended to 
dismiss analogical reasoning assumed that deductive and inductive logic defined the 
bounds within which questions had to be answered; when there was no answer, 
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analogical reasoning was assumed “too weak to support the weighty consequences of an 
adjudication” (Weinreb, 2005, p. 124).  Diverging from those who critiqued analogical 
reasoning, Weinreb (2005) argued that “the capacity for analogical reasoning is hard-
wired in us,” and that analogical reasoning is consistently and successfully relied upon (p. 
124).  He also emphasized that reasoning analogically is common to legal systems and 
central to the adjudicatory process (Weinreb, 2005). 
The debate over analogical reasoning can be traced, at least in part, to the ability 
to perceive similarities and to sort them according to one’s purpose.  The philosophic 
“problem of universals,” which dates back to Plato and Aristotle, relates to ontological, 
epistemological, and linguistic issues (Weinreb, 2005).  Based on Guba and Lincoln’s 
(1994) classification of social science researchers into positivist, postpositivist, critical, 
and constructivist paradigms, Toma (1997) classified legal scholars into four paradigms 
of legal formalists, legal realists, critical scholars, and interpretive scholars.  Comparing 
the formalist description to that of Guba and Lincoln’s (1994) positivist description, 
Toma (1997) explained that legal formalist scholars seek to organize and generalize legal 
cases in order to find patterns that can be articulated as legal principles.  Toma (1997) 
further compared the legal realist to Guba and Lincoln’s (1994) postpositivists, whereby 
legal realists do not accredit an objective reality, do consider influential social factors, 
and aspire to a realist ontology and objective epistemology.  Critical scholars, according 
to Toma (1997), similarly espouse a realist ontology, yet view reality as not neutral and 
formed by social, economic, and political forces.  Finally, interpretive scholars assume 
that multiple realities exist (Toma, 1997). 
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  Allan (2007) described the sharing of paradigms in the use of precedent and 
analogy as “the basis for elucidating and refining a collective moral code, expressing the 
fundamental legal commitments of the whole community as shaped by history and 
experience” (p. 198).  Common law reasoning by analogy is thus valuable to a complex 
world in which consensus is unlikely (Allan, 2007).  Both formalist and realist legal 
camps influence analogic reasoning, tending towards formalistic when examining factual 
similarities among cases and realistic when focusing on the values shared by the rule of 
law and those “that are at stake in the case at hand” (Huhn, 2003, p. 315).  Using 
reasoning by analogy, courts are able in many cases to circumvent ideas that are highly 
abstract or very broad statements of principles and focus on a narrow range of issues 
(Allan, 2007).  As Allan (2007) described, “[t]he true meaning of any textual provision is 
ultimately a matter of its correct application (or disapplication) in the infinite variety of 
circumstances arising from time to time; and that judgment is always a function of the 
reasons citizens and officials can offer one another in the debate over political morality 
that nourishes, and draws on, the common law” (p. 203).          
Debates over methods of legal analysis and criticisms of reasoning by analogy 
notwithstanding, the present study was well-suited to the use of analogical reasoning 
based on its common acceptance and wide use by legal scholars and judges in rendering 
legal interpretations.  Methods associated with reasoning by analogy provide a useful 
approach to comparing legal opinions and for allowing for the ever-changing nature of 
legal opinion.  A focus on the facts of particular cases allows for a detailed explanation of 
the ways that tenure litigation decisions were influenced by policies and practices of the 
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institutions.  In sum, the historical orientation of reasoning by analogy provided a 
foundation on which to observe tenure denial litigation during a near 40-year span, 
allowed the researcher to place the cases in the appropriate legal context, and facilitated 
the intellectual process of data analysis to identify themes and trends that emerge for 
offering constructive managerial advice based on legal principles.   
Delimitations and Limitations 
 This study and its applicability were bounded by delimitations and limitations.  
Broad generalizations may not be appropriate across court jurisdictions, over a period of 
time, or from institution to institution.   
Delimitations   
The empirical data and study were delimited by the following criteria:  
1.  Cases included only those in which tenure denial was a litigated or underlying 
issue.  Promotion, retention, contract renewal, and similar issues, and cases which 
were settled were not included unless an in-depth reading of the case indicated 
these issues were also tied to an issue of tenure denial. 
2. Cases included only those in which the institution was the unsuccessful litigant on 
at least one issue.  An in-depth, thorough analysis of a court’s reasoning for ruling 
against an institution may reveal nuances of policies and procedures that are 
particularly problematic for institutions.   
3. Cases included only decisions that were rendered in federal appellate and state 
highest appellate courts.  Records of trial court decisions are generally less 
accessible, and appellate court decisions can affect law and policy.   
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4. Cases included only decisions rendered from 1972 to 2011.  The Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 was made applicable to higher education in 1972, and few tenure denial 
cases were litigated prior to that date.  
5. Cases included only decisions that were reported.  Only reported cases are 
precedential. 
6. Cases included those that arose in both public and private institutions.  
7. Cases included only those that pertain to doctoral or four-year institutions.  
Organizational structure and tenure decisions of community and professional 
colleges are often different than those of doctoral or four-year institutions (Kaplin 
& Lee, 2006). 
8. Cases did not include those that were brought as a class action.  Class action suits 
are beyond the scope of this study.       
Limitations    
The empirical data of the study were limited by the following:  
1.  Qualitative and legal research methods rely on the researcher for data collection; 
thus, data choices and analysis are value-laden and dependent upon the researcher 
and accordingly are subject to researcher bias, constraints, and interpretation as to 
relevance. 
2. The data are limited by the continued generation of new appellate case law on the 
issue of tenure denial litigation.  A ruling that is current at the time of the study 
could be reversed or clarified by the time the study is published, new judicial 
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theories could arise, and the conclusions and recommendations drawn in this 
study could be altered. 
3. The data are naturally limited by the size of the federal and state court systems.   
4. The data were generated from the Westlaw and LesixNexis electronic databases.  
This presumes that the databases are current, complete, and correct. 
5. The conclusions and recommendations are not intended to be construed as 
offering legal advice.  Any conclusions or recommendations that a reader 
considers useful should not be considered an end point, but rather should serve as 
a starting point for discussions with General Counsel, administrators, and peers.     
This study did not seek to set forth solid answers or rigid predictions of how a 
court would rule in a future case.  Nor did it seek to present quantitative data, such as 
percentages of cases that involved a particular cause of action or that were heard in a 
particular court.  It sought, instead, to utilize existing case law in order to inform higher 
education administrators about what courts have said regarding tenure denial litigation 
issues and the tenure process, and to make recommendations about policies and 
procedures that might be considered effective in better managing the tenure process.  By 
considering the researcher’s assessment of the case law and conclusions drawn from 
judicial narratives, readers may deem particular recommendations as helpful towards 
gaining a better understanding of how to manage and improve an institution’s tenure 




The validity and reliability of research that is qualitative in nature is often looked 
upon with skepticism by researchers who use more traditional methods (Merriam, 2009).  
In qualitative research, the underlying philosophical assumptions and worldviews 
contribute to the interpretive and values-based nature of the inquiry, which can affect the 
validity and reliability of a study (Creswell, 2007).  Creswell (2007) reviewed and 
summarized perspectives of and terms used by several researchers pertaining to the 
concepts of validity and reliability in qualitative research; he then suggested a framework 
of thinking by which “researchers employ accepted strategies to document the ‘accuracy’ 
of their studies,” which Creswell (2007) labeled “validation strategies” (p. 207).  In this 
study, every effort will be made to ensure that the cases chosen are pertinent to the 
research purpose and questions and that the researcher’s analysis is thorough and 
accurate.  Strategies used to enhance the trustworthiness or validity of the current study 
include a clarification of the researcher’s bias, triangulation, and peer review. 
Researcher Bias   
In a qualitative study, the researcher is the “key instrument” (Creswell, 2007, p. 
38) or “primary instrument” (Merriam, 2009, p. 15) for data collection and analysis.  The 
researcher is thus the one who gathers the information and does not typically rely on 
instruments developed by other researchers.  The data collected can be reduced by the 
researcher into patterns, categories, and themes; coded according to the researcher’s 
needs; displayed visually; and narrated to the reader (Creswell, 2007).  Rather than trying 
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to eliminate or cover any researcher biases, it is important to identify the biases and how 
they may affect the data collection and interpretation. 
For this study, the researcher’s bias, or “researcher’s position” (Merriam, 2009, p. 
219) is that of a licensed attorney and scholar who has interests that encompass both law 
and higher education.  The researcher has gained experience researching and analyzing 
case law as well as drafting opinions for state and federal appellate judges on a wide 
range of civil and criminal issues.  
Triangulation   
Also employed in this study, triangulation is a validation strategy that involves the 
use of many and varied sources, methods, and theories to provide corroborating evidence 
for a study (Creswell, 2007).  A combination of data sources serves to strengthen a study 
(Patton, 2002).  Data and interpretive resources for this study were mined from multiple 
databases, from additional references and citations located in identified resources, and 
from multiple organizations.  This study compared published judicial decisions for court 
cases that met the study criteria, and sought to identify similarities and differences 
represented in the cases.  Case briefs also contributed to the analytical process.   
Peer Review   
Peer review is likewise pertinent as an external check on this study (Creswell, 
2007).  A dissertation committee comprised of two higher education scholars (one who 
serves as chancellor of a major research institution and professor, and one who is a 
former chancellor of a public institution and professor), a scholar of law, and a scholar of 
management assures that reviewers challenged the researcher as to the study’s 
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methodology, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations.  As case law evolves and 
additional studies are pursued by other scholars, the law will progress, and the current 
study will continue to be reviewed for its validity. 
Ethical Considerations 
Qualitative researchers must also be concerned with ethical responsibilities 
(Creswell, 2007; Merriam, 2009; Patton, 2002).  No significant ethical considerations 
existed for this study.  Case law comprises the data for the study; thus, there were no 
issues of human subjects or informed consent.  All information that was collected as 
primary data or secondary interpretive resources is publicly accessible; thus, there were 
no issues of confidentiality, data access, or data ownership.  No sponsor existed for the 
research; thus, there were no issues of the researcher losing control over the data or its 







The purpose of this study was to examine judicial influence on academic 
decision-making by identifying factors in the tenure process that have induced courts to 
rule against higher education institutions in litigation stemming from tenure denials.  By 
gaining a better understanding of why courts have inserted judicial decisions in place of 
institutional decisions in tenure related litigation, this study aimed to identify potential 
flaws in the tenure process, decrease institutions’ exposure to tenure decisions that may 
result in litigation, and decrease the influence of the courts on tenure decisions. 
To achieve the purposes, this study reviewed judicial opinions from the U.S. 
Supreme Court, U.S. Courts of Appeal, and states’ highest appellate courts during the 
period of 1972 to 2011 in which higher education institutions did not wholly prevail in 
tenure denial litigation.  Selected cases included reported cases that arose in public and 
private, four-year or doctoral institutions, for which tenure denial was a litigated or 
underlying issue.  Class action suits were not included in this study.   
Two conceptual lenses provided the theoretical framework through which to 
consider the information gleaned from the cases:  the principle of shared governance, by 
which authority for decision-making is shared through a multi-layered process (AAUP, 
2006c; Kaplan, 2004; Mason, 1972); and the doctrine of judicial deference, by which 
courts are generally deferential to academic decision-making (Cohen & Spitzer, 1995-
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1996; O’Neil, 2010; White, 2010).  Through these lenses, this study addressed the 
following questions: 
1.  What policies and procedures employed by public and private colleges and 
universities have contributed to federal and state appellate courts’ unfavorable 
rulings against institutions in tenure denial litigation between the years 1972 
and 2011? 
2. What remedies have been granted to faculty who win tenure denial suits? 
3. What steps might colleges and universities take in the tenure process to 
minimize tenure denial litigation and the possibility of an unfavorable 
decision in a tenure denial lawsuit? 
Historical legal research, a form of qualitative study, was the research method 
used to identify, obtain, and analyze the cases for the study.  Identifying and obtaining the 
cases involved multiple procedures.  Extensive reading on the subject of tenure 
contributed to an understanding of the many issues underlying and concomitant to tenure 
litigation and aided in the identification of appropriate terms to use in searching for 
relevant cases.  Through Westlaw and LexisNexis online database research systems, 
federal and state cases were identified and screened for their suitability for the study.  In 
addition to computer-assisted research, cases and supporting secondary materials, 
including other studies and academic commentary articles, were read to gather additional 
citations to cases that might fit the parameters of the study.   
Cases that were identified as meeting the delimiters for the study were briefed to 
glean information pertinent to the research questions.  As part of the briefing process, the 
 
165 
prior and subsequent histories of the cases were reviewed in the online databases.  Such 
histories showed the progress of the cases through the court systems and indicated 
whether any of the legal principles relevant to the study had been cautioned against or 
explicitly overruled.  While legal research provided the method for identifying, obtaining, 
and screening the cases for meeting the study parameters, qualitative methodology was 
then applied to glean from the data themes and trends that emerged from the cases to 
answer the specific research questions.   
In addition to this overview of the present study, this chapter includes a 
description of the data and pertinent findings.  Using judicial narratives and case 
commentary, the findings are first presented in the larger context of the conceptual 
lenses, and then more specifically in the context of the first two research questions.  
(Because the third research question pertains to risk management and measures for 
minimizing exposure to tenure litigation, it will be answered in Chapter 5, in the section 
dedicated to making recommendations.)  A brief summary of the findings concludes the 
chapter. 
Data 
All cases chosen for this study met the criteria of the study’s delimiters, as 
follows:  tenure denial was a litigated or an underlying issue; the institution did not 
prevail on at least one issue; cases were from federal appellate or states’ highest courts; 
the years spanned from 1972 to 2011; only reported cases were included; cases arose out 
of four-year or doctoral granting institutions; institutions were public or private; and no 
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class actions were included.  It was determined that 22 federal cases and 11 state cases 
met the delimiters of this study, for a total of 33 cases.  
 Appendix A contains a listing of the case citations for cases used in this study.  
Appendix B includes two tables that provide a snapshot view of the cases used in the 
study, by providing the following information:  the case citation; the basis of the suit; the 
claims and the law on which the claims were based; certain facts and issues that were 
pertinent to a court’s disposition of the case; and the court’s disposition.  Federal case 
information is located in Table 1, and state case information is located in Table 2.   
 As displayed in Table 1, only two cases used for this study were heard in the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  The other federal cases were spread across the Courts of Appeal.  The 
numbers of cases identified from each circuit are follows:  First Circuit (2); Second 
Circuit (1); Third Circuit (5); Fifth Circuit (1); Sixth Circuit (5); Seventh Circuit (1); 
Eighth Circuit (1); Ninth Circuit (2); Tenth Circuit (1); and D.C. Circuit (1).  Table 1 also 
identifies that the earliest federal case reported that met the study criteria was reported in 
1973, and the latest was reported in 2001.  Fourteen cases arose from public institutions, 
and eight cases arose from private institutions.   
As displayed in Table 2, cases came from several different states (or District of 
Columbia) courts including Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Ohio, 
New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.  Table 2 also identifies that the 
earliest case reported that met the study criteria was reported in 1975, and the latest was 
reported in 2007.  Seven cases arose from public institutions, and four cases arose from 
private institutions.   
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Neither the federal nor the state law searches yielded enough cases to draw 
meaningful quantitative information, such as percentages of cases arising out of a 
particular circuit or type of institution, or percentages of cases which contained certain 
legal claims.  By design, collection or interpretation of such figures was not a goal of this 
study.  Collectively, the bases of federal and state cases arose from allegations of 
violation of a plaintiff’s rights; discrimination on the basis of sex, race, or national origin; 
contract related allegations; tort related allegations, and various other claims.  Underlying 
the suits are various laws including Title VII, state contract and tort laws, state and 
federal statutes, as well as a few other laws.  Discrimination allegations were the most 
common.  Further discussion of the legal bases for the claims is presented in findings as 
applied to the research questions.   
Findings 
Providing context to this study’s themes that arise from the cases chosen are 
judicial narratives regarding conceptual frameworks of shared governance and judicial 
deference.  While these concepts do not provide a specific answer to the research 
questions posed, these concepts necessarily pervade a thorough discussion of tenure 
litigation issues.  Accordingly, the next two sections include excerpts from cases that 
demonstrate the judiciary’s recognition of the process of shared governance as applied in 
tenure decisions, and the judiciary’s prevailing attitude of judicial deference to academic 
decision-making.  The conceptual framework sections are followed by findings that are 
applied to answer the first two research questions.  
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Findings Related to Shared Governance 
 Shared governance is a longstanding, well-recognized, respected theoretical 
framework pertaining to decision-making in academia that involves multiple layers and 
shared authority (AAUP, 2006c; Kaplan, 2004; Mason, 1972).  More than half of the 
federal cases included in this study thoroughly presented the shared process involved in 
the tenure decision at issue (Abramson v University of Hawaii, 1979; Abramson v. 
William Paterson College of New Jersey, 2001; Brennan v. King, 1998; Brown v. 
Trustees of Boston University, 1989; Gutzwiller v, Fenik, 1988; Harris v,. Ladner, 1997; 
Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 1980; Lynn v. Regents of the University of California, 
1981; Roebuck v. Drexel University, 1988; Sola v. Lafayette College, 1986; Stern v. 
Shouldice, 1983; Stewart v. Rutgers, The State University, 1997).  Many state cases also 
thoroughly presented the shared process involved in tenure decision at issue (Craine v. 
Trinity College, 2002; Dixon v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 1988; 
Kakaes v. George Washington University, 1996; Shoucair v. Brown University, 2007; 
University of Alaska v. Geistauts, 1983). The following excerpts are exemplary of 
judicial narratives pertaining to shared governance:  
 
Retention and tenure decisions in [the professor’s] department are first considered 
by the Curriculum and Instruction Retention Committee (“the Committee”). . . 
.The Department Chair is an ex-officio member of the Committee.  Though not a 
voting member, the Chair does choose whether or not to sign the Committee’s 
recommendation.  By not signing a recommendation, the Chair indicates a lack of 
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support for the Committee’s evaluation.  The Dean then makes a recommendation 
to the Provost.  Finally, the President of [the institution] makes a determination 
whether or not to recommend retention (of tenure, where applicable) to the Board 
of Trustees.  The [Institution’s] Board of Trustees then decides whether to retain 
and/or grant tenure based on the recommendation of the President (Abramson v. 
William Paterson College of New Jersey, 2001, p. 268; internal citations omitted).  
 
Tenure review at [Institution] is a multi-step process ultimately leading to a 
decision by the board of trustees . . . . At no stage of the procedure is the 
recommendation of any evaluator binding upon the evaluator or decision-maker at 
the next stage” (Brennan v. King, 19981998, p. 260). 
 
Reappointment is a multistep process that involves review by several levels of 
faculty and administration . . . . Trustee approval is the final step in promotion and 
the granting of tenure (Craine v. Trinity College, 2002, p. 526-527). 
 
The Handbook includes a section entitled, “Precise Policies And Procedure Of 
The Tenure Process,” which details the following levels of review for a tenure 
application:  The departmental Appointments, Promotions, and Tenure (APT) 
Committee, the department chairman, the College of Arts and Sciences APT 
Committee, The Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, the Vice-President for 
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Academic Affairs, the President and the Board of Trustees (Harris v. Ladner, 
1997, p. 1122). 
Even when lengthy narratives were not dedicated to delineating the shared 
decision-making in the tenure process, some courts brought forth aspects of shared 
governance while presenting facts and identifying problems within a certain piece of the 
tenure process (Board of Trustees of University of Kentucky v. Hayse, 1989; Ford v. 
Nicks, 1984, 1989; Hill v. Ross, 1999; Sawyer v. Mercer, 1980; Skudrzyk v. Reynolds, 
1993; Stolberg v. Members of Board of Trustees for State Colleges of State of 
Connecticut, 1973; University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 1990).  Although the court in 
Jones v. University of Central Oklahoma (1993) provided little analysis of the process, it 
noted “the formalized nineteen-step process utilized by the University to evaluate [the 
professor’s] application” (p. 362).    
Findings Related to Judicial Deference 
When reviewing decisions made in higher education institutions, courts strongly 
favor an attitude of deference (Kaplin & Lee, 2006).  From the research findings, it is 
evident that courts value the preservation of institutional autonomy in making lawful 
tenure decisions.  Several federal cases included in this study directly acknowledged the 
principle of deferring to a higher education institution’s internal decision-making (Brown 
v. Trustees of Boston University, 1989; Ford v. Nicks, 1984 Ford v. Nicks; 1989; 
Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 1988; Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 1980; Sola v. Lafayette 
College, 1986; United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents of Stephen F. Austin State 
University, 1982; University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 1990).  State cases that directly 
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acknowledged judicial deference to academic decisions include Craine v. Trinity College, 
(2002) and Dixon v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (1988).  The following 
excerpts are exemplary judicial narratives confirming the judicial stance of deference: 
 
This Court itself has cautioned that “judges  . . . asked to review the substance of a 
genuinely academic decision . . . should show great respect for the faculty’s 
professional judgment . . . . Nothing we say today should be understood as a 
retreat from this principle of respect for legitimate academic decision-making 
(University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 1990, p. 199; internal citations omitted). 
 
In tenure cases, courts must take special care to preserve the University’s 
autonomy in making lawful tenure decisions (Brown v. Trustees of Boston 
University, 1989, p. 346). 
 
To be sure, in balancing the probativeness of evidence like this against its danger 
for unfair prejudice, a court should realize that comparing the qualifications of 
others granted tenure with those of plaintiff presents the risk of improperly 
substituting a judicial tenure decision for a university one (Brown v. Trustees of 
Boston University,1989, p. 347). 
 
While we recognize that federal courts have generally deferred to the decisions of 
college and university officials in whether to grant tenure, particularly where the 
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educational institution has not as yet had the opportunity to initially evaluate the 
credentials and overall performance of a tenure applicant, we need not address the 
issue in this case (Ford v. Nicks, 1984, p. 864).  
 
There is a general presumption in favor of reinstating discrimination victims at the 
level of seniority they would have attained had they remained in their jobs . . . . 
but federal courts have traditionally been wary of interfering with academic 
tenure decisions (Ford v. Nicks, 1989, p. 875; internal citations omitted). 
 
The principle of academic deference guides our view of comparison evidence 
because the principle that a school may choose its own faculty for any 
nondiscriminatory reason is never more in jeopardy than when a plaintiff puts 
before a jury evidence that two individuals with similar credentials were 
considered for tenure, and one was denied it (Craine v. Trinity College, 2002, p. 
537). 
Findings Related to Research Questions 
Research Question 1.  What policies and procedures employed by public and 
private colleges and universities have contributed to federal and state appellate courts’ 
unfavorable rulings against institutions in tenure denial litigation between the years 1972 
and 2011? 
 The policies and procedures that have contributed to unfavorable rulings against 
institutions in tenure denial litigation can be broadly categorized as: (a) Infringement 
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upon rights; (b) Discrimination; and (c) Breach of contract.  These categories are not 
necessarily discrete within a particular case or among cases.  As is exhibited in Tables 1 
and 2 in Appendix B, professors often bring multiple allegations that are based on 
multiple legal theories.  As well, problematic conduct by an institution may fit into more 
than one thematic category.  As an example, unfair scrutiny of a tenure applicant may fit 
the categories of both discriminatory behavior and as an infringement upon a professor’s 
rights, such as equal protection.  Similarly, contract requisites that are not met might be 
deemed a breach of contract or might infringe upon a professor’s right to a fair process, 
as delineated in the contract.   
Infringement upon rights.  All of the cases in the study involved some sort of 
infringement upon plaintiff’s rights, whether substantive or procedural rights, the right 
not to be discriminated against, or the right to have an institution adhere to a contract. 
The excerpts included in this section arise from cases in which an institution infringed 
upon a professor’s procedural or substantive rights (Board of Trustees of University of 
Kentucky v. Hayse, 1989; Brennan v. King, 1998; Dixon v. Rutgers, The State University 
of New Jersey, 1988; Ford v. Nicks, 1984; Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 1988; Harris v. Ladner, 
1997; Hill v. Ross, 1999; Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 1980; Lynn v. Regents of the 
University of California, 1981; Mumford v. Godfried, 1995; Roebuck v. Drexel 
University, 1988; Skudrzyk v. Reynolds, 1993; Soni v. Board of Trustees of University of 
Tennessee, 1975; State ex rel. Chapdelaine v. Torrence, 1975; State ex rel. James v. Ohio 
State University, 1994; Stern v. Shouldice, 1983; Stewart v. Rutgers, The State University, 
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1997; United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents of Stephen F. Austin State University, 
1982;  University of Alaska v. Geistauts, 1983).   
Procedural Rights 
 Lacked Proper Procedures (e.g., poorly established, poorly communicated, 
materials not provided). 
The District Court further held that the University “objectively acted toward 
[Professor] in such a manner as to reasonably lead him to believe that he was a 
person with a relative degree of permanency in the academic community of this 
University.  Upon acquiring this property interest, it cannot be terminated without 
procedural due process (Soni v. Board of Trustees of University of Tennessee, 
1975, p. 350). 
 
[T]he denial of the demanded hearing frustrated the law and deprived [Professor] 
of constitutional due process (State of Tennessee ex rel. Chapdelaine v. Torrence, 
1975, p. 549). 
 
The Faculty Handbook does not articulate the requirements of tenure as it does for 
promotion.  The President of the College testified that the academic qualifications 
for the grant of tenure were similar to those published for promotion, i.e. 
possession of the terminal academic degree or its scholarly equivalent or 




[Institution’s] standards for review of a tenure candidate’s teaching ability are 
vague, and there is little in the record to illuminate the requirements or the 
assessment process (Roebuck v. Drexel University, 1988, p. 718). 
 
The standards for assessing service are exceedingly vague and the parties disagree 
about the application of these standards (Roebuck v. Drexel University, 1988, p. 
718). 
 
[President’s] letter neither advised [Professor] that this was the final decision in 
his tenure process nor informed him that any appeal of the decision would have to 
be made within thirty days to be timely (Skudrzyk v. Reynolds, 1993, p. 463). 
 
Throughout the proceedings below, [Professor] was denied access to her tenure 
review file.  The materials contained in the file were those upon which the tenure 
review committee claims that it based its denial of tenure, and, as such, are highly 
relevant to the issues in this case.  At the discovery stage, when [Professor] 
requested that the University produce the file, the district court issued a protective 
order.  At trial, the University submitted the file to the court; the court reviewed it 
in camera but refused to disclose the contents of the file to [Professor].  
[Professor] asserts that the file was submitted by the University, and used by the 
district court, as evidence, rather than for the purpose of determining whether the 
contents of the file were privileged.  Thus, [Professor] contends that the refusal to 
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disclose the contents of the file violated due process.  We agree (Lynn v Regents 
of the University of California, 1981, pp. 1345-1346).   
 
While we are mindful of the need to maintain the confidential nature of the peer 
review system, we believe that adoption of the qualified academic freedom 
privilege would interfere significantly with the enforcement of our anti-
discrimination laws (Dixon v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 1988, 
p. 1057).  
 
[T]he promotion and tenure records maintained by a state-supported institution of 
higher education are “public records” pursuant to [Ohio’s statute] , are not subject 
to any exception, and are, therefore subject to the public records disclosure 
requirements of [Ohio’s statute] (State ex rel. James v. Ohio State University, 
1994, p. 913). 
 Failed to follow proper procedures (e.g., unfairly applied; departed from 
policies, customs, and practices; departed from grievance committee’s 
recommendations).   
[Professor] was not bound to exhaust the arbitration aspect of the handbook 





[I]t may have been reasonable for [Professor] to believe that the University was 
reconsidering her application pursuant to the Guidelines and that the tenure 
decision thus was not yet final.  Her belief could have been bolstered by the fact 
that the University has a “grievance” procedure, wholly distinct from the 
reconsideration process, which is available to an unsuccessful candidate only after 
the University’s final adverse action.  The reconsideration [Professor] received 
was, according to the University’s own process, not part of its grievance 
procedure.  As a result, the reconsideration might well not have been “a 
grievance, or some other method of collateral review of an employment decision” 
that “does not toll the running of the limitations periods.”  Rather, the 
reconsideration may have been a continuation of the original application process 
(Harris v. Ladner, 1997, p. 1125-1126; internal citations omitted). 
 
The jury could also have found evidence of [Department Head’s] discriminatory 
intent in the manner in which he conducted the selection of [Professor’s] outside 
evaluators.  [Professor] introduced evidence that male members of the 
Department routinely got all five of the evaluators they requested and that 
requests to exclude a specific scholar were routinely granted.  However, in her 
case, [Department Head] initially selected only two of the scholars she 
requested—including a scholar she had expressly requested not be included []—
and denied her request that a German scholar be selected (Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 




[Professor] testified that [Defendant reviewer] told her that when he met with a 
University official responsible for affirmative action, he told that person that 
[Defendant reviewer] did not believe in affirmative action and did not intend to 
follow the University’s guidelines.  There was testimony that [Defendant 
reviewer] made similar comments to [another female professor], stating that 
affirmative action was a lot of silly procedures and a waste of time. . . . [Further 
testimony showed] that after [Professor] was denied tenure, [Defendant reviewer] 
said that he was not inclined to ever put women in tenure track positions again 
(Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 1988, p. 1327). 
 
The University’s Regulations did not authorize the Dean to reject appointment to 
the rank of Associate Professor.  His authority was limited to reviewing the 
proposal, adding his endorsement or commentary, and forwarding everything 
through channels, ultimately to the Board of Trustees, which had the exclusive 
final authority to approve or disapprove the application (Board of Trustees of the 
University of Kentucky v. Hayse, 1989, p. 611). 
 
[Professor] is entitled to further pursue his claim for reinstatement because he was 
initially denied administrative due process (Board of Trustees of the University of 




The meetings of the tenure committee had taken place in violation of [Alaska’s 
Open Meetings Statute], because they were not made open to the public.  All 
actions taken by the committee were therefore deemed void (University of Alaska 
v. Geistauts, 1983, p. 426) 
 
The grievance committee found that the [review committee’s] decision to deny 
[Professor’s] promotion to professor was “arbitrary and capricious” and “could 
not have been reached by reasonable evaluators.”  It noted various inconsistencies 
and procedural errors . . . . In our view, this is sufficient evidence upon which a 
jury could conclude that [Professor’s] 1994-1995 tenure denial may have 
stemmed from discrimination based on race (Stewart v. Rutgers, The State 
University, 1997, pp. 433-434; internal citations omitted). 
Substantive Rights 
 Equal Protection violated.  
[T]he jury could have found from the evidence that [Department Head] 
intentionally treated [Professor] less favorably through the evaluation process 
than he treated men; that he put barriers in her path that were not encountered by 
men seeking tenure in the Department; that he imposed higher standards of 
scholarship upon [Professor] than upon similarly situated men; and that he 
intentionally engaged in a calculated effort over time to insure that [Professor] did 




 [A]ny preference for one sex in making offers of employment, however slight the 
preference may be, must be justified . . . . [Professor] has done what needs to be 
done to show that reliance on the plan may be pretextual by demonstrating the (i) 
the written terms of the plan do not support [Dean’s] decision; and (ii) the 
University denies having engaged in prior discrimination.  An employer that 
wants to use sex (race, religion, etc.) as a factor in hiring decisions and yet denies 
ever engaging in discrimination (and therefore denies that a remedy is in order) 
must supply some other “exceedingly persuasive” justification (Hill v. Ross, 1999, 
p. 590). 
 Retaliated against employee for supporting others. 
We therefore conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion by 
awarding [Professor] tenure, restoring him to the position he would have been but 
for the illegal discrimination by [Institution] [in retaliation for protesting against 
Institution’s employment practices regarding his wife’s sex discrimination claim] 
(Ford v. Nicks, 1984, p. 864). 
 First Amendment violated. 
 [Professor] was not merely conveying information on behalf of other parties; he 
was espousing his personal opinion.  Moreover, when we focus on the role that 
[Professor] assumed in advancing his opinion, the facts suggest that he was acting 
as a concerned public citizen speaking on a matter of public interest, not that he 
spoke “merely as an employee, concerned only with internal policies or practices 
which were of relevance only to the employees” of [Institution].  In other words, 
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his speech was not “upon matters only of personal interest.”  Rather, it concerned 
a matter which can be “fairly considered as relating to [a] matter of concern to the 
community.” (Mumford v. Godfried, 1995, p. 761; internal citations omitted). 
 
Having found [Professor’s] speech to be protected, we hold that it was a question 
for the jury whether the defendants were motivated to terminate [Professor] in 
retaliation for his speech or in an attempt to rid the College of an unqualified 
professor (Stern v. Shouldice, 1983, p. 749). 
 
The district court found that [Professor] began speaking out concerning the 
misuse of research funds shortly after arriving at [Institution], and that he 
continued making those allegations throughout his tenure there . . . . [T]he Court 
found that [Professor’s] conduct was constitutionally protected, that this conduct 
was a substantial, or motivating factor in the decision not to rehire him, and that 
the defendants failed to prove the same decision would have been reached even 
absent that protected conduct (United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents of 
Stephen F. Austin State University, 1982, pp. 561-562). 
Discrimination.  Of the 33 cases, 24 included some form of discrimination claim 
related to Title VII, ADA, Equal Pay Act, or correlated federal and state law 
discrimination claims (Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 1979; Abramson v. William 
Paterson College of New Jersey, 2001; Board of Trustees of University of Kentucky v. 
Hayse, 1989; Brennan v. King, 1998; Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 1989; 
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Craine v. Trinity College, 2002; Dixon v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 
1988; Ford v. Nicks, 1984; Ford v. Nicks, 1989; Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 1988; Harris v. 
Ladner, 1997; Hill v. Ross, 1999; Jones v. University of Central Oklahoma, 1993; Kunda 
v. Muhlenberg College, 1980; Lynn v. Regents of the University of California, 1981; 
Mumford v. Godfried, 1995; Roebuck v. Drexel University; 1988; Saint Francis College 
v. Al-Khazraji, 1987; Shoucair v. Brown University, 2007; Sola v. Lafayette College, 
1986; Stern v. Shouldice, 1983; Stewart v. Rutgers, The State University, 1997; Stolberg 
v. Members of Board of Trustees for State Colleges of State of Connecticut, 1973; United 
Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents of Stephen F. Austin State University, 1982.).  Title 
VII was invoked most often.  Claims of discrimination were addressed through courts’ 
analyses of procedures, policies, standards, attitudes, and behaviors, as exemplified in 
excerpts below.   
 Failed to follow procedures.  
[Professor] should have an opportunity to demonstrate that the ordinary and 
generally accepted tenure decision process included a review of reconsideration 
requests in the final year and that in her case the decision of the President in May, 
1972 to refuse to review her tenure denial constituted discrimination against her 
on the basis of sex (Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 1979, p. 210). 
 Professor held to higher review standard. 
[The witnesses] testified that [Professor] was either superior or equal to the other 
candidates who had received tenure.  They testified that none of these others had 
been required to write a second book.  The first book of the others, rewritten from 
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a thesis, had sufficed.  One had not written any book.  Yet notwithstanding 
acceptance and publication of [Professor’s] book by a leading university press, the 
Assistant Provost and President, while acknowledging [Professor’s] promise, 
insisted that she needed to do more to qualify for tenure (Brown v. Trustees of 
Boston University, 1989, p. 347). 
 
[Professor’s] evidence disclosed numerous instances from which [Department 
Head’s] discriminatory intent could be inferred.  One such instance was 
[Department Head’s] statement to [Professor] that she would need to publish an 
additional book independent of her dissertation and this book would be given 
considerable weight in her tenure decision . . . . [T]he evidence showed that no 
male member of the Department had ever been advised that he should publish a 
second book, independent of his dissertation, before he would be considered for 
tenure.  Further, the evidence showed that [Professor] met or exceeded the 
number of publications of every faculty member, except [Department Head] 
(Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 1988, p. 1326). 
 Patterns of discriminatory conduct showed motive or patronizing attitude. 
[A professor] testified that [President] remarked that [a tenure applicant] was an 
outstanding scholar, saying “I don’t see what a good woman in your department is 
worrying about.  The place is a damn matriarchy.” (Brown v. Trustees of Boston 




[President] again refused to intervene in the tenure review process, telling [a 
tenure applicant] that a person with her credentials would do well “and anyway, I 
never worried about job security, and your husband is a parachute, so why are you 
worried [?]” (Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 1989, p. 349). 
 Those exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the 
adverse decision. 
A reasonable inference that could be drawn from the record is that [President] was 
influenced by both [Dean] and [Department Chair].  In fact, [President] even 
stated in his deposition that before making his decision not to retain [Professor], 
he sought [Dean’s] counsel (Abramson v. William Paterson College of New 
Jersey, 2001, p. 285). 
 
[Professor] presented a combination of factors that, taken as a whole, permitted 
the jury to conclude that the demise of [Professor’s] tenure bid was a fait 
accompli once the [Reviewer’s] animus had infected the process (Shoucair v. 
Brown University, 2007, p. 431) 
 Research, teaching, and service evaluations obscured discrimination. 
Wherever the responsibility lies within the institution, it is clear that courts must 
be vigilant as not to intrude into such determinations, and should not substitute 
their judgment for that of the college with respect to the qualifications of faculty 
members for promotion and tenure.  Determinations about such matters as 
teaching ability, research scholarship, and professional stature are subjective, and 
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unless they can be shown to have been used as the mechanism to obscure 
discrimination, they must be left for evaluation by the professionals, particularly 
since they often involve inquiry into aspects of arcane scholarship beyond the 
competence of individual judges (Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 1980, p. 548).  
 Reasons provided for decision were pretextual. 
[Professor] has successfully demonstrated such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions such that a factfinder could 
reasonably . . . disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons 
(Abramson, 2001; p. 284; internal quotations omitted; omission in original). 
 
Insofar as the four professors’ testimony tended to show that the qualifications of 
others granted tenure were beneath [Professor’s] known qualifications, it was 
relevant to create an inference that the University’s criticisms of [Professor’s] 
scholarship were pretextual (Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 1989, p. 
346). 
 Subjective nature of review criteria can mask pretext. 
[A] jury could conclude that [Professor] was hired in large part because of his 
ability to interact with the surrounding West Philadelphia community, and that 
such service was uniquely valuable to [Institution] because the strained relations 
between [Institution] and its neighbors.  Moreover, many of [Professor’s] 
community service activities were performed at the behest of [Institution] 
administrators.  Given the evidence . . . that [Professor’s] service was both 
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appreciated and found valuable by the University, a jury could infer that 
[Administrator’s] claim that [Professor’s] service was not “relevant to the mission 
of the University” was not credible and was, in fact, a pretext (Roebuck v. Drexel 
University, p. 728; internal citations omitted).   
 Policies were not accurately stated. 
Underlying the [District] court’s order was its finding of fact that “(h)ad  
[Professor] been counseled in the same manner as male members of the Physical 
Education Department, we find that she would have done everything possible to 
obtain a master’s degree in order to further enhance her chances of obtaining 
tenure.” (Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 1980, p. 549). 
 Retaliation, harassment, hostile work environment existed. 
[T]he District Court should have considered when ruling on [Professor’s] hostile 
work environment claim:  (1) [Dean’s] “unprecedented” monitoring of 
[Professor’s]  conferences and absences; (2) [Institution] charging [professor] 
with a sick day on a Jewish holiday when she was not scheduled to teach; (3) both 
[Department Chair and Dean], on separate occasions, criticizing and raising their 
voices at [Professor] regarding her lack of availability during the Sabbath; (4) 
[Department Chair] scheduling meetings on Jewish holidays and refusing to 
change them so [Professor] could attend; (5) [Department Chair’s] pointed 
statement to [Professor] regarding her faith and behavior (“The trouble with you 
is that it doesn’t show that you are Orthodox.”) (Abramson v. William Paterson 




Although it is true that [Reviewer] did not go so far as to recommend “firing” 
[Professor], in the unique context of a tenure review process the jury nevertheless 
reasonably could have determined that his arguably subtler form of sabotage was 
just as damaging (Shoucair v. Brown University, 2005, p. 430). 
Breach of contract.  Breaches of contract addressed by the courts included failure 
to follow established policies and procedures, failure to provide timely notice, and 
principles of reliance (Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 1997; Brennan v. King ,1998; 
Brown v. North Dakota State University, 1985; Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 
1989; Craine v. Trinity College, 2002; Harris v. Ladner ,1997; Jones v. University of 
Central Oklahoma, 1993; Kakaes v. George Washington University, 1996; Mumford v. 
Godfried, 1995; Sawyer v. Mercer, 1980; Sola v. Lafayette College, 1986; State ex rel. 
Chapdelaine v. Torrence, 1975; United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 1982). 
 Policies or procedures were not followed. 
In the present case, we conclude that the evidence supports the conclusion that the 
defendant breached the parties’ contract by indicating that the plaintiff would be 
evaluated according to one standard but denying tenure because of her failure to 
meet a different one (Craine v. Trinity College, 2002, p. 541). 
 
Despite the faculty manual’s directive to be as specific as possible and to pay 
particular attention to the candidate’s prospects for tenure, the defendant was 
 
188 
generally positive about the plaintiff’s work and vague about her deficiencies 
(Craine v. Trinity College, 2002, p. 542). 
 Failed to provide timely notice. 
A reasonable person reading the applicable provisions of the Faculty Code could 
fairly conclude that the notice provided to [Professor] in [Vice President’s] letter 
of June 28, 1993, suffered from the same defects as did the notices provided to the 
plaintiffs in [two similar] cases (Kakaes v. George Washington University, 1996, 
p. 135). 
 
We see no basic ambiguity in the contract with respect to tenure.  Giving the 
language its ordinary and popular meaning, [Professor] was to get tenure on the 
expiration of a four year probationary period, without more.  Once [Professor] 
was given a contract to teach for the all-significant fourth year, [Institution] came 
under a contractual duty to take affirmative action by giving notice to [Professor] 
“within ten days after the beginning of the second semester of the academic year” 
if [Professor] was not to continue as a teacher at [Institution]. The contractual 
notice was not given, nor did [Institution] take any other action to indicate 
dissatisfaction with [Professor’s] work as a teacher, but permitted [Professor] to 
finish the full four year probationary period.  We agree with the Court of Appeals 
that under the literal wording of the contract of employment, [Professor] acquired 
tenure at the expiration of his four year probationary period (Sawyer v. Mercer, 
1980, p. 699). 
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 Special contract violated. 
In this particular case, there is an additional consideration in [Professor’s] favor.  
He accepted the appointment in reliance upon the affirmative representation that 
among the fringe benefits offered by the University was tenure after three years 
of satisfactory service.  This created a viable understanding that satisfactory 
service for three years would result in tenure status (State ex rel. Chapdelaine v. 
Torrence, 1975, p. 547).   
Research Question 2.  What remedies have been granted to faculty who win 
tenure denial suits?   
Both equitable and legal remedies were awarded in tenure denial litigation cases, 
depending on the type of claim brought.  For example, the remedies available in a Title 
VII claim provide wide latitude for a district court to fashion a remedy that makes a 
victim whole by restoring him or her to the position he or she would have been in, had 
the discrimination not occurred (Ford v. Nicks, 1984).  Reinstatement, back pay, and 
tenure are available to the court as remedies in a Title VII claim.  As explained in Brown 
v. Trustees of Boston University (1989), however, “[c]ourts have quite rarely awarded 
tenure as a remedy for unlawful discrimination” (p. 359).   
The issue of remedies is most frequently addressed at the trial court level in the 
initial case, and thus discussions of remedies at the appellate court level were relatively 
limited.  Appellate courts can and do affect damage awards, however, by directive to the 
trial court on remand, by reinstating a jury’s damage award, or by affirming or denying a 
district court’s specific damages award.  Though most tenure denial litigation claims 
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involve a professor’s pursuit of tenure, a grant of tenure is not frequently provided.  The 
equitable and legal remedies granted in the cases studied are further categorized below.  
Equitable Remedies. 
 Promotion with tenure was available if professor completed master’s degree 
(Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 1980).  
 Reinstated professor (Ford v. Nicks, 1989; Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 1980). 
 Reinstated professor for a term, with option of reapplying for tenure (University 
of Alaska v. Geistauts, 1983).   
 Reinstated professor with tenure (Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 1981; 
Ford v. Nicks, 1984). 
 Granted tenure (Sawyer v. Mercer, 1980).  
Legal Remedies.  
 Awarded compensatory or punitive damages (Board of Trustees of University of 
Kentucky v. Hayse, 1989; Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 1988; Shoucair v. Brown 
University, 2007; State ex rel. Chapdelaine v. Torrence, 1975; Stern v. Shouldice, 
1983; Stolberg v. Members of Board of Trustees for State Colleges of State of 
Connecticut, 1973).  
 Awarded costs or attorney’s fees (Stern v. Shouldice, 1983; Stolberg v. Members 
of Board of Trustees for State Colleges of State of Connecticut, 1973). 
 Awarded back pay (Ford v. Nicks, 1984 , Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 1980; 





 To study judicial influence on academic decision-making, this research included 
33 cases that address some aspect of tenure denial litigation.  Shared governance and 
judicial deference provided the conceptual frameworks.  Using legal research methods 
and qualitative analysis, cases were examined to consider the policies and procedures that 
have contributed to courts’ unfavorable rulings against universities in tenure denial, and 
the remedies granted to plaintiffs as a result.  Courts intervened in an institution’s 
decision as to tenure when an institution infringed upon a professor’s rights, 
discriminated against a professor, or breached a contract with a professor.  Equitable and 
legal remedies were granted in both federal and state courts.  The remedy of awarding 






SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to examine judicial influence on academic 
decision-making by identifying factors in the tenure process that have induced courts to 
rule against higher education institutions in litigation stemming from tenure denials.  By 
gaining a better understanding of why courts have inserted judicial decisions in place of 
institutional decisions in tenure related litigation, this study aimed to identify potential 
flaws in the tenure process, decrease institutions’ exposure to tenure decisions that may 
result in litigation, and decrease the influence of the courts on tenure decisions. 
The study examined cases from the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Courts of Appeal, 
and states’ highest appellate courts during the period of 1972 to 2011 in which higher 
education institutions did not wholly prevail in tenure denial litigation.  Selected cases 
included reported cases that arose in public and private, four-year or doctoral institutions, 
for which tenure denial was a litigated or underlying issue.  Class action suits were not 
included in this study.   
 The conceptual lenses of shared governance and judicial deference provided the 
framework for the study, through which the study addressed the following questions: 
1. What policies and procedures employed by public and private colleges and 
universities have contributed to federal and state appellate courts’ unfavorable 




2. What remedies have been granted to faculty who win tenure denial suits? 
3. What steps might colleges and universities take in the tenure process to 
minimize tenure denial litigation and the possibility of an unfavorable 
decision in a tenure denial lawsuit? 
Historical legal research and qualitative methodology were used to identify, 
collect, examine, screen, and analyze the data and information that were pertinent to this 
study.  After identifying cases that fit the delimiters of the study, cases were briefed to 
glean pertinent information.  Brief factual overviews and judicial narratives were 
provided to exemplify themes and trends that provided insight to the research questions.   
Three additional sections of this chapter comprise the summary of the study.  
First, a summary of the research findings regarding the conceptual frameworks and 
answers to the first two research questions are presented.  Second, a discussion of the 
findings considers the present study as it relates to the literature and research previously 
discussed in the literature review presented in Chapter Two.  Answering the third 
research question, this chapter then includes practical recommendations for those in 
academia to consider so that they might avoid or mitigate litigation that may arise out of 
tenure denial decisions.  Finally, suggestions for further research are presented that would 
flow logically from the present study, such that the information gleaned may be 
confirmed, enhanced, or extended.   
Summary of the Findings 
That academic tenure decisions are made through a shared, multi-layered process 
was fully recognized by courts.  In setting for the factual basis of the case, more than half 
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of the judicial opinions analyzed for this study reviewed the process involved in 
institutional tenure decisions.  Also important in judicial review of decisions in academia 
is the preservation of institutional autonomy.  Many of the cases analyzed for this study 
acknowledged the significance of showing respect for professional judgment.   
The policies and procedures employed by public and private colleges and 
universities that have contributed to federal and state appellate courts’ unfavorable 
rulings against institutions in tenure denial litigation include three categories:  
infringement upon a professor’s rights, discrimination against a professor, and breach of a 
contract with a professor.  Infringement upon a professor’s rights included both 
procedural and substantive rights.  Procedural infringement themes included instances 
whereby an institution lacked proper procedures or when decision-makers failed to 
follow proper procedures.  Substantive infringement themes included instances in which 
an institution violated equal protection rights, retaliated against an employee, or violated 
First Amendment rights.  Discrimination against a professor arose when decision-makers 
in an institution: failed to follow procedures; held a professor to a higher review standard; 
had a pattern of discriminatory conduct, through motive or a patronizing attitude; 
exhibited discriminatory animus, and such animus influenced the adverse decision; did 
not accurately communicate the policies; provided pretextual reasons for their 
discriminatory decision; and created a hostile work environment.  Breach of contract 
themes of problematic behaviors arose when decision-makers failed to follow policies or 
procedures, failed to provide timely notice, or violated a special contract.   
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Particular problems can arise with policies and procedures applied to research, 
teaching, and service.  Courts noted the subjective nature of determining such matters.  
While acknowledging the need to leave such evaluative measures to professionals, it was 
also noted that subjectivity could obscure discrimination or to mask pretext.   
Academic freedom was frequently acknowledged by the courts, and courts 
recognized that tenure decisions must be made in consideration of the academic needs of 
the institution.  Although courts recognized the importance of academic freedom, courts 
also cautioned against claiming academic freedom in an effort to justify unlawful 
behavior or in an attempt to hinder a fair process.  Courts noted that academic freedom is 
not connected to every decision made in academia. 
Categories identified and themes that emerged were not discrete.  Multiple claims 
were often pursued in a single case, state and federal claims were sometimes joined, and 
courts’ decisions and reasoning often pertained to more than one issue.  State laws and 
statutes can directly affect the outcome of a case, as can time, such as when a statute is 
abrogated.  Institutional status can affect claims, as when a private institution is not 
bound by a state statute affecting public institution tenure rights.   
Remedies granted to faculty who prevailed in the tenure denial suits reviewed 
included both equitable and legal remedies.  The remedies granted depended on the type 
of underlying claim.  Equitable remedies included promotion with tenure, subject to 
obtaining an additional degree; reinstatement; reinstatement for a term, with the option to 
reapply for tenure; and a grant of tenure.  Legal remedies included an award of 
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compensatory or punitive damages; an award of costs or attorney’s fees; and an award of 
back pay.   
Discussion of the Findings 
 A content analysis of 33 judicial opinions provided the basis on which to discern 
categories and themes that comprise the findings of this study.  Compared to other 
tenure-related litigation studies, such as those that spanned fewer years (AAUW, 2004; 
Amacher & Meiners, 2004; Crittendon, 2009; DiBiase, 1979; Phelps, 1979; Boissé, 1985; 
Hamill, 2003; Leap, 1995; O’Neal, 1992; Steadman, 2005; Timm, 1994; Troxel, 2000); 
those that focused on specific issues such as the peer review process (Timm, 1994), or 
race or sex discrimination (Crittendon, 2009; O’Neal, 1992); or those that limited their 
institutional scope (Boissé, 1985; Hamill, 2003; Phelps, 1979 ), this study aimed to cast a 
wide net in its search for cases by spanning almost 40 years, not limiting the analysis to a 
particular legal basis for tenure litigation, including public and private institutions, and 
including both federal and state courts.  This choice was based, in part, on previous 
literature that indicated the likelihood of institutional success in tenure litigation (AAUW, 
2004; Amacher & Meiners, 2004; Boissé, 1985; Crittendon, 2009; Hamill, 2003; Leap, 
1995; Phelps, 1979; Steadman, 2005).  Quantifying the relative lack of success for 
plaintiffs in race and sex discrimination claims in tenure denial litigation, Crittendon’s 
(2009) research revealed that plaintiffs won only 31% of cases at the U.S. District Court 
level and won only 8% of cases at the level of the U.S. Courts of Appeal (p. 106), for the 
cases that met the parameters of her study.   
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Even with the perceived breadth of the parameters set for obtaining cases in the 
present study, the number of cases returned was few.  That cases chosen for the study 
were few in number is at least partially attributable to delimiters placed on the study, such 
as not including community colleges or professional schools, not including class actions, 
including only published cases, and considering only those cases decided in federal 
appellate and states’ highest appellate courts.  As well, some cases were possibly 
excluded if the case overviews or summaries obtained through the electronic searches did 
not mention tenure denial.  A contract issue that ultimately resulted in a tenure denial, for 
example, could have masked a case appropriate for inclusion.  Although substantial effort 
was made to find every suitable case, it is not unlikely that a few relevant cases were not 
identified—an unavoidable reality of researcher influence.   
Another limitation on the data retrieved for this study was the primary focus in 
some cases on issues of procedure, such as whether a plaintiff has rights to bring a case 
pursuant to a particular statute (e.g., Saint Francis College v., Al-Khazraji, 1987), rather 
than on the merits of a tenure denial decision.  Appellate reviews of summary judgment 
also involve issues of procedure, which are then intertwined with an analysis of the 
substance of the case below.  Filing for summary judgment is a procedural tactic by 
which either party can request that the case be judicially decided in their favor.  In tenure 
denial cases, the defendant institution is almost always the party that files the motion.  
Upon receipt of a request for summary judgment, the judge assesses the merits of the 
plaintiff’s case to assess whether material or relevant facts warrant a trial.  Thus, if a 
university wins a grant of summary judgment, the trial judge effectively rules that the 
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plaintiff lacks sufficient facts to continue the lawsuit.  A plaintiff who survives a 
university’s motion for summary judgment will not necessarily win the case; rather, she 
or he gains the opportunity to try the case before the judge or jury (AAUW, 2004).  The 
AAUW (2004) study reported that the number of cases dismissed on summary judgment 
in recent years has increased.  
For the cases that met this study’s parameters, 12 involved a grant of summary 
judgment at the trial court level (Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 1979; Abramson v. 
William Paterson College of New Jersey, 2001; Brennan v. King, 1998; Brown v. North 
Dakota State University, 1985;  Hill v. Ross, 1999; Jones v. University of Central 
Oklahoma, 1993; Kakaes v. George Washington University, 1996; Lynn v. Regents of the 
University of California, 1981; Mumford v. Godfried, 1995; Saint Francis College v. Al-
Khazraji, 1987; Sola v. Lafayette College, 1986; Stewart v. Rutgers, The State University 
of New Jersey, 1997) .  Of these, some were reversed on appeal, and some were affirmed 
in part and reversed in part, as shown in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix B.  In cases for 
which issues of summary judgment were reversed, courts’ analyses of the law and fact 
typically identified problematic policies and procedures in the institution’s tenure review 
process.  Even so, this would not necessarily mean that on remand the plaintiff would 
win; only that there was enough of a factual issue that it was inappropriate for the trial 
court to have granted summary judgment.  Thus, while the appellate courts’ summary 
judgment analyses may serve to identify potentially problematic issues in the tenure 
process, the instructive nature of such analyses for the purposes of this study is limited. 
 
199 
This reveals that it would be useful in future studies to include district court cases.  
While this study chose appellate cases for their reported and precedential characteristics, 
adding district court analyses would provide much-needed depth and breadth to the 
judicial narratives on policies and procedures that were identified as problematic.  The 
Ford v. Nicks (1984) and Ford v. Nicks (1989) cases provide an example of the interplay 
of a district court’s analysis.  As reported in Ford v. Nicks (1984), husband and wife 
plaintiff professors first filed suit in district court against the institution, contending that 
their terminations from the teaching staff at the institution constituted employment 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.  The female professor alleged that her dismissal 
was due to sex discrimination, while the male professor alleged his dismissal was in 
retaliation for protesting the institution’s employment practices and for assisting his wife 
in her battle for reinstatement.  The district court judge found the institution had violated 
Title VII in both cases, and awarded both professors back pay, reinstatement to their 
former positions, and full tenure rights.  On appeal in Ford v. Nicks (1984), the court 
found that the district court had properly awarded the male professor tenure, but 
remanded the female professor’s case for retrial on the basis that an incorrect burden of 
proof had been improperly applied.   
In the case on remand to the district court, Ford v. Nicks (1988), the court 
analyzed the institution’s proffered reasons for not granting the professor tenure, and 
granted the professor reinstatement with full salary and benefits, seniority, and tenure 
status.  The district court’s analysis included the judicial theories of disparate treatment 
and disparate impact, burdens of proof, and the burden shifting process in proving a 
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discrimination claim.  In considering the institution’s proffered  reasons for not hiring the 
professor, the court included extensive facts from the record regarding funds available to 
pay her salary, and the professor’s credentials as compared to the institution’s needs.  
Extensive review of the facts as they applied to the law resulted in the court’s decision 
that but for sex discrimination, which was a determinative factor in the institution’s 
decision not to rehire the professor, the professor would have continued in her 
employment with the institution.    
On appeal the second time, the court in Ford v. Nicks (1989) held that the 
evidence supported a finding of discrimination and reinstatement, but that the district 
court abused its discretion in ordering that the professor be appointed to full 
professorship with tenure.  The court’s ruling was based, in part, on statutory 
interpretation and timing.  The court held that the system of automatic tenure was 
abolished before the professor would have qualified for automatic tenure.  
From following the Ford v. Nicks (1984, 1988, 1989) line of cases, it is apparent 
that there is much to be gleaned from cases that are at the district court level.  The district 
court case heavily relied on the record.  The record, facts, application of the facts to the 
law, and interplay between the courts holds great potential for gleaning policies and 
procedures that the courts found problematic regarding the institution’s behavior.  Future 
studies could benefit from including district court cases in the mix, or from delving 
deeply into the records of cases.   
Thus, while the cases chosen for this study were identified as ones in which 
institutions “lost” on at least one issue in tenure denial litigation, the amount of valuable 
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information that served to answer the research questions was unexpectedly limited by the 
fact that the merits of the tenure decision were addressed in even fewer cases than those 
meeting the delimiters.  Fully acknowledging the research-related limitations to the data, 
however, it is instructive that few cases retrieved in a relatively wide search actually 
established or affirmed the merits of a plaintiff’s win in tenure denial litigation.  This 
further supports previous reports that institutions prevail in most tenure denial litigation.   
Academic Tenure, Shared Governance, and Judicial Deference 
An overarching theme of this study is that the judiciary can influence decisions 
that are made in academia through the interpretation of legal claims brought to court.  
Examining the judicial influence on decisions in academia is particularly interesting in 
the context of tenure decisions, because of the unique attributes of academic tenure and 
the halls of academe (Finkin, 1996; Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  Academic tenure 
entwines traditional principles of the institution, which are deeply rooted in the history of 
academia, with legal principles.  Tenure, with its strong cultural foundations (Metzger, 
1973), is viewed by many as a protector of academic freedom (Poskanzer, 2002; White, 
2010), and academic freedom is viewed as foundational to professors’ freedoms to search 
for truth (Alexander & Alexander, 2011; Chait, 2002b; Kaplin & Lee, 2006).   
Also unique to academic tenure is that the process is multi-layered and can be 
affected by multiple decision-makers, through a system of shared governance (AAUP, 
2006c; Kaplan, 2004; Mason, 1972).  The policies, procedures, and actions at issue in a 
tenure decision can take place over many years.  During that time, personnel can come 
and go, administrators can move into another position, those who serve on the tenure 
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review committee can change responsibilities, departments can merge, and contracts and 
employment policies can be rewritten.   
These and other factors contribute to the fact that academic tenure lawsuits are 
more complex than most other types of employment litigation.  Such complexity may 
contribute, in part, to the level of institutional success in tenure denial litigation, as was 
confirmed by the limited number of cases that were identified for this study.  This 
complexity was well-recognized in Zahorik v. Cornell University (1984):  “Tenure 
decisions in an academic setting involve a combination of factors which tend to set them 
apart from employment decisions generally” (p. 92).  The court additionally noted the 
lifelong commitment from the university to the employee, the multi-layered process with 
many decision-makers, and the lack of competition for any particular tenured position.   
Like the Zahorik v. Cornell University (1984) court, many courts in this study 
recognized the complexity of tenure decisions and considered the process of tenure 
decisions in detail.  An excerpt from Brennan v. King (1998) provides an example: 
Tenure review at [Institution] is a multi-step process ultimately leading to a 
decision by the board of trustees.  Initially, the candidate’s record is reviewed by 
at least three tenured members of his or her department.  This review leads to a 
departmental recommendation that is transmitted to the dean of the college.  The 
dean, in turn, makes a recommendation to the provost of the university.  The 
provost then makes a recommendation to the university president.  In the last 
stage of the process, the president makes a recommendation to the board of 
trustees, and the board then makes a final decision.  At no stage of the procedure 
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is the recommendation of any evaluator binding upon the evaluator or decision-
maker at the next stage (p. 260).   
The multi-layered process, as described by the court, is a core feature of the principle of 
shared governance that is prevalent and valued in academia (AAUP, 2006c; Kaplan, 
2004; Mason, 1972).  That many courts in the study either thoroughly or partially 
referenced parts of the complex process exemplifies that the uniqueness of tenure 
decisions and the system of shared governance was recognized by the judiciary.  
While decision-makers at multiple levels of the tenure process and input from 
both external and internal reviewers may provide veritable checks and balances that 
strengthen the decision-making process, the decentralized process can also be the root of 
problems:  As an example, in Craine v. Trinity College (2002), the plaintiff was misled in 
what she thought would be the focus of her tenure review.  In one review, quality of 
scholarship was the focus; in the tenure denial, the quantity of scholarship was identified 
as the focus.  Due to a breakdown in the shared governance process, the advice given to 
the plaintiff was unclear.  During her last reappointment review, the plaintiff’s colleagues 
had determined that she was on track for tenure; two years later, the department voted 
that she should receive tenure.  However, the appointments and promotions committee 
then voted against the plaintiff, based on the fact that she had only one published article 
in a refereed professional journal.  Particularly interesting was that even the department 
supported the plaintiff’s request for reconsideration and challenged a change in rules 
between the second and final tenure review as being unfair.  At trial, the plaintiff won a 
$12.7 million jury verdict (Euben, 2002), which fully demonstrates the risk that may arise 
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in a multi-layered system in which the component parts neither view themselves as on the 
same team nor function in tandem.   
Roebuck v. Drexel University (1988) provides another example of problems that 
can arise in a decentralized decision-making process.  In this case, the professor brought a 
racial discrimination suit in response to his tenure denial.  Although there were guidelines 
established for tenure review, the court explained that they were unclear and difficult to 
discern.  The Department Chair imposed standards that were not in the Faculty Guide.  
The President of the institution explained that teaching and scholarship were primary, 
while the guidelines provided that they were to be considered equally.  The departmental 
committee lauded the plaintiff’s service activities.  Thus, different levels of the process 
applied different standards and were in conflict. 
In addition to recognizing principles of shared governance, many of the cases that 
met this study’s delimiters further demonstrated that courts recognize and respect 
universities’ institutional autonomy in making lawful tenure decisions.  In accord with 
Phelps’s (1979) study, the cases reviewed did not outwardly criticize the way that 
academic tenure decisions were made in academia.  Generally supportive in their 
description of the concept and practices of academic tenure, many courts stated their 
deferential stance when reviewing academic decisions—even in this set of cases for 
which institutions did not wholly prevail.  The Brown v. Trustees of Boston University 
(1989) court explained its position:  “In tenure cases, courts must take special care to 
preserve the University’s autonomy in making lawful tenure decisions” (p. 346).   
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One of the reasons provided for judicial deference to academic decision-making is 
in respect of academic freedom.  The Ford v. Nicks (1984) court, citing to multiple cases 
that propounded this concept, noted that freedom in academic decision-making produces 
important societal benefits.  In Kunda v. Muhlenberg College (1980), the court explained 
that “[t]he essence of academic freedom is the protection for both the faculty and students 
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding” (p. 547).  
Further, the court called academic freedom the “lifeblood of any educational institution” 
(Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 1980, p. 547).  Such high importance on academic 
freedom raises caution, then, when courts increase their willingness to infuse their 
decisions into those of academia (Gajda, 2009; Kaplin& Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995; 
Poskanzer, 2002).   
Even when courts understand and respect principles of shared governance and 
acknowledge deference to institutions, the judiciary wrestles with tensions that arise 
between understanding the concerns and structures of the academy—many that are rooted 
in longstanding tradition—and the interface between those concerns with the law.  
Though courts affirm institutional rights to select who can join their ranks, they look less 
to tradition and more to laws and governing boards when an issue of ultimate control of 
the institution arises (DiBiase, 1979).  And while courts affirm the importance of 
academic freedom, they will not do so when freedom of the institution conflicts with 
higher principles such adherence to a contract.  The Craine v. Trinity College (2002) 
court noted that a “university cannot claim the benefit of the contract it drafts but be 
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spared the inquiries designed to hold the institution to its bargain” (p. 540).  Concerned 
about fair process, the State ex rel. James v. Ohio State University (1994) court stated:  
[I]t is ironic that the university here argues that academic freedom is challenged 
by the disclosure of the documents.  It seems the antithesis of academic freedom 
to maintain secret files upon which promotion and tenure decisions are made, 
unavailable even to the person who is the subject of the evaluation (p. 913). 
The court in Kunda v. Muhlenberg College (1980) similarly cautioned against claiming 
academic freedom for any academic decision: 
It does not follow that because academic freedom is inextricably related to the 
educational process it is implicated in every employment decision of an 
educational institution.  Colleges may fail to promote or to grant tenure for a 
variety of reasons, such as anticipated decline in enrollment, retrenchment for 
budgetary reasons, termination of some departments, or determination that there 
are higher priorities elsewhere.  These are decisions which may affect the quality 
of education but do not necessarily intrude the nature of the educational process 
itself (p. 547). 
In sum, principles of tenure and academic freedom must still be grounded in law.   
Problematic Policies and Procedures in Academic Tenure Decisions 
While deference to academic decision-making is common, courts are willing to 
insert a judicial decision for that of an institutional decision when the process of shared 
governance has resulted in a decision that is not lawful.  The policies and procedures that 
were identified through court narratives can be placed into three categories:  (a) 
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Infringement upon rights; (b) Discrimination; and (c) Breach of contract.  Studies by 
Steadman (2005) and Timm (1994) similarly categorized implications of judicial 
decisions.  The emergent themes that resulted in the categorical formation implicate that 
courts are reluctant to preempt academic experts in decisions that require professional 
expertise and qualifications, but are willing to review procedural issues to determine their 
lawfulness.  The nuances lie in determining whether a decision made was purely 
academic (O’Neil, 2010).  In ruling on an illegal action, courts will exert their influence 
into a decision in academia only to the extent necessary to ensure that illegal decisions 
are not made (Leap, 1995).   
Infringement upon rights.  Procedural and substantive rights arise as issues in 
tenure denial litigation.  Procedural rights emanate from an institution’s failure to 
establish or communicate policies and procedures, or from a failure to follow procedures 
that are in place.  Substantive rights arise under constitutional and statutory guarantees.  
A plaintiff’s procedural and substantive rights are often intertwined with a discrimination 
analysis or contractual interpretation.   
In general, institutions that fail to adhere to stated policies create property interest 
for affected faculty members.  In State ex rel. Chapdelaine v. Torrence (1975), a statute 
required that tenure was automatic upon completion of a probationary period coupled 
with employment.  The professor was terminated without conformity to the tenure law.  
The court found that after three years, the professor had developed a property interest.   
 In Mumford v. Godfried (1995), the court deemed a professor’s speech on 
departmental issues as relating to a matter of community concern and subject to First 
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Amendment protection.  The court in United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents of 
Stephen F. Austin State University (1982) deemed professor’s departmental criticisms a 
nonprivate manner and subject to First Amendment protections. 
Discrimination.  Discrimination in the process of tenure review remains a 
problem.  The congressional act to strengthen Title VII resulted, at least in part, from the 
perception that administrative ranks in higher education were predominately made up of 
white males (Franke, 2001).  A majority of cases included some form of discrimination 
claims related to Title VII, ADA, Equal Pay Act, or correlated federal and state law 
discrimination claims, with Title VII being invoked most often.  This finding generally 
aligns with Hamill’s (2003) study results, in which 62% were Title VII cases, with sex 
discrimination alleged most often (p. 62).  Hamill (2003) surmised that this was due to 
the increased number of women entering the higher education work force.  Kaplin & Lee 
(2006) also stated that Title VII was frequently invoked. 
Most Title VII suits are claims for disparate treatment (Leap, 1995).  As 
previously discussed in the literature review, a claim for disparate treatment is established 
through the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 1995; 
Poskanzer, 2002).  Three stages comprise the process:  (a) a plaintiff must establish that 
he or she is a member of a protected class.  (b) a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she 
was qualified for the job; and (c) the position for which the plaintiff applied and was 
rejected (or not reappointed) must remain open, and the institution must continue to seek 
other applicants who are less qualified or equivalent in qualifications to the plaintiff.  
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The first element, whether the plaintiff is part of a protected class, is relatively 
straightforward for most cases.  It is not usually difficult to make the case that a plaintiff 
is in a protected class of sex, race, color, national origin, or religion.  Saint Francis 
College v. Al-Khazraji (1987) exemplified that this is not always true, however.  
Although the court discussed its discrimination claim under a Section 1981 analysis, the 
case showed that establishing protected class is not always uncomplicated.  The 
defendants argued that the professor could not sue under Section 1981 because he was an 
ethnic Arab, taxonomically a Caucasian, and therefore not a member of a protected class.  
The Court disagreed, and explained that Congress did not intend to limit Section 1981 on 
the basis of discrimination for belonging to a particular ethnic group.  Rather, the Court 
reasoned, Congress intended to “protect from discrimination identifiable classes of 
persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or 
ethnic characteristics” (Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 1987, p. 613). 
Courts that discuss a prima facie case typically discuss the standards by which the 
elements will be assessed.  A court’s effort to determine whether a plaintiff is qualified 
for tenure can pose greater problems.  Judges in different courts have differing 
perspectives; when assessing seemingly similar facts, different courts may arrive at 
different decision.  Compounding this issue is that qualifications may be determined by 
internal peer review, external peer review, and administrative assessment of subjective 
factors that are demonstrated in a tenure dossier that spans many years’ worth of a 
plaintiff’s teaching, research, and scholarship.  It is this category, particularly, in which 
judges expressed great deference to the expertise necessary in an institutional judgment.   
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“Wherever the responsibility lies within the institution, it is clear that courts must 
be vigilant as not to intrude into such determinations, and should not substitute 
their judgment for that of the college with respect to the qualifications of faculty 
members for promotion and tenure” (Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 1980, p. 
548).    
Meticulous documentation as to the assessment of a candidate’s qualifications is crucial 
for supporting an institution’s ultimate tenure decision. 
If an institution’s reasons for not awarding tenure to a candidate are inconsistent 
or lack substance, a plaintiff may be able to prove that the proffered reasons are 
pretextual.  In Roebuck v. Drexel University (1988), the court noted multiple 
inconsistencies with the defendant university’s explanations for the professor’s service 
ratings.  While some reviewers deemed his service to be an excellent match for the needs 
of the university, other reviewers did not.  The court explained that cumulatively, the 
evidence could “cast into doubt the credibility of [Institution’s] assertions, and that the 
reasons proffered by the University were mere pretexts” (p.730).    
In order to ascertain whether various aspects of the tenure decision were made for 
appropriate reasons, it may be necessary for a plaintiff to obtain the materials that support 
his review.  In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that Title VII requirements for disclosure of materials pertains to universities and held 
that the EEOC could subpoena universities who refused to voluntarily provide tenure 
review materials.  Even after the Supreme Court’s ruling, some universities have asserted 
that tenure review materials are confidential (AAUW, 2004).  The professor in State ex 
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rel. James v. Ohio State University (1980) had to file a motion to compel to obtain his 
tenure related materials, even though the university’s own promotion and tenure 
guidelines explained that the related materials were not exempted from the Ohio Public 
Records Act.  
Poskanzer (2002) encouraged institutions to conduct thorough, fair tenure reviews 
and to have nothing to hide.  To that point, the court in State ex rel. James v. Ohio State 
University (1994) explained:  [I]t is ironic that the university here argues that academic 
freedom is challenged by the disclosure of the documents.  It seems the antithesis of 
academic freedom to maintain secret files upon which promotion and tenure decisions are 
made, unavailable even to the person who is the subject of the evaluation (p. 913). 
Breach of contract.   Cases selected for this study revealed that courts are not 
interested in placing within their purview the administration or governance of institutions 
of higher education.  Accordingly, courts have demonstrated the priority of discerning the 
agreement between the parties.  Contracts are enforceable promises, with rights that 
emanate from government documents, statutes, regulations, faculty handbooks, 
institutionally adopted terms and conditions, common practices, and employee contracts 
(White, 2010).  To determine the plaintiff’s rights in Kakaes v. George Washington 
University (1996), the court’s lengthy discernment of a notice provision began:  “A 
proper understanding of this somewhat esoteric dispute requires familiarity with the 
applicable provisions of the Faculty Code” (p. 129).   
In upholding the law, courts require that institutions comply with any and all 
contractual commitments to faculty.  Provisions of a contract must be implemented in a 
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consistent and fair manner.  As explained in Craine v. Trinity College (2002), a 
“university cannot claim the benefit of the contract it drafts but be spared the inquiries 
designed to hold the institution to its bargain …. The principle of academic freedom does 
not preclude us from vindicating the contractual rights of a plaintiff who has been denied 
tenure in breach of an employment contract” ( p. 540). 
 Allegations related to contract were found in a number of opinions and were often 
included with other claims.  Divisions among claims are not discrete as to the use of 
contract interpretation to determine a plaintiff’s rights, because reviewing discrimination 
claims may require interpreting the agreement of the parties, or claiming rights to due 
process may require examining the contract to ascertain the process due under the tenure 
review procedures.   
 Breach of contract allegations are often rooted in procedural irregularities, thus 
highlighting the need for institutions to not only have clear, thorough procedures, but also 
to provide adequate training to those who must enact and enforce such policies and 
procedures.  The AAUP advocates for all terms and conditions of faculty employment to 
be clearly stated in writing.  Other scholars have advised that the wording of tenure 
documents in all policies and handbooks should be specific (Kaplin & Lee, 2006; Leap, 
1995) and that tenure criteria should be based on merit and free of bias (Hendrickson, 
1999).    
Differences by Court, Time, or Institutional Status 
As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2, the three major categories of problematic 
policies and procedures, including infringing upon a professor’s rights, discriminating 
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against an employee, and breaching a contract with an employee arose in both federal and 
state courts, and the claims can be intertwined.  As discussed, an interpretation of state 
antidiscrimination laws can be considered to be subsumed within the court’s 
interpretation of the Title VII claims.  In Brown v. Trustees of Boston University (1989), 
the court ruled that the district courts exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the contract 
claim was proper.  Because the district court had federal question jurisdiction over 
Brown’s Title VII claim, it was proper to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim 
because “the state law claim alleging violation of the anti-discrimination clause of the 
contract exactly paralleled the federal Title VII claim [and] lay within the district court’s 
discretion” (p. 356).  
In federal courts, authorities can differ when interpreting the same or similar 
questions.  A split in authorities among federal circuit courts regarding access to peer 
review materials was discussed by the court in Dixon v. Rutgers, The State University of 
New Jersey (1988).  In that case, the university argued that for purposes of academic 
freedom interests, peer review materials should be protected by a qualified privilege.  The 
court explained that four circuit courts had, at that time, considered forms of the proposed 
qualified privilege.  Two of the circuit courts had adopted the qualified privilege, and two 
others had rejected it.  Thus, the results arising in courts in which materials are privileged 
would likely differ when compared with results from courts in which materials are not 
deemed privileged, particularly as to a plaintiff’s ability to meet the burden of proof.   
State courts’ interpretations of policies and policies can differ widely based on 
state statute.  A tenure denial would be examined differently in states with automatic 
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tenure statutory provisions versus states without such statutes.  In State ex rel. 
Chapdelaine v. Torrence (1975), a Tennessee statute provided that tenure was automatic 
upon completion of a probationary period coupled with reemployment.  In analyzing the 
plaintiff professor’s claims, the court would not allow for a “common law” interpretation 
of tenure, because a statutory law was firmly in place.  
Changes in statutes over time would likely affect the outcome of tenure litigation.  
In Ford v. Nicks (1984), male and female, husband and wife faculty members alleged 
wrongful termination on the basis of sex, as well as retaliation for protesting against the 
institution’s employment practices.  The male professor was found to have proven a Title 
VII case of discrimination, and Tennessee law at that time granted automatic tenure to 
any professor at a state university who successfully completed five years of employment.  
The female professor was found to have presented a prima facie case of discrimination, 
but the trial court misapplied the burden of persuasion, and the case was remanded.  On 
remand and subsequent appeal of the case, the court in Ford v. Nicks (1989) determined 
that the female professor had proven her case of discrimination and should be awarded 
reinstatement.  However, the district court’s award of a full professorship with tenure was 
reversed on the basis of facts related to the timing of the female’s hiring and when her 
claims arose, and the abolishment of the system of automatic tenure.  
Institutional status can have an effect on the claims that can be brought and the 
result of the claims.  For example, in Sawyer v. Mercer (1980), the plaintiff professor 
claimed that he acquired tenure when the college did not provide notice in a timely 
manner, and he completed the four year probationary period.  In response, the college 
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argued that tenure was not automatic, and that the Board had to act in an affirmative 
decision.  Although there was a state statute in existence regarding the parameters of an 
automatic grant of tenure for public college teachers, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled 
that the college was not bound by the state statutes relating to tenure, because the college 
was a private institution.  The employment relationship was a function of state contract 
law, which the Court interpreted to award tenure to the professor.   
Remedies 
A denial of tenure can mean the loss of a job, rejection, and alienation.  A 
negative tenure decision alters lives, splits colleagues, and places a cloud on working 
environments.  Those who were once friends can become adversaries.  No matter who 
prevails, the costs are great (Franke, 2001; Leap, 1995; Poskanzer, 2002).  The lifestyle 
and career costs are evident in the case of Ford v. Nicks (1984).  There, the male plaintiff 
professor, after dismissal from the institution, attempted to find other employment, was 
unsuccessful at attempts to secure academic employment, and ultimately began to work 
in real estate.  His wife, the female plaintiff professor, also attempted unsuccessfully to 
locate employment at other educational institutions following her dismissal from the 
institution.  She, too, began to work in real estate and then secured employment with a 
nonacademic agency.   
A particular problem arises for courts when fashioning a remedy becomes 
necessary for a plaintiff who succeeds in a tenure denial lawsuit (Leap, 1995).  Because 
the academic profession does little to fashion relief for wrongful denial of tenure, and 
may not recognize that that a denial was wrongful, courts are placed in the position of 
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fashioning adequate relief.  Courts look to law for determining appropriate relief (Ancell, 
1978).  In reality, true relief for plaintiffs who may have gone through years of litigation 
and unemployment can be particularly challenging to obtain.  Even when reinstatement is 
granted, the working environment may then pose special challenges in terms of 
departmental and colleague acceptance. 
As the findings demonstrate, equitable and legal remedies were granted in both 
federal and state courts.  Equitable remedies ranged from making promotion with tenure 
available if the professor completed a master’s degree, to various levels of reinstatement, 
to grants of tenure.  Legal remedies included damages, costs or attorney’s fees, and back 
pay.  In fashioning remedies, courts often express principles of fairness.  In Stolberg v. 
Members of Board of Trustees for State Colleges of State of Connecticut (1973), a 
plaintiff had to go to great expense to combat the conduct of a university defendant.  The 
court explained that it sought to  
assure that the plaintiff, and others who might similarly be forced to great expense 
to vindicate clear constitutional claims are not deterred from securing such 
vindication by the prospect of costly, protracted proceedings which have become 
necessary only because of the obdurate conduct of the defendants (Stolberg v. 
Members of the Board of Trustees for State Colleges of State of Connecticut, 
1973, p. 490). 
Violation of a liberty or property interest calls for due process.  A notable property 
interest case, Soni v. Board of Trustees of University of Tennessee (1975) declared that 
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because a professor had de facto tenure, he was entitled to a full hearing before dismissal.  
The court ordered a new hearing, but not tenure.   
Violation of a contractual agreement that grants automatic tenure if certain criteria 
are met requires a grant of tenure.  The defendant institution tried to assert a common law 
tenure theory in Sawyer v. Mercer, (1980), but where a contract was specific, the court 
deemed that the professor had acquired tenure.  Statutes can also dictate that tenure be 
granted upon the fulfillment of requisites (Ford v. Nicks, 1984).   
Title VII violations may require reinstatement and other make-whole relief.  This 
study affirmed that awarding tenure is considered appropriate if there were no other 
options for making the plaintiff whole.  The award of tenure is rare.  In Kunda v. 
Muhlenberg College (1980), the court awarded promotion and tenure, which was 
unprecedented at that time, and reasoned that an award of tenure was the only way to 
make the plaintiff whole.  Based on a specific finding of the district court, the court found 
that the plaintiff had not been recommended for tenure because she lacked an advanced 
degree, and had not been counseled that the degree was the limiting factor.  The remedy 
granted by the court was reinstatement, back pay, and promotion with tenure to be 
granted upon the completion of a master’s degree.  The court sought to place the plaintiff 
in the position she would have been in “but for” the unlawful discrimination had 
occurred.  The dissent opined that tenure should not have been granted, because there was 
no proof that had the plaintiff met the requisites of obtaining her advanced degree, she 
would have then been granted tenure.   
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In Brown v. Trustees of Boston University (1989), another Title VII 
discrimination case, the court affirmed a district court’s grant of tenure and other 
compensatory damages to the plaintiff.  Explaining the rarity of a grant of tenure, the 
court stated:  “Courts have quite rarely awarded tenure as a remedy for unlawful 
discrimination” (Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 1989, p. 359).  The court stated 
that tenure was to be awarded only when there was no dispute as to a professor’s 
qualifications.   “  
In Ford v. Nicks (1984) the male plaintiff professor had been discharged, after 
four years, in retaliation for helping his wife in her sex discrimination claim against the 
institution.  The court upheld an order reinstating the professor, with tenure, to the 
institution which automatically granted tenure after five years of teaching.  Thus, contract 
rights can intertwine with discrimination claims for determining the appropriate award.   
Through fashioning remedies, courts wield considerable power to affect academic 
policy and rules surrounding employment decisions.  Moreover, courts wield 
considerable power to affect the lives of faculty members for whom tenure denial is an 
issue.   
Recommendations from the Study: Research Question Three 
Research Question 3 asked the following:  What steps might colleges and 
universities take in the tenure process to minimize tenure denial litigation and the 
possibility of an unfavorable decision in a tenure denial lawsuit? 
This study identified three main categories of problematic institutional behaviors, 
the result of which courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs:  (a) Infringement upon rights; (b) 
 
219 
Discrimination; and (c) Breach of contract.  Steps that minimize these issues will help to 
minimize tenure denial litigation and the possibility of an unfavorable decision in a 
tenure denial lawsuit.  The ability to establish and implement preventive measures that 
address problems in the above categories requires that administrators and faculty 
decision-makers know how to do so.  In reality, knowing the law, staying current on the 
law, and knowing how to implement legal procedures is a monumental task for which 
administrators and faculty are likely ill-prepared.  Accordingly, Kaplin & Lee (2006) 
suggested employing experienced administrators and legal counsel who know and 
understand the impact of laws and tenure.   
Similarly, hiring a risk manager places a high importance on regular and ongoing 
reviews of laws, policies, and procedures affecting the institution (Hamill, 2003).  Risk 
managers can focus on the avoidance of problems that can lead to a lawsuit and be the 
contact point from which other actions emanate.  Furthermore, a risk manager can bring 
to a higher level the process of monitoring policies, procedures, and employment 
decisions as they progress, and providing ongoing training for those involved in the 
process or who will be involved in the future. 
With guidance and advice from counsel and risk managers, those who have 
responsibility for oversight of tenure decisions should discuss and analyze prior tenure 
denial litigation and related studies to extrapolate useful information (ACE Report, 
2000).  Information gleaned can be shared through administrative and faculty 
professional development training regarding pertinent laws, policies, and institutional 
regulations.  Online training formats that can be kept current might prove particularly 
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useful for such development.  As well, formalized systems of networking and mentoring 
might help to facilitate the conveyance of such information.  Administrators and faculty 
members should have time allowance in their schedules not only to serve on review 
committees, but to be trained and well-prepared to serve on review committees.  For 
higher education programs that train administrators and prepare higher education faculty 
members, a course in higher education law should be required.   
Maintaining a good relationship between counsel and administrators is crucial for 
keeping open the channels of communication.  It is important that institutional and 
departmental missions are clearly communicated to counsel, and that legal frameworks 
are proactively developed with an eye towards honoring the institutional mission and 
priorities.  Prior to any employment action, the decision should be considered in light of 
all legal and procedural standards.  To these measures for managing risk, the following 
suggestions are added: 
 Design policies and procedures for the institution that comply with all 
antidiscrimination, contractual, procedural, and statutory requisites.   
 Assure policies and procedures are clearly and concisely written.  Faculty 
handbooks should be written with the presumption that they are legally binding 
and should include provisions the institution expects to follow meticulously.   
 Keep procedures up-to-date in any and all handbook or contractual formats. 
 Advise and inform all involved in the tenure process of institutional policies, 
procedures, including tenured faculty and tenure-track faculty.  Tenure-track 
faculty should receive this information early in their career. 
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 Be knowledgeable of departmental needs and institutional mission when 
conducting a hiring search.  Inform search committees of the criteria needed for 
the position.  Link hiring policies with tenure policies. 
 Ensure diversity in hiring and review committees. 
 Provide appropriate training for administrators and faculty on procedural fairness, 
due process, and assessment procedures. 
 Provide professional development opportunities for all faculty members and 
administrators on topics such as discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. 
 Follow established procedures.  If exceptions are necessary, document the 
exceptions and explain fully. 
 Provide all requisite materials, as required by law. 
 Clarify standards of review that will be used in the tenure process. 
 Honor a tenure applicant’s rights; avoid retaliation for assertion of those rights.  
 Monitor the possibility of a hostile, retaliatory, patronizing, or discriminatory 
work environment.  If any is detected, correct immediately.  Proactively identify 
all appropriate consequences for those who offend varied levels of institutional 
policy. 
 Require regular, written evaluations for all tenure-track faculty members.  Use 
specific performance measures to identify a candidate’s progress in research, 
teaching, and service.  Communicate both positive and negative aspects about a 
candidate’s tenure progress and prospects. 
 Make sure evaluations of teaching, research, and service are equally applied. 
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 For a negative decision, treat a rejected tenure candidate with sensitivity and 
respect.  Faculty and administrators should fully communicate and explain their 
decision  
 For a negative decision, offer support services such as assistance in seeking new 
positions, time for travel to interviews, and mentoring.   
 In consideration of the above recommendations, identify the persons who would 
best provide the requisite information, and who must be included as recipients of 
the information. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
In order to gain a full understanding of the cultural and historical aspects of tenure 
and pertinent current legal issues, this interdisciplinary study included scholarly 
background and processes from both the legal and educational disciplines.  Any study of 
tenure, promotion, or retention that would further enhance, extend, or continue this 
scholarship would likely combine the disciplines in varying degrees.  For the sake of 
presentation, the recommendations set forth below are divided into legal analysis studies 
related to tenure, promotion, and retention issues, and qualitative case studies, which 
suggest in-depth study to help tell more about the nuanced stories that exist behind the 
litigation.   
Legal Analysis Studies of Case Law 
Future studies of case law related to tenure, promotion, and retention litigation 
could add to the discussion by: 
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 Changing or adding to any of the delimiters – a review of litigation arising out of 
community colleges or professional schools, for example, could add insight to 
tenure processes, requirements, and fairness in other genres. 
 Clustering and analyzing decisions by court—a comparative study of judicial 
decisions by circuit or by state could extend knowledge as to courts’ views about 
judicial deference to academia, the nuances of summary judgment analyses, or 
burdens of proof in different circuit courts.   
 Studying trial court cases, particularly those that were not further appealed—a 
depth of factual analysis could be gleaned beyond what is available at the 
appellate level.   
 Analyzing litigation for institutions with Collective Bargaining Agreements 
versus those that do not have such agreements—particular interest could be given 
to quantifying the percentage of suits brought in institutions that have bargaining 
as compared with those that do not, the content of the suits, the level of judicial 
deference given when collective bargaining is in force, and how the process of 
shared governance is affected by the bargaining agreement.   
 Comparing and contrasting the language of judicial deference used in corporate 
case decisions with the language of judicial deference used in academic cases—
results could add to insight about judicial perspectives of board functions, and 
similarities and differences between board functions in corporate and academic 
contexts.   
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 Reviewing tenure denial litigation and remedies to assess the extent to which 
remedies drive litigation and the level to which litigation proceeds when certain 
remedies are at stake—results could be particularly instructive to administrators 
and counsel as to the potential purposes, costs, and benefits of litigation. 
Legal Analysis Studies of Statutory Law 
Legal analysis can also be conducted on statutory law.  State legislators, 
especially, may be influenced by public opinion, constituent pressures, and costs related 
to the funding of higher education.  To extend the present study, a study of legislation 
affecting tenure could be conducted: 
 Comparing statutory language state by state—the statutes could be parsed, 
interpreted, and followed as to their influence on judicial deference, shared 
governance, and litigation.   
 Following a particularly public case and determining whether the outcome of the 
cases subsequently influenced changes in legislation—a review of the legislative 
history of a bill could indicate the catalysts for change in tenure governance 
policies.   
Qualitative Case Studies 
Qualitative studies provide depth and could help legal and educational scholars to 
understand the story underlying litigation.  Studies could be conducted: 
 Assessing an institution’s tenure, promotion, and retention training for faculty (or 
administrators) as to laws, policies, and procedures. 
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 Evaluating the perceived versus the actual level of faculty (or administrative) 
preparedness and training as to tenure, promotion, and retention laws, policies, 
and procedures.   
 Assessing the standard of review implemented at each level of the tenure review 
process. 
 Comparing the hiring criteria for a particular tenure-track candidate with the 
criteria applied to the candidate’s subsequent tenure review.   
 Following an individual plaintiff through the litigation process to help reveal the 
gamut of expectations, emotions, difficulties, and successes faced during the 
process of litigation.   
 Focusing on cases that did not reach trial, in order to shed light on plaintiffs’ 
reasons for not fully pursuing litigation, settlement offers, and the subsequent 
effects on plaintiffs’ perceptions (e.g., whether they “won” or “lost,” attitudes 
towards their peers and institutions, careers, and lives).   
 Focusing on cases that did not reach trial, in order to shed light on institutional 
perspectives on the effects of settlement on the tenure process, related policies 
and procedures, public perceptions, and institutional finances.   
 Comparing an institution that went through tenure litigation with a similar 
institution (and similar tenure claim) that reached a settlement, so as to reveal 
differences in costs and benefits (e.g., financial, emotional, time commitment, and 
perceptions).   
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 Following a single case through the system, each time it was appealed, sent back 
to the trial court, and perhaps appealed again (or rehearing denied, appeal denied).  
Obtaining the briefs filed and any supporting documents could be particularly 
meaningful to assess nuances of policies and procedures with which the court 
grappled. 
 Tracking a particularly noteworthy case through “the court of public opinion” as it 
progresses through the judicial system, with the goal of identifying public opinion 
through editorials and articles, and identifying any institutional changes that 
resulted from the pressures that formed outside the ivory tower. 
 Examining at a single institution how tenure and promotion policies have changed 
over time.  One aspect of the study could include the change in requirements for 
presenting a tenure dossier.  Another aspect could show how the materials 
submitted have changed, such as categories assessed, type of documentation, 
amount of documentation, and specificity. 
 Studying tenure dossier requirements pre- and post-litigation, for an institution 
that had been through litigation.   
 Following an entire tenure review process, to show the perspectives of both the 
faculty and administrative reviewers, and to gain insight as to how and why the 
reviewers made the decisions they made. 
 Analyzing how administrators and senior faculty members transmit the 
institutional expectations to junior track faculty members. 
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 Comparing tenure, promotion, and retention processes at institutions with 
Collective Bargaining Agreements to processes at institutions that do not have 
such agreements.   
 Following two tenure litigants, one who prevailed and one who did not, to 
compare the futures of the candidates.  
Conclusion 
This study analyzed the influence of the judiciary on academic decision-making, 
as examined through tenure denial litigation.  By looking only at cases in which 
institutions did not wholly prevail, it identified policies and procedures used in making 
tenure decisions that courts found particularly problematic.  The uniqueness of the tenure 
decision, with its multi-layered complexity and shared governance structure, makes 
judicial review of such decisions challenging.  
The research questions of this study were considered primarily from the 
perspective of the institution, with the objective of identifying what those who serve in 
administrative or senior faculty roles can do to prevent litigation, or to successfully 
defend institutional decisions, should litigation arise.  Faculty may also benefit from the 
study by learning more about their rights, responsibilities, and roles in the process of 
tenure decisions.  While many policies and procedures that courts find problematic arise 
from diverse situations and allegations in the context of tenure litigation, they can be 
broadly classified into three categories:  (a) Infringement upon rights; (b) Discrimination; 
and (c) Breach of contract.  Thus, courts are most likely to insert their decisions when 
those made in academia are contrary to law.   
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The data from this study supported that courts are empowered to uphold the law, 
not to be surrogates for the principles of the academic community.  In fact, courts 
exhibited great deference to academia for faculty personnel decisions.  The crux of 
determining why courts rule against an institutional tenure decision lies within the 
difference between academic decision-making, for which the professional judgment and 
expertise of academicians is crucial, and decisions made in academia that are procedural 
and unrelated to the goals of academic freedom, and contrary to law.  To the former, 
courts are highly deferential; to the latter, courts are not.   
Judicial deference to academia, complexity of the tenure process, and challenges 
of litigation notwithstanding, the fact that few tenure litigation cases reach the appellate 
level and fewer still are won by plaintiffs raises the distinct possibility that institutions 
are, in a vast majority of instances, developing and implementing tenure, promotion, and 
retention plans that are grounded in solid law and policy.  Knowledge gained from 
previous tenure, promotion, and retention litigation scholarship, combined with input and 
training from general counsel, risk managers, and the AAUP, have surely aided 
administrators and faculty in their understanding of the tenure process.  Yet, the many 
(and unknown number) of cases that arise and are settled before ever reaching court and 
cases that are brought to court  indicate that there remains much work to be done.  
Though institutions largely prevail in tenure denial litigation and few cases proceed to the 
appellate level, higher education institutions must continue to be attentive to laws, 
policies, procedures, and training to pursue fairness and compliance with the law. 
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Litigation represents extreme forms of academic community conflict that cultural, 
managerial, or legal policies of an institution failed to prevent.  Higher education 
administrators and faculty, particularly those who are in decision-making and leadership 
roles, need to gain a better understanding of the risks involved in the tenure process.  
Measures taken to avoid or mitigate litigation can help build community within the 
institution.  By carefully considering and planning for decisions that are based in both 
law and policy, institutions can be strengthened.  Counsel, administrators, and faculty 
must work together towards this goal.   
This study sought to improve what is known about the law’s effect on higher 
education by better understanding the flaws in the tenure process that require judicial 
intervention.  It is hoped that information gleaned from this study can contribute 
meaningfully to the dialog in the education and legal communities.  Knowing more about 
fair policies and procedures can improve higher education institutions’ ability to protect 
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Overview of Selected Tenure Denial Litigation Cases Heard in Federal Appellate Courts 
Citation Basis of Suit Claims/Law Facts and Issues Pertinent to Disposition Disposition 
Abramson v. 
University of Hawaii, 
594 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
Female instructor at 
public institution 
alleged wrongful 
denial of tenure and 




of contract/Title VII 
State contract law. 
Consequences of tenure denial extended through 
expiration of terminal contract year; Professor’s 
claims should be determined by referencing how 
institution actually makes tenure decisions, not 
by how guidelines say they should; Generally 
accepted tenure process included a review of 
reconsideration requests in final year. 
Affirmed district court’s grant of 
summary judgment as to equal 
pay claim; Reversed summary 
judgment as to Title VII claims; 
Remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Abramson v. William 
Paterson College of 
New Jersey, 260 F.3d 
265 (3rd Cir. 2001). 
 
Associate professor at  
public institution 
alleged wrongful 
denial of tenure and 
termination based on 
Orthodox Jewish 











Excessive monitoring of conferences and 
absences, charging sick days on religious 
holidays, criticism of unavailability on holy days, 
scheduling meetings on religious holidays, and 
faith based statements could lead a jury to 
conclude professor was negatively affected; 
Changing nature of proffered reasons tended to 
show pretext.   
 
Reversed district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for 
institution on all claims; 
Remanded for further 
proceedings. 
 
Brennan v. King, 139 
F.3d 258 (1st Cir. 
1998). 
Male assistant 
professor at private 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure and termination 
based on sexual 
orientation and being 




State contract law. 
Discrimination claims were not barred because 
contract of employment did not require 
submission of tenure dispute to arbitration.   
Affirmed district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of 
institution on breach of contract; 
Reversed summary judgment as 
to professor’s federal 
discrimination claims; 





Table 1 Continued 
Citation Basis of Suit Claims/Law Facts and Issues Pertinent to Disposition Disposition 
Brown v. Trustees of 
Boston University, 
891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
Female assistant 
professor at private 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure based on sex.  
Discrimination; 





State contract law. 
Conduct and comments by persons involved in 
tenure review process indicated a discriminatory 
attitude. 
Affirmed district court’s ruling 
in favor of professor on sex 
discrimination charge; Affirmed 
order of reinstatement as 
professor with tenure; Vacated 
ruling granting an injunction as 
to other professors, due to 
overbreadth. 
Ford v. Nicks, 741 
F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 
1984). 
Male associate 
professor and female 
assistant professor, 
husband and wife 
faculty members at 
public institution 
alleged wrongful 
termination based on 
sex, and retaliation for 
protesting against 
employment practices 




At trial, male professor had proven a Title VII 
violation by a preponderance of evidence; 
Female professor had presented a prima facie 
case of discrimination, but trial court misapplied 
the burden of persuasion from plaintiff to 
defendant; Tennessee law in existence at time of 
case granted automatic tenure to any professor at 
a state university who successfully completed 
five years of employment at institution.  
Affirmed district court’s ruling 
in favor of male professor in 
total awarding tenure and back 
pay; Remanded court’s finding 
in favor of female professor on 
her discrimination claim because 
of improper burden shifting to 
institution. 
Ford v. Nicks , 866 
F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 
1989). 
Female assistant 
professor at public 
institution alleged 
wrongful termination 
based on sex.  
Discrimination/Title 
VII. 
Institution was inconsistent as to facts regarding 
professor’s lack of qualifications; Institution’s 
application of policies and procedures was 
inconsistent; Institution did not accurately state 
its policy; Reinstatement proper; Abolishment of 
system of automatic tenure made grant of tenure 
improper. 
Affirmed district court’s finding 
of discrimination and award of 
reinstatement; Reversed award 
of full professorship with tenure; 






Table 1 Continued 
Citation Basis of Suit Claims/Law Facts and Issues Pertinent to Disposition Disposition 
Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 
860 F.2d 1317 (6th 
Cir. 1988). 
Female professor at 
public institution 
alleged wrongful 
denial of tenure on the 
basis of sex. 
Discrimination/Title 
VII; § 1983. 
Evidence showed certain decision-makers in 
tenure process intentionally discriminated against 
professor by requiring more scholarship, 
selecting outside reviewers in an inconsistent 
manner, and choosing negative evaluations. 
Affirmed district court’s finding 
of Equal Protection and 
Substantive Due Process 
violations; Affirmed award of 
punitive damages against chairs; 
Reversed dismissal of Title VII 
claim and directed judgment 
entered in favor of professor; 
Remanded for further 
determination of appropriate 
equitable relief; Directed that 
reinstatement with tenure should 
be ordered only if professor 
could not receive fair 
consideration of her tenure 
application. 
Harris v. Ladner, 127 
F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
Female assistant 
professor, who was 
black, of Guyanese 
descent, and a faculty 
member at private 
institution, alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure and promotion 
on the basis of race. 
Discrimination; Equal 
Protection and Due 
Process violations; 
Breach of contract; tort 
violations/§ 1981; U.S. 
Const. Amend. V and 
XIV; State contract and 
tort law. 
Professor’s right to reconsideration was not a 
collateral review, but rather a continuation of the 
original application process; statute of limitations 
did not bar the action. 
Reversed district court’s 
dismissal of professor’s 
nonconstitutional claims; 
Affirmed dismissal of 
constitutional claims; Remanded 
for further proceedings. 
Hill v. Ross, 183 F.3d 
586 (7th Cir. 1999). 
Male professor at 
public institution 
alleged wrongful 
denial of tenure on the 
basis of sex. 
Discrimination; Equal 
Protection/Title VII; 
U.S. Const. Amend. 
XIV. 
Fact issues existed as to whether the institution 
used sex as a sole factor in its hiring decision, 
where department set a target percentage for 
hiring that it could not explain and left position 
vacant rather than hiring professor. 
Reversed district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for 






Table 1 Continued 
Citation Basis of Suit Claims/Law Facts and Issues Pertinent to Disposition Disposition 
Jones v. University of 
Central Oklahoma, 
13 F.3d 361 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
Male professor at 
public institution 
alleged wrongful 
denial of tenure on the 
basis of race. 
Discrimination; Due 
Process; Breach of 
contract; tort 
violations/Title VII; § 
1983; State contract 
and tort law. 
Existence of a formal procedure for tenure 
decisions does not automatically preclude the 
professor from relying on an unwritten tenure 
policy; district court was required to consider 
state law in its analysis. 
Reversed district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for 
institution; Remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Kunda v. Muhlenberg 
College, 621 F.2d 532 
(3rd Cir. 1980). 
Female instructor at 
private institution 
alleged wrongful 
denial of tenure and 
promotion on the 
basis of sex. 
Discrimination/Title 
VII. 
Institution did not counsel professor as to the 
necessity of obtaining master’s degree for 
acquiring tenure; Tenure requirements were not 
addressed by Faculty Handbook. 
Affirmed in entirety district 
court’s order in awarding 
professor reinstatement, back 
pay, and promotion with tenure 
to be granted upon the 
completion of master’s degree. 
Lynn v. Regents of the 
University of 
California, 656 F.2d 
1337 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Female assistant 
professor at public 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure and merit 
salary increases on the 
basis of sex. 
Discrimination/Title 
VII. 
Testimony, evidentiary documents, and statistical 
data revealed a general pattern of discrimination 
that favored men and disfavored women’s issues 
and those who concentrated on such issues; 
District court reviewed professor’s tenure file for 
evidentiary purposes but denied access to 
professor, which violated her due process. 
Reversed district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for 






Table 1 Continued 
Citation Basis of Suit Claims/Law Facts and Issues Pertinent to Disposition Disposition 
Mumford v. Godfried, 
52 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 
1995).  
Male probationary 
faculty member at 
public institution 
alleged wrongful 
denial of tenure and 
discharge in violation 






Violation of free 
speech rights and 
contract/§ 1983; U.S. 
Const. Amend. I; State 
common law and tort 
claims. 
Professor’s speech on departmental issues could 
be fairly considered as relating to a matter that 
was a community concern and should not have 
been excluded from First Amendment protection. 
Affirmed district court’s 
dismissal of professor’s common 
law and tort claims; Affirmed 
summary judgment dismissal of 
due process claim; Reversed 
summary judgment dismissal of  
First Amendment claim; 
Remanded for further 
proceedings.  
Roebuck v. Drexel 
University, 852 F.2d 
715 (3rd Cir. 1988). 
Male assistant 
professor at private 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 




Professor’s service responsibilities, for which he 
was hired, were noted favorably and yet devalued 
by some in tenure review process; Racial animus 
by university officials included inconsistent 
application of tenure guidelines. 
Reversed district court’s grant of 
judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict on professor’s § 1981 
claim; Affirmed the grant of a 
new trial on the § 1981 claim; 
Vacated the Title VII judgment 
with instruction to await jury 
verdict on retrial; Remanded for 
further proceedings.  
Saint Francis College 
v. Al-Khazraji, 481 
U.S. 604 (1987). 
Male associate 
professor at private 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure and termination 
based on Arab race, 
national origin, and 
Muslim religion. 
Discrimination/§ 1981 Legislative history of § 1981showed Congress 
intended to protect from discrimination 
identifiable classes of persons who are subjected 
to intentional discrimination solely because of 
their ancestry or ethnic characteristics; Congress 
intended § 1981 to forbid such discrimination; 
Distinctive physiognomy not essential to qualify 
for race discrimination protection under § 1981. 
Affirmed Court of Appeals; 
Held professor’s action not time 
barred; Persons of Arabian 
ancestry could bring claims for 
racial discrimination under 






Table 1 Continued 
Citation Basis of Suit Claims/Law Facts and Issues Pertinent to Disposition Disposition 
Sola v. Lafayette 
College, 804 F.2d 40 
(3rd Cir. 1986). 
 
Female assistant 
professor at private 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure, wrongful 
discharge, and breach 
of contract arising 
from discrimination 
on the basis of sex. 
Discrimination, breach 
of contract, tort 
violations/Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act; 
State contract and tort 
laws. 
 
No facts supported professor’s claims that she 
was denied contractual protections; No facts 
supported that gender played a role in 
institution’s decision; Affirmative action claims 
were deemed raised in brief and at oral argument 




Affirmed district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for 
institution on professor’s claims 
of wrongful discharge (public 
policy) and breach of contract 
(handbook, gender),; Vacated 
dismissal of claim for breach of 
contract (affirmative action); 
Remanded. 
Soni v. Board of 
Trustees of University 
of Tennessee, 513 
F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 
1975). 
Male associate 
professor at public 
institution alleged 
wrongful nonrenewal 
of contract and tenure 
denial without a 
hearing. 
Violation of due 
process/State law. 
State law that existed at that time prohibited a 
grant of tenure to aliens, but professor was told 
he would be treated like any other professor; 
Professor was later terminated without due 
process hearing; System of practice gave rise to 
expectation of continued employment. 
Affirmed district court’s 
decision ordering hearing and 
back pay from date of 
termination; Held that monetary 
judgment against institution was 
not barred by 11th Amendment. 
Stern v. Shouldice, 
706 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 
1983). 
Male assistant 
professor at public 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure in retaliation 
for expression of 
speech. 
Retaliation/§ 1983; 
U.S. Const. Amend. I. 
Professor’s speech was constitutionally 
protected; limits existed on a public institution’s 
freedom to prohibit or regulate professor’s 
criticism. 
Affirmed district court’s 
assessment of nominal damages, 
costs, and attorney’s fees; 
Reversed award of back pay and 
prejudgment interest. 
Stewart v. Rutgers, 
The State University, 
120 F.3d 426 (3rd 
Cir. 1997). 
Female assistant 
professor at public 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 




Evidence existed from which jury could conclude 
tenure denial was racially motivated; Noted 
inconsistencies and procedural errors in review of 
professor’s bid for tenure, which was “arbitrary 
and capricious” and “could not have been 
reached by reasonable evaluators.” 
Reversed district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for 
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Citation Basis of Suit Claims/Law Facts and Issues Pertinent to Disposition Disposition 
Stolberg v. Members 
of Board of Trustees 
for State Colleges of 
State of Connecticut, 
474 F.2d 485 (2nd 
Cir. 1973.  
Male assistant 
professor at public 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure and revocation 
of contract in 
retaliation for 
expression of speech. 
Retaliation/§ 1983; 
U.S. Const. Amend. I. 
College president acted inappropriately towards 
professor; Under existing regulations, teachers 
who satisfactorily completed three years in 
probationary status were entitled to tenure; 
Competence was never questioned; Institution’s 
actions contributed to award of attorney’s fees. 
(NOTE:  Professor was awarded tenure at the end 
of trial.  Though he prevailed, he appealed 
seeking additional remedies.) 
Affirmed district court’s award 
of compensatory damages and 
denial of damages for 
humiliation, distress, and injury 
to reputation; Affirmed denial of 
punitive damages; Reversed 
denial of attorney’s fees; 
Remanded for determination of 
reasonable attorney’s fees. 
United Carolina Bank 
v. Board of Regents of 
Stephen F. Austin 
State University, 665 
F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
Male professor at 
public institution 
alleged wrongful 






violations; Breach of 
Contract//§ 1983; U.S. 
Const. Amend. I and 
XIV; Texas Penal 
Code. 
Institution was aware that professor’s criticism 
was being voiced in a nonprivate manner; 
Institution failed to offer any evidence of falsity 
of professor’s criticisms. 
(NOTE:  District court awarded tenure, 
reinstatement, and relief, but professor died 
during proceedings mooting the tenure issue; 
Decedent’s estate became plaintiff of record.) 
Affirmed district court’s holding 
that professor’s termination 
violated First Amendment rights; 
Affirmed award of attorney’s 
fees against Board, president, 
and individual defendants; 
Reversed award of back pay 
against Board of Regents and 
president; Reversed claim under 
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U.S. 182 (1990). 
Female associate 
professor at private 
institution, following 
tenure denial, brought 
complaint before the 
EEOC that alleged 
unlawful 
discrimination based 
on race, sex, and 
national origin.  
EEOC then brought 
action seeking to 
enforce subpoena 
after institution 
refused to release 
confidential tenure 
review files of 




Professor’s charge stated sexual harassment and 
that her qualifications were “equal to or better 
than” those of five named male faculty members 
who received more favorable treatment; 
Professor was not given reasons and alleged a 
few reasons were pretext for discrimination; 
Disclosure of files was necessary. 
Affirmed judgment of Court of 
Appeals and refused to 







Overview of Selected Tenure Denial Litigation Cases Heard in States’ Highest Appellate Courts 
Citation Basis of Suit Claims/Law Facts and Issues Pertinent to Disposition Disposition 
Board of Trustees of 
University of 
Kentucky v. Hayse, 
782 S.W.2d 609 (Ky. 
1989). 
Male assistant 
professor at public 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure and promotion 
and wrongful 







U.S. Const. Amend. 
I, V, and XIV.  
University had the burden to persuade jury that 
professor’s termination was not based on 
impermissible factors. 
Vacated lower court’s judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in 
favor of institution; Reinstated 
jury’s judgment in favor of 
professor for damages; Vacated 
separate judgment that denied 
injunctive relief against 
institution; Remanded case to 
decide merits of controversy; 
Required institution to consider 
professor’s tenure under the 
rules and regulations at the time 
tenure was denied. 
Brown v. North 
Dakota State 
University, 372 
N.W.2d 879 (N.D. 
1985). 
Female college 
teacher at public 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure in violation of 
regulations 
promulgated by State 





Issues of fact existed regarding the exact nature 
of professor’s duties and responsibilities while 
employed at institution; Issues were crucial to 
contract interpretation. 
Reversed lower court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of 
institution and remanded for 
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Citation Basis of Suit Claims/Law Facts and Issues Pertinent to Disposition Disposition 
Craine v. Trinity 
College, 791 A.2d 518 
(Conn. 2002). 
Female professor at 
private institution 
alleged wrongful 
denial of tenure based 
on sex discrimination 
and violation of 
contract and tort 
principles.  
Discrimination; 








laws; State contract 
and tort law.  
Professor proved prima facie case of sex 
discrimination but failed to meet burden that 
tenure denial was motivated by discrimination; 
Institution failed to comply with faculty manual 
regarding tenure; Professor was given poor 
instructions as to requirements to achieve tenure. 
Reversed lower court’s denial of 
institution’s motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on 
the claim of sex discrimination; 
Affirmed denial of institution’s 
motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on 
professor’s claim for contract 
and tort issues; Remanded with 
direction to modify the judgment 
accordingly.  
Dixon v. Rutgers, The 
State University of 
New Jersey, 541 A.2d 
1046 (N.J. 1988).  
Female assistant 
professor at public 
institution alleged 
wrongful denial of 
tenure and promotion 
on the basis of sex.   
Disparate 
treatment/New 
Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination. 
Comparing confidential promotion packet of 
female professor who was denied tenure with 
packets of male faculty members who were 
granted tenure was deemed relevant to 
professor’s discrimination claim.  
Rejected institution’s request to 
create a qualified privilege to 
protect confidentiality of peer 
review materials, but provided 
protective orders to limit access 
to materials in order to 
accommodate competing 
interests. 
Kakaes v. George 
Washington 
University 683 A.2d 
128 (D.C. 1996). 
Male assistant 
professor at private 
institution alleged 
unlawful denial of 






Court considered whether institution had failed to 
provide timely notification to professor prior to 
any tenure decision, as required by Faculty Code; 
Letter professor received indicated final decision 
had not yet been reached. 
Reversed lower court’s grant of 
summary judgment for 
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Citation Basis of Suit Claims/Law Facts and Issues Pertinent to Disposition Disposition 
Sawyer v. Mercer, 594 
S.W.2d 696 (Tenn. 
1980). 
Male assistant 
professor at private 
institution alleged 
unlawful denial of 
tenure based on breach 
of contractual 
obligations. 
Breach of contract; 
State contract law. 
Institution (private college) was not bound by 
state statutes relating to tenure; Employment 
contract controlled relationship and was not 
ambiguous. 
Affirmed lower court’s decree 
and awarded professor tenure; 
Remanded for entry of decree. 
Shoucair v. Brown 
University, 917 A.2d 
418 (R.I. 2007). 
Male assistant 
professor at private 
institution alleged 
unlawful denial of 
tenure based on 
retaliation and 
discrimination on the 





Claim for retaliation was supported by evidence; 
Alternative reasons for tenure denial were 
refuted; Professor supported tenure qualification 
with recommendations from respected authorities 
in the field. 
Affirmed lower court’s judgment 
as to award of compensatory 
damages and back pay; Vacated 
award of punitive damages; 
Remanded to strike punitive 
damages; No reinstatement 
granted. 
Skudrzyk v. Reynolds, 
856 P.2d 462 (Alaska 
1993). 
Male professor at 
public institution 
alleged unlawful 
denial of tenure 
claiming substantial 





State’s appellate procedure rules required agency 
to clearly indicate that a decision was a final 
order and that a claimant had 30 days to appeal, 
to meet statutory deadlines; President’s letter 
denying tenure to professor did not indicate that it 
was a final decision or that it had to be timely 
filed within 30 days. 
Vacated lower court’s order 
ruling that professor’s suit was 
an administrative appeal and 
refusing to relax limitations 
period in statute; Remanded for 
further proceedings. 
State ex rel. 
Chapdelaine v. 
Torrence, 532 S.W.2d 
542 (Tenn. 1975). 
 
Male assistant 
professor at public 
institution alleged 
unlawful denial of 
tenure and wrongful 






contract law; State 
statute. 
 
Under statute, tenure was automatic upon 
completion of probationary period coupled with 
reemployment; President misunderstood and 
misapplied law; Court would not allow a 
“common law” of tenure when statutory law was 
clearly in place; Professor was terminated 
without conformity to tenure law. 
 
Affirmed lower court’s salary 
award; Remanded, peremptory 
writ of mandamus to issue to 
direct Board of Regents to pay 
salary award plus interest; 
Concurred with lower court’s 
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State ex rel. James v. 
Ohio State University, 
637 N.E. 2d 911 
(Ohio 1994). 
Male assistant 
professor at public 
institution, following 
denial of tenure, 
brought action in 
mandamus to compel 
university to provide 
access to promotion 





Institution’s statement in promotion and tenure 
guidelines explained that related materials were 
not exempted from the Ohio Public Records Act. 
Held promotion and tenure 
records maintained by state 
supported higher education 
institutions are subject to 
disclosure requirements of the 
Ohio Public Records Act. 
University of Alaska v. 
Geistauts, 666 P.2d 
424 (Alaska 1983). 
Male professor at 
public institution 
alleged unlawful 
denial of tenure based 
on Alaska Public 
Meetings Act. 





Failure to hold open meetings of the tenure 
committee was not harmless error; Plain meaning 
of statute disfavored institution’s position; 
Tenure decision was void. 
Affirmed lower court’s judgment 
as modified; Reinstated 
professor for term; Ordered that 
professor would have option of 
applying for tenure following 
reappointment term; Ordered 
that application for tenure by 
professor should be considered 
by the then-current tenure 
committee and not by the 
committee who served at time 
professor initially applied; 
Ordered that professor could 
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